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Motives, Default Risk and Valuation errors in Corporate Takeovers 
By Eleni Sophocleous 
 
Abstract 
Motivated by the plethora of theories in explaining the conflicting evidence on the acquiring 
firms’ profitability after a merger, this thesis examines how market conditions affect the most 
prominent takeover motives and the acquirers’ abnormal returns and analyse changes in 
acquiring firms’ default risk around the announcement on four different types of 
diversification. In the takeover process, information asymmetry holds a very central role, 
along with other firm and deal variables which release new information in the market and 
alter investors’ views.  Further, market conditions around the announcements significantly 
affect not only the takeover activity but also investors’ beliefs and optimism which will 
eventually drive the acquirers’ stock prices. 
We first investigate the main takeover motives by analysing the wealth creation of the 
acquiring, the target firm and their combined gains. Firms react to both internal and external 
conditions by restructuring their business and takeovers are the fastest strategy to do so. 
Consequently, we re-examine takeover motives by incorporating the potential influence of 
market conditions (i.e. market misvaluation and merger waves). The results indicate that 
value increasing acquisitions are driven by both synergy and hubris, while value decreasing 
acquisitions by managerialism, after controlling for the hostility of the deal and extreme 
market valuations. We then turn our attention to the diversification benefits of mergers; 
although recent evidence suggests that mergers increase default risk for the acquiring firms, 
we find that due to the less uncertainty around horizontal mergers, acquirers can actually 
enjoy the risk-reducing diversification benefits of this related type of merger. Finally, we 
investigate how firm, market and industry valuation errors affect acquires performance in the 
UK market, after we control for multiple deals, method of payment and target type.  Results 
suggest that although firm and deal characteristics help investors to revalue the potentials of 
an acquisition, investors are more likely to base their views on the state of the 
market/industry or the value of the firm and this will in turn drive the acquiring firms’ 
abnormal returns.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Research Motives and Contributions 
Mergers and Acquisitions are among the most popular restructuring strategies for corporate 
firms as numbers show that every year merger deals increase in number and in value. In 2012 
the aggregate deal value of global mergers has reached 2,243.8$ bn, which is on par with 
2011 deal value (2,243.9$ bn), despite the US and Europe financial crisis. The largest 
announcement of 2012 was Abbot Laboratories spin off of AbbVie, worth 54.4$ bn. 
Eurozone deals were 5.4% less than 2011’s, with a total deal value of 687$ bn and accounted 
for 13% of global mergers. The UK and Ireland accounted for the largest proportion of deals 
with a 21.7% market share. European mergers (outside the Eurozone) accounted for 17.8% of 
the global mergers and was the best performing year since 2008 in terms of total deal value 
which reached 566.5$ bn.  Asia-Pacific 368.1$ bn worth of deals contributed 16.4% of the 
global activity in 2012 while emerging markets contributed 22.8% to global mergers with a 
total deal value of 511.9$ bn.
1
    
 
                                                          
1
 Statistics were obtained from the most recent survey on transactions announced between 1 January 2012 and 
31 December 2012 of www.mergernarket.com 
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To put numbers in perspective, the ‘2012 Intelligence Heat Chart’ above by MergerMarket, 
shows the predicted flow of mergers based on the information relating to firms rumoured or 
officially up for sale in each region with the black colour being the most active region. The 
production path of a firm, expanding in a new industry and/or geographical area, the 
improvement of productivity, efficiency and competitive positioning, the value creation for 
shareholders and improvement of manager’s career are all possibilities than can be achieved   
with one single move, a merger with another firm; not surprising mergers have evolved into a 
global phenomenon which dominates the world economic scene.  
In general, mergers should be attractive to the shareholders of the firms involved if they 
increase the value of their shares. Value creation may result from a number of factors such as 
economies of scale in production, distribution and management, a technology that can be best 
deployed by the surviving company, the acquisition of new channels of distribution, and 
cross-selling of each other’s products. However, empirical evidence shows that merger 
synergies are difficult to attain and their size can be disappointing.
2
 Empirical evidence on 
announcement returns reveals that target and acquirer firms’ returns vary depending on the 
characteristics of the deal. Accordingly, although there is substantial evidence that target firm 
shareholders enjoy significantly positive announcement abnormal returns of about 30% 
irrespective of the takeover mode (i.e. friendly or hostile), acquirer firm shareholders 
generally gain either significant negative, zero or positive announcement- and post- 
acquisition returns.
3
 Consequently, the literature on mergers has concentrated into other 
influences that induce a firm to engage in a merger. 
Through mergers, firms expect to realize technological and marketing synergies by 
expanding in a new stage of production, a new industry and/or a new geographical area, to 
reduce costs, increase productivity and/or efficiency of corporate resources, and improve 
competitive positioning. Efficiency theory (Bradley et al., 1983), neoclassical theory (Gort, 
1969; Harforf, 2005), hubris theory (Roll, 1986), managerial theory (Jensen, 1986) and 
                                                          
2
 See for example Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005), Savor and Lu (2009) and Fu and Officer (2013). 
3
 For evidence on announcement and post-acquisition returns see Asquith (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), 
You, Caves, Smith and Henry (1986), Dennis and McConnel (1986), Jarell, Brickley and Netter (1988), 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), Lang, Stulz and Walking (1989), Jarell and Poulsen (1989), Franks, Harris and 
Titman (1991), Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelkar (1992), Bhagat and Hirshleifer (1996), Schwert (1996), Cotter, 
Shivdasani and Zenner (1997), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Ghosh and Lee (2000), 
Mulherin and Boone (2000), Akhigbe, Borde and Whyte (2000), Bruner (2002), Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller 
(2002), Billet, King and Mauer (2004), Fee and Thomas (2004), Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005), Savor 
and Lu (2009) and Fu and Officer (2013) 
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misvaluation theory (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003) are a few schools of thought that have 
extrapolate upon traditional theories seeking to explain merger activity.  
One of the most distinct patterns in mergers is the cyclical pattern of the deal activity. In the 
history of mergers, US has led the way for the merger activity for well over 100 years, and 
more than 5 major merger waves have been recorded since the early 1900s. Although some 
characteristics seem to be consistent across the history of mergers, each wave has been 
distinctly different from the others in many ways. Merger waves are in general the result of a 
combination of market and legal factors that intrigue firms to engage into mergers.  
The literature of finance has repeatedly discussed the correlation between merger activity and 
various market conditions. Assuming the firms react to both internal and external conditions, 
changes in the market can have an impact on the firm in such way that the firm is appealed to 
persuade a merger. In general the level of stock markets appears to be a very important factor 
in the takeover process. A booming market is often an indicator of the overall economy’s 
state and a signal of firms’ future profit potentials. The history of mergers shows that periods 
of intense takeover activity coincide with periods of high market valuation. The market 
momentum allows firms to raise finance easily through the issue of new equity, and offer 
these shares as the medium of exchange in mergers and consequently, the merger activity 
increases.  
There are also considerable differences between levels of merger activity during industry 
specific shocks. Market and regulatory conditions facilitate industrial shocks at which firms 
are required to make major changes and restructure their activities. Mergers and acquisitions 
are one of the easiest and fastest corporate restructuring strategies. Mitchell and Mulherin 
(1996) shows that mergers waves tend to be caused by a combination of market, regulatory 
and technological shock which motivates firm to expand by taking over another firm, instead 
of growing internally. Harford (2005) shows that industry shock alone are not enough to 
trigger a merger wave and that industry shocks are not a necessary condition but an excuse 
for firms to mimic their counterparts and restructure.  
It is widely acknowledged in the literature that the firm’s true value and future growth 
potential significant affects takeover process and profitability. Several studies have shown 
that high growth firms outperform undervalued firms in the post acquisitions period (Rau and 
Vermaelen, 1998; and Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). However, low growth firm seem to 
11 
 
increase shareholders wealth around the announcement, perhaps because the market 
recognizes the acquiring firm’s potential for subsequent wealth creation. 
The first empirical study of this thesis, ‘Chapter 2: The Impact of Market Conditions on the 
Motives for Mergers and Acquisitions’ considers the relation between acquirer, target and 
total gains (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993, henceforth  BN method) to distinguish among 
the three prominent merger motives in the US takeover market. Given the central role of 
market conditions in the takeover activity, we also investigate whether motives change in the 
present of market misvaluation or during different merger waves. Furthermore, we extent BN 
method to control for several variables which have been identified in the literature to 
significantly affect takeover process. Our results show that despite the hostile nature of tender 
offers, both tender and non-tender offers are driven by synergy. We argue that since the 
introduction of the Best Price Rule in the late 1980s the nature of tender offers is as friendly 
as mergers and therefore there are no differences between the two mode of mergers. We also 
find that value-increasing acquisitions are driven by both synergy and hubris, whereas value-
decreasing by managerialism. According to investor sentiment hypothesis, during high (low) 
valuation periods markets optimism (pessimist) intensifies investors’ positive (negative) 
expectations. Therefore an acquirer is more likely to be overconfident during periods of high 
market valuation than in neutral periods and this can explain the co-existence of synergy and 
hubris during high valuation periods and pure synergy in neutral valuation periods.  
In the second empirical chapter, ‘Chapter 3: Diversified Mergers and Default Risk’ we 
examine whether mergers realize the benefits of different types of diversification in terms of 
default risk. The literature on mergers is not conclusive about the direction of acquiring 
firms’ default risk after a merger. Although, one might expect that diversification would lead 
to lower levels of risk, recent empirical evidence (Furfine and Ronen, 2011) shows that 
mergers increase risk.
4
 We analyse changes in default risk between the period before the 
announcement and after the completion, on four types of diversification; vertical, horizontal, 
mixed vertical/horizontal and conglomerate. Default risk is estimated using a dynamic logit 
model of accounting and market data, while the level of vertical integration is calculated 
using industry commodity flow information from the Use table of Benchmark input-output 
tables as in Fan and Goyal (2006). Our results show that the increase in default risk is mainly 
driven by public firms and firms with higher idiosyncratic risk and that horizontal mergers 
                                                          
4
 Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) provide evidence on managers’ risk choices from bank acquisitions.  
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once combined with other deal/firm characteristics can decrease default risk in the post 
acquisitions period. We conclude that information asymmetry regarding the nature of each 
diversification type may impact acquiring firms’ default risk. Our results remain robust to 
various factors related to takeover process and performance.   
Finally, recognizing that UK takeover market represents the more active part of Eurozone, 
the last empirical chapter of the thesis ‘Chapter 4: The source of misvaluation and UK 
takeover profitability’ investigated the source of misvaluation and the profitability of the UK 
acquirers. We examine how firm, market and industry valuation affect the acquiring firms 
performance around the announcement and in the long-run period, after we control for 
various factors which have been found to affect takeover performance. Our results show that 
valuation errors stemming from the firm, the market and or the industry are equally important 
in driving the acquiring firm’s performance. We suggest that although deal and firm 
characteristics help investors to revalue the potentials of the acquisition, investor sentiment 
significantly affects investors in the presence of misvaluation and in turn drive the stock 
prices.   
Our research contributes to corporate takeover literature and further enables our 
understanding regarding the true motives of acquisitions during merger waves, booming or 
depressed periods, the impact of different type of merger diversification on acquirer’s default 
risk after the merger completion, and finally the equal important role of firm, market and 
industry valuations, as well as the deal and firm characteristics in shaping investors’ opinion 
about the profitability of the merger.  
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Chapter 2: The Impact of Market Conditions on the Motives for 
Mergers and Acquisitions 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Intrigued by the worldwide increase in deal announcements during the last two decades, an 
increasing body of literature has concentrated in exploring takeover motives, process and the 
controversies surrounding takeover outcomes. Although traditional theories view takeovers as 
corporate restructuring activities which create value by improving efficiency and 
productivity, empirical evidence shows that the majority of takeovers fail to reach 
shareholders’ expectations. Evidence on bidding firms wealth loss (see for example, Dodd, 
1980; Bradley, Desai and Kim 1988; Franks et al., 1991; Andrade et al., 2001) highlight the 
need to further investigate the takeover motives. Among these research efforts, alternative 
building blocks of theories have created suggesting that acquiring firms are motivated by 
reasons other than value creation. Counter-arguments suggest that takeovers destroy value 
because are driven by managerial objectives. Among others, hubris and managerialism 
theories have been advanced in the literature. According to Roll (1986) managers are infected 
by hubris and thus overestimate their own abilities, mis-valued both the target firm and the 
prospects of the acquisitions and end up overpaying the target firm. Within similar lines, 
managerialism hypothesis suggest that managers who pursue their own personal objectives 
instead of aiming to maximize shareholders’ wealth tend to overpay the target firm. For 
example, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) explain that managers will engage in acquisitions within 
the same line business or to secure their job position.   
Nevertheless, despite that the most obvious motive for a merger is to improve a firm’s 
financial performance, some acquisitions are contacted for reasons others than the best 
interest of shareholders. Such acquisitions are usually focused on the self-interest of 
managers. Understanding the key motives of a takeover makes it easier to evaluate the likely 
success or failure of the deal. The focus of this study is to investigate the primary motives for 
a sample of US Mergers and Acquisitions from 1980 to 2010  and distinguish between the 
three most important motives; synergy, managerialism and hubris.  
One of the most distinct patters in mergers is the cyclical pattern of the deal activity. Thus 
far, six merger waves have been examined in the literature: 1900s, the 1920s, the 1960s, the 
14 
 
1980s, the 1990s and the 2000s.
5
 The rise and fall of each wave can be traced on various 
reasons, such as technological shocks, agency problems, managerial hubris and market 
timing. For example the fourth merger wave, 1980s which marks the beginning of our sample 
period, emerged when the previous wave with the inefficient conglomerate acquisitions came 
to an end.  
Behavioral theories suggest that merger waves are more likely to occur during periods of high 
market valuations. In addition, during high valuation periods certain deal characteristics have 
been found to be used more frequently.  For example Shleifer and Vishny (2003) show that 
during the bull market of the 1990s, the main method of payment is equity, since overvalued 
acquirers take advantage of the so-called mispricing premium of their firms and the less 
overvalued targets. Recent literature provides supporting evidence on the link between 
takeover activity and market conditions, and finds that a number of deals result in value 
destruction projects (Moeller et al., 2005). Such deals suffered from agency problems and are 
more likely to be driven by managerialism rather than synergy. Jensen (2004) discusses the 
agency costs of overvalued firms that are likely to change the incentives of the managers and 
as he explains when a firm is overvalued ‘it is not whether you are going to lose the game, 
but when you are going to lose it, and the costs are enormous’. When markets are flourishing, 
and a firm’s stock is overvalued, the managers will have access to low cost-of-capital funds 
from their overvalued equity but also from the debt markets. Managers who hold equity-
based compensation (such as options) have the incentive to invest using the firm’s equity 
because they will increase their own wealth. Acquisitions with firms whose stock is less 
overvalued are an ideal investment opportunity. These managers are more likely to be driven 
by managerialism or hubris; eventually they will have to justify firm’s overvaluation with 
high firm performance that will not be able to deliver.    
Takeover motives are difficult to observe mainly due to existence of different managerial 
motives in any sample and also due to the noise created by that other factors affecting 
takeover process. In this chapter, we consider the relation between wealth gains for target and 
the acquirer, as well as the ones between the target and the total gains to distinguish among 
the three prominent merger and acquisition motive that dominate US takeover market during 
the period of 1980 to 2010. We investigate whether our results change across various market 
conditions such as merger waves, and market valuation periods (high, neutral and low). Such 
                                                          
5
 Alexanridis et al., (2012) 
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an investigation is essential since market conditions and different market periods influence 
investment decisions in different fashions [Shleifer and Vishny (2003); (Polk and Sapienza, 
2004)].  
Further, we extent Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) methodology on takeover motives, 
henceforth BN method, from a simple regression analysis to a more dynamic form by 
controlling for other variables that might affect takeover process and see how these variables 
alter the relation between target, acquirer and total wealth gains. Schwert (1996) uses 
regression analysis to study the effects of pre-announcement stock price run-ups on the 
premiums in a merger sample. Although single regression analysis is inconclusive, multiple 
regression analysis combines the effects of different characteristics (i.e. pill, auction, success, 
news, tender offer, management buyout (MBO), cash, and equity). Gaspar, Massa and Matos 
(2005) investigate the relation between investor turnover and investment horizon and use 
multiple regression analysis to control for various characteristics that might be related with 
investor turnover except investment horizon.  
Previous studies on takeover motives have concentrated on the hostile nature of acquisitions. 
For example Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) investigate a sample of tender offers from 
1963 to 1988 and find that overall synergy is the primary motive. Our analysis includes both 
forms of takeover, tender and non-tender offers announced between 1980 and 2010. Tender 
offer is a form of a hostile takeover. If a takeover is hostile that means that the manager of the 
target firm was not in favour of such takeover and usually in such an acquisition, the target’s 
managerial team is replaced. The acquirer makes public his intentions to buy the target firm’s 
shares at a specific price and period and usually includes a premium over the current market 
price to encourage the target firm to complete the deal as soon as possible. In such type of 
merger where the acquirer contacts the target firm’s shareholders directly, the transaction is 
usually much faster than a merger, there are less regulatory delays, the information 
asymmetry between the two parties minimizes and the acquirer does not face any 
competition. Acquirers’ main motives for a tender offer are to increase profitability, to enter a 
new market, a new industry, a new distribution channel or a customer group, and to achieve 
technological advances. Evidence on acquiring firms abnormal returns indicate that acquirers 
that make tender offers outperform all other acquisitions (Agrawal et al., 1992 and Loughran 
and Vijh, 1997). Given the synergetic differences on the hostile nature of acquisitions we 
investigate whether the motives differ in each group.  
16 
 
Overall, our results show that both tender and non-tender offers are driven by synergy, value-
increasing acquisitions are driven by both synergy and hubris, whereas value-decreasing by 
managerialism.
6
 The latter finding remains robust across high and low valuation periods, 
where during low valuation periods the primary motive is synergy for value-increasing 
acquisitions and managerialism for value-decreasing acquisition. Our results suggest that i. 
the hostile nature of the deal will not affect the primary merger motives and ii. the state of the 
market is an important driver of the takeover motives. Historically, a tender offer was viewed 
as a hostile takeover. However the introduction of the Best Price Rule (14d-10) in the late 
1980s by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) brought the end of hostile 
takeovers since the acquirer has to offer the same price to both blockholders and other 
investors. The adoption of state antitakeover laws in the late 1980s and revisions to the Best 
Price Rule in 2006 made tender offers as friendly as mergers (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 
2003; and Offenberg and Pirinsky; 2012). Thus not surprising we find that the hostility nature 
of the deal will not affect the takeover motive. Bouwman et al (2009) show that market 
conditions affect corporate decisions and the acquisition performance. Further, according to 
investor sentiment hypothesis, during extreme valuation periods, markets optimism can 
intensify investors’ positive expectations and vice versa. Thus a manager would be more 
optimistic in high valuation periods and therefore more likely to be infected by hubris or 
overconfidence than in a neutral valuation period. This explains why we find that value 
increasing acquisitions during neutral valuation periods are driven solely by synergy whereas 
these acquisitions are driven by both synergy and hubris during extreme valuation periods.   
In addition, we identify significant differences during merger wave periods. We find that in 
general that value increasing acquisitions are driven by synergy and value decreasing 
acquisitions by hubris in the first two wave periods of our sample whereas during the last 
wave period that value increasing acquisitions are driven by hubris and value decreasing 
acquisitions by managerialism. The differences in motives within the merger waves might be 
relevant with the differences that have been documented as to the characteristics of each 
merger wave. For example, the 1980’s wave is very large in terms of activity and the size of 
the target firms. Most of the acquisitions during this period were hostile, the medium of 
payment was cash (through leveraged takeovers) rather than stock and they were 
characterized by heavy use of leverage. The next wave period in the 1990’s, was 
                                                          
6 Our main results are in line with previous studies; Berkovitch and Narayanan, (1993), Seth, Song and Pettit, 
(2000) and Hodgkinson and Partington, (2008). 
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characterised by technological advances involves larger cross-border mergers, and high stock 
valuations that initiate the use of stock as a method of payment. The 2000s wave is 
characterized by large private equity players, high market valuations, large premiums, low 
interest rates and a financial crisis that started from the loan market and spread to the house 
market.  
2.1.1 Motives for Takeovers  
As the competition in the capital markets intensifies, firms have focused on increasing their 
market shares by engage into value enhancing projects to improve their efficiency and 
productivity. Mergers and Acquisitions are a popular corporate restructuring activity since 
they enable resources to move quickly and create benefits for the acquirer and the target firm. 
Traditional theories describe acquisitions as value-enhancing activities suggesting that are 
merely executed for synergistic reasons. However, counter-arguments suggest that 
acquisitions are motivated by reasons others than maximising shareholders’ wealth. 
Empirical studies show that, overall, takeovers generate significant wealth for the combined 
entity. However, gains are not distributed evenly across the two firm that are involved in the 
transaction, but instead target shareholders enjoy large wealth gains, whereas shareholders of 
bidding firms suffer from wealth destruction (see for example, Dodd, 1980; Bradley, Desai 
and Kim, 1988; Franks et al., 1991; Andrade et al., 2001). 
Several schools of thoughts have been developed in an attempt to rationalize the takeover 
controversy of motives and outcomes. The efficiency theory views takeovers as activities 
which generate cost-reducing synergies, and therefore improves the combined firm’s 
operations 9Bradley et al., 1983 and 1988). The neoclassical theory suggest economical, 
technological and regulatory changes lead to industry re-organizations and asset re-allocation 
that firms utilize through mergers and acquisitions (Gort, 1969; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996 
and Harford, 2005). Synergistic acquisitions should generate value for the combined entity.  
The target firm usually receives an acquisition premium and the bidder firm realizes 
shareholders wealth by capturing synergies above the cost of the acquisition. Additionally, 
target gains should increase with any increase of total gains depending on the level of target 
firm bargaining power. For example, the more the competition among bidders, the higher the 
target gains would be. Managerialism and Hubris theory focus on a firm-specific level that 
was left un-explored by the traditional theories. By relaxing the assumption of rational 
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managers, both theories suggest that managerial motivations, rather than maximising 
shareholders’ wealth, are the driving forces of takeover activity and this explains the bidding 
firm wealth destruction. (Roll, 1986; Morck et al., 1990; Jensen, 2005; and Song, 2007). 
Hubris hypothesis by Roll (1986) provides an alternative explanation for the takeover 
activity, where managers are infected by hubris and excessive self-confidence. To explain the 
value destroying takeovers, Roll explains that target selection is based not on pure economic 
gains as neoclassical or efficiency theory suggest, but instead on managers personal factors. 
Managers infected by hubris, overestimate their abilities to value and restructure a firm and 
end up overpaying over-valued (or not) target firms.  Hayward and Hambrick (1977) find that 
overconfident managers pay substantially higher premiums than rational managers. A more 
recent study by Malmendier and Tate (2005) use unexercised options that managers hold to 
measure confidence level, and find that overconfidence managers engage into more and less 
successful acquisitions. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) show that managers of 
larger firms pay higher premiums probably because they feel more capable to make a 
successful acquisition.  
Within similar lines, managerialism hypothesis suggest takeovers are driven by managerial 
motives but according to this theory managers consciously pursue their own personal 
objectives at the cost of their shareholders (Seyhun, 1990). Shleifer and Vishny (1990) 
explain that managers will engage in acquisitions within the same line business to en-power 
their position in the firm or to secure their job position if they feel threaten or to extract 
higher salary/bonus.  Amihud and Lev (1981) find that conglomerate acquisitions merely 
result from agency problems, since risk diversification does not benefit shareholders.  Jensen 
(1986) suggests that sometimes if a firm’s cash reservals are enough, managers would avoid 
pay out dividends to re-invest resources to projects such as acquisitions that can increase their 
private benefits.  A recent study by PWC (2012) explains that the top challenges to realizing 
synergies are i. delays in implementing planned actions, ii. Integration costs/complexities 
were underestimated, iii. Potential synergies and cost savings were overestimated and iv. lack 
of accountability for particular actions. Some synergistic acquisitions mean headcount 
reduction, overhead reduction and increasing purchase power by entering into a new market, 
a new customer base or a new business line. Managers who feel that they will be replaced 
would search for other investment opportunities to pursue their own personal benefits.  
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2.1.2 BN (1993) Methodology  
To distinguish between the three main motives for mergers and acquisitions we follow a 
methodology initiated by Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) and later altered by Seth, Song 
and Pettit (2000). The first indication of the motive of the merger is the gains of i. the bidder 
firm, ii. the target firm and iii. the total gains.  The second indication is i. the correlation 
between target gains and total gains and ii. target gains and acquirer gains. Table 2.1 
summarizes this approach’s basic predictions.  
[Table 2.1] 
Accordingly, target firms enjoy positive abnormal returns irrespective of the takeover motive, 
whereas bidder and total gains fluctuate from zero to positive or take negative value 
depending on the motivation. In a synergistic acquisition the combined value should be 
greater than the sum of bidder and target value. We expect total gains to be positive and 
bidder gains to be positive or zero depending on the competition level between bidders. In the 
event of a bidding contest, target firm’s gains will increase with the level of bargaining power 
and will be extracted from total gains, thus we expect the correlation between the two to be 
positive. Correlation between target and acquirer gain can be either zero in the extreme 
scenario of high competition where acquirer gains would be zero or positive if the level of 
competition is lower, and acquirers realize positive gains. 
In acquisitions driven by hubris, managers overpay target in value-decreasing projects. Since 
these acquisitions do not create any value, target gains are merely a transfer from bidder gains 
thus target and acquirer gains will be negatively correlated and target and total gains would 
be totally un-correlated. Bidder should experience negative gains, and total gains should be 
zero. In the event of bidder competition, these predictions should become stronger, with 
bidder gains becoming more negative target gains more positive and total gains to remain 
zero.  
Acquisitions driven by managerialism would be overall value decreasing since are executed 
for reasons other than shareholder’s wealth maximisation. Bidders would experience negative 
wealth gains but target would still enjoy positive returns. The greater the bargaining power of 
the target firm, the higher the target gains would be and the lower bidder and total gains are. 
Therefore, target gains would be negatively correlated with both total gains and acquirer 
gains.  
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All three motivations might be present in the entire sample and we might not be able to 
conclude which is the primary motive. Since each hypothesis has opposite effects, it is 
possible that they cancel each other out. To address this problem, total gains are divided into 
two sub-groups; positive total gains and negative total gains. The positive total gains group 
will contain value-increasing acquisitions and therefore managerialism hypothesis can be 
ruled out from this group of acquisitions. We expect that these acquisitions would be mainly 
driven by synergy. However in the positive total gain group, hubris  might be present but in a 
weaker form. If both of these motivations are presented in the sample then target gains would 
be positive, bidder gains can be from negative to positive and  total gains would be zero to 
positive depending which is the strongest motive. To clarify this, the correlation between 
target and acquiring firms gains is examined, within both acquisitions with positive and 
negative acquirer’s gains. If synergy is the primary motive then target and acquirer 
correlation would be positive and there would be no difference in the correlation between the 
two within positive and negative acquirer gains’ groups. If synergy and hubris co-exist, then 
target to acquirer correlation would be positive in the positive acquirer gains’ group and 
negative in the negative acquirer gains’ group.  
The negative total gains group of acquisitions would contain value-decreasing deals thus 
synergy can be eliminated since is predicts positive total gains and we have to distinguish 
between hubris and managerialism. Target and acquirer gains correlation for these two 
hypotheses predict a negative relationship and thus we use target and total gain correlation 
which predicts no relationship in the event of hubris and negative relationship in the event of 
managerialism.  
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Relation between Target and Total Gain under BN (1993): 
1Target Gain = (Total Gain)   (2.1) 
 
Relation between Target and Acquirer Gain under BN (1993) and Seth et al. (2000): 
1Target Gain = (Αcquirer Gain)   (2.2) 
1 2Target Gain = (Αcquirer Gain)+ (Αcquirer Gain Dummy )     (2.3) 
where Dummy = 0 if acquirer gain is positive 
                         = 1 if acquirer gain is negative 
 
2.1.2.1 Additional Proxies  
Total gains are a well-accepted proxy for synergy. However, the differences between hubris 
and managerialism are sometimes difficult to pin point and therefore for robustness purposes 
we use additional proxies to distinguish between the latter two motives. We adopt Net buyer 
measure of Malmendier and Tate (2005) to capture hubris and G-Index to capture 
managerialism. 
Under hubris hypothesis of Roll (1986), managers overestimate their own abilities (i.e. they 
are overconfident) and incorrectly assess the value of the target firms. According to 
Malmendier and Tate (2005), overconfident managers are the ones who fail to reduce their 
personal portfolio exposure to firm-specific risk as captured by the portion of their equity-
based compensation or their stock holdings and their human capital investment in the firm. 
Net Buyer measure of overconfidence or hubris, takes the value of 1 if the manager of the 
acquiring firm does not reduce his stock holdings across a period of at least 6 years and zero 
otherwise. Malmendier and Tate (2005) and Heaton (2002) find evidence that overconfident 
managers overestimate the returns of the merger and overpay the target firms. Kaplan and 
Robinson (2003) show that bidders offer higher premiums when they are overconfidence but 
not in the presence of agency (managerialism) problems. Andreou et al., (2011) also uses Net 
buyer measure and investigates the role of managerial overconfidence in corporate 
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diversification and show that overconfident managers are more likely to manage diversified 
firms.  
Under the managerialism hypothesis or private benefits hypothesis, mergers are driven by the 
manager’s personal interests. These managers choose projects that will maximize their 
welfare at the expense of acquirer shareholders (Mitchell and Lehn, 1990; Berkovitch and 
Narayanan, 1993). These managers are more likely to invest on low-benefit or value-
destroying mergers as long as they increase their personal interests (Servaes, 1991; Land, 
Stulz and Walking, 1989, 1991). The Government index or G-Index or GIM, is an index for 
US public firms related to shareholder rights and managerial entrenchment (Gompers, Ishii 
and Metrick, 2003). It shows ‘the balance of power between shareholders and mangers’ and 
therefore can be used to capture agency or managerialism problems. G-Index can take values 
from 1 to 19 and firms are categorised into 10 groups; Firm with a G-index ≥ 14 
(Dictatorship Portfolio) have the ‘weakest shareholder rights’ or the ‘highest management 
power’, while firms with a G-index ≤ 5 have the ‘strongest shareholder rights’ or the ‘lowest 
management power’ (Democracy Portfolio).  
2.1.3 Extended BN (1993) Methodology 
We extent Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) method by controlling for other variables that 
might affect the takeover process and see how they affect the correlation between target, 
acquirer and total wealth gains. It is highly possible that different variables might be 
correlated with the motives behind a takeover, other than market-related such as valuation 
and wave periods. Multivariate analysis helps us investigate the correlation between gains 
and one independent variable set. We identify deal-related factors that have been documented 
in the literature of mergers and acquisitions to affect acquisition process and investigate how 
these variables change the correlation analysis across out three main sub-samples; the entire 
sample, the tender offers sample and the non-tender acquisitions. Following Schwert (2000), 
and Officer (2003) we include certain deal characteristics in an attempt to disentangle the 
separate effects of these variables on takeover motives.  
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Relation between Target and Total Gain – Extended BN Approach 
9 9
0 i
k=1 1
Target Gain = (Total Gain) + (Total Gain) + k ki k ki
k
a D D   

    (2.4) 
 
Relation between Target and Acquirer Gain – Extended BN Approach 
9 9
0 i
k=1 1
Target Gain = (Total Gain) + (Acquirer Gain) + k ki k ki
k
a D D   

    (2.5) 
 
The intercept   and the slope    change as the characteristics of the deal change; the dummy 
variables     equal one if the k
th 
characteristic applies to case i and zero otherwise. For each 
portfolio we run two different regressions where the depended variable, Y is always Target 
Gain and independent variable, X is Total Gain in the first regression and Acquirer Gain in 
the second.   
[Table 2.2] 
Table 2.2 shows the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables we use in the 
regressions analysis. Completion is a dummy variable indicating whether the acquisition has 
completed or not. Competing bids shows if multiple acquiring firms were interested for the 
target firm in the following six months, Hostility is a dummy variable that shows is the 
attitude of acquisition was unsolicited (0) or hostile (1), Toehold is a dummy variable that 
equals one if during the announcement, the acquirer owns more than 5% of the target or zero 
otherwise and Cash (stock) is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer firm offers 
100% cash (stock) to the target firm.  
Withdrawn mergers have been used as a signal about CEO quality (Jacobsen et al., 2013). 
Accordingly, when the manager withdraw its offer rather than raise the offer price, may 
perceived positively by the shareholders and the quality of the manager. Such managers are 
more likely to be motivated by synergy rather than managerialism or hubris. Competing bids, 
or an acquisition battle is when multiple acquirers bid for the same target. Evidence show that 
the winner of the contest is worse off after the merger completion (Pepall and Richards; 
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2000). We therefore expect that the acquirers of such acquisitions will not be motivated by 
synergy. In a toehold the acquirer usually buys less than 5% of the target firm’s equity. The 
market usually perceives a toehold as a precursor to a hostile takeover. Cash and Stock 
variables count for the method of payment used in the transaction. As explained above, stock 
offerings are more likely to happen if the stock is overvalued (Shleifer and Vishny; 2003) and 
it is more likely that managers will be infected by hubris or managerialism rather than 
motivated by synergy.    
2.1.4 The Importance of Misvaluation and Wave Period 
This study contributes to corporate acquisition literature and further enables our 
understanding of the important role of market conditions on takeover motives and the wealth 
effects of takeovers. Empirical research has concentrated on the relation of misvaluation and 
wave periods and various characteristics of takeover process. Acquirer and acquiring firms’ 
decisions are naturally associated with factors affecting firms’ valuation and market 
conditions around the announcement period. For example, according to Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) mis-valuation can serve as an important driving force for a takeover decision and 
suggest that stock acquisitions are usually driven by overvaluation. The idea is that rational 
managers can correctly value their firms but markets cannot, either due to information 
asymmetries or market inefficiencies. Manages can take advantage of mis-valuation by 
offering their overvalued stock as the primary mean of payment in a less overvalued target 
firm or targeting undervalued firms. However, stock payments are considered negative 
information signal and at the merger announcement the market will correct its mistake 
through stock price, generating loses for the bidder.  
Bouwman et al., (2009) show that market conditions affect corporate decisions and 
acquisition performance. There are also a plethora of empirical evidence showing that market 
valuation affects the characteristics and the outcome of the merger. Rhodes-Kropf and 
Viswanathan (2004) theoretically modelled Shleifer and Vishny (2003) idea and show the 
significance of mis-valuation in the takeover process. Dong, Hirshleifer, Richardson and 
Teoh (2006) provide evidence that market mis-valuation affects takeover process. The 
authors find that bidder and target mis-valuation will affect takeover volume, and 
characteristics like the method of payment, the premium, the type of acquisition (i.e.hostile), 
the successful probability and the wealth gains. Ang and Cheng (2006) finds evidence of 
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overvaluation in stock payments but this should not be the rule. Rhodes-Kropf (2005) 
recognizes the importance of mis-valuation for takeover activity but suggest that a 
combination of factors drive this activity.  
Motivated by the under-researched misvaluation assumptions and the potential effects on 
takeover motives, this study builds on BN method and examines the potential influence of 
misvaluation. According to investor sentiment hypothesis, during extreme valuation periods, 
market optimism can intensify investors’ positive expectations and vice versa. Thus a 
manager would be more optimism in a high valuation period rather than a neutral valuation 
period. The state of the market would also affect the target firm views about the prospect of a 
merger. The differences in valuations will affect the views of acquiring firms’ managers and 
this in turn should be reflected in the primary takeover motives. 
One of the most distinct patters in mergers is the cyclical patter of the deal activity. In our 
analysis we search for differences in takeover motives during different periods based on the 
three waves that are presented in our merger sample. The first wave period of our sample is 
the 1980’s divestiture wave. A lot of firms during this period were considered to be 
undervalued and thus were mainly financed with cash. We expect that during this wave the 
majority of acquisitions will be driven by synergy or hubris. Technological advances is the 
most significant feature of the next merger wave in 1990’s. During this period, the 
acquisitions were quite large in size and the high market valuations motivated firms to use 
their overvalued stock to make acquisitions. Overvaluation tends to pressure firms to get rid 
of their over-valued stock and thus we expect to see fewer synergistic acquisitions and more 
value-destroying deals. The third wave period that we investigate in the merger wave started 
in 2000’s and peaks around 2005. Around this period, markets become globalized, market 
valuations are considered to be high, and the average premiums paid to the target firms are 
also large. 2007 is the year that the loan, bank and house market crisis hits the US market, 
and spreads across all Europe who responded with a reduction of interest rates, tight credit 
criteria and with financial austerity in all aspects of the economy. This would be the start of 
the depressing period for the last wave. We expect different wave periods to be associated 
with different merger motives due to the different characteristics of each wave. 
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2.2 Data Description 
 
2.2.1 Sample Description 
The US Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) sample is from Thompson One Banker database. 
A list of mergers, acquisitions and tender offers is selected announced between 1980 and 
2010. The deals involve public US bidders and domestic or foreign public targets.
7
 Neither 
the bidder nor the target is a government, healthcare, a utility, a bank, a real estate or a 
financial institution. Restrictions on deal value (deal value is the total value minus fees and 
expenses, paid by the bidder) and relative size (ratio of deal value to the bidder market value) 
do not influence our finding and thus are not applied.
8
 Finally, we require information about 
all explanatory variables we use in our regression analysis to be available.  This further 
reduces our sample. Our final sample size comprise of 3533 bid announcements. 
To calculate bidder, target and total gains us follow Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) and 
Bekovitch and Narayanan (1993) methodology. First, we calculate the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) for a five-day window (-2, +2) around the announcement date for all firms. To 
estimate abnormal returns we use the market model with a minimum estimation length of 90 
days and a maximum of 255 days. Then, target gain is computed by multiplying the target’s 
CAR by the market value 11 days prior to the announcement, minus the value of the target 
shares held by the bidder. Bidder gain is calculated by multiplying bidder’s CAR by the 
market value of the acquiring firm 11 days prior to the announcement. Total gain is the sum 
value of target and bidder gain. To examine the robustness of our findings we use different 
announcement windows (i.e. -1, +1) and perform our analysis using equally returns. Our 
results remain robust.
9
  
2.2.2 Valuation and Wave Classification 
We use Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) P/E method to classify our sample into different 
valuation periods (i.e. high, neutral, low). This classification method requires correcting the 
monthly market P/E ratio of S&P 500 by removing the upward trend. We obtain the P/E data 
                                                          
7
 We also request that the bidder owns less than 10% prior to the deal and obtains more than 50% after the deal 
and find that our results remain robust (Fuller et al., 2002). 
8
 To ensure that the findings are not sensitive to the relative size or the value of the deal, we perform the analysis 
excluding from the sample the 5% smaller relative size deals and deals that have deal value less than 5, 10 and 
50 million dollars.  
9
 Our results remain robust when using equally returns or market adjusted returns.  
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from Bob Shiller website
10
 and detrend the P/E ratio ‘by removing the best straight-line fit 
from the P/E of the month in question and the previous 60 months’ as Bouwman, Fuller and 
Nain (2009). A high-valuation month is the one that i) its detrended P/E ratio is above its 60-
month average and also ii) it belongs in the top-half of all the above-average months of our 
sample. A low-valuation month is the one that i) its detrended P/E ratio is below its 60-month 
average and ii) it falls into the bottom half of the below-average months of our sample. The 
rest months are classified as neutral-valuation months. Bouwman, Fuller and Nain (2009) 
shows that alternative classifications of valuation periods
11
 do not alter the pattern of the 
results. Using P/E classification method, 816 announcements (23% of the overall sample) fall 
into high-valuation period, 951 (27%) into low-valuation period and 1766 (50%) in neutral-
valuation period.  
[Table 2.3] 
Table 2.3 presents the descriptive statistics for target, bidder and total gains, and CARS to 
target and bidder for a five-day window (-2, +2) around the announcement date for the entire 
sample and all sub-samples that we anticipate to find differences in the driving motivations.  
Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for total gains, and CARs to target and bidder firms 
for the event period (-2,+2). Panel B and C shows the descriptive statistics of the tender 
offers and non-tender offers respectively. In each panel, we present total number of 
acquisitions (N), the ratio of acquisitions with positive to negative total gains, the mean, 
median, min and max values. For the entire sample, mean target gains are significantly 
positive ($83.44mil.) irrespective of the valuation or the wave period. This pattern remains in 
both tender and non-tender offers. There seem to be a substantial increase of the mean target 
gains in announcements during low-valuation periods, (i.e. $122.23mil. for the entire sample, 
$146.43mil. for tender offers, and $115.41mil. for non-tender offers) and also, during the 
latest wave period ($128.84mil. for the entire sample, $150.59mil. for tender offers, and 
$122.72mil. for non-tender offers). The average target CAR is 24.12% and remains positive 
in all portfolios. We observe a significance increase in the average target CAR during Tender 
offers and especially in the latest merger wave that the CAR almost doubles. Mean bidder 
gain is negative, -$93.39million and remains negative within all valuation and wave periods. 
However, it becomes more negative during high and low valuation periods for both tender 
                                                          
10
 www.irrational exuberance.com 
11
 Market valuation methods: S&P Index Level, Quarterly P/E ratio, Equal P/E ratio, Standard Deviation P/E 
Ratio, Market M/B ratio (median M/B ratio of all publicly listed firms), Industry M/B ratio (median M/B ratio 
of all publicly listed firms in that industry) 
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and non-tender offers, and during the latest wave period. The severity of bidders’ losses 
decreases within neutral valuation periods and during the first wave period (1980-1990). The 
differences in mean gains comparing the first and the latest wave period might be due to the 
increase in the size of firms and value of the deals during the latest wave period comparing 
with previous wave periods. Mean Bidder CAR is negative, -1.56% and remains negative 
except during tender offers which becomes small positive of 0.15% due to the positive CARs 
in neutral valuation periods (0.61%) and in the second merger wave (1.01%). Interestingly, 
mean total gains are only positive during low valuation periods within the entire sample, 
tender and non-tender offers and during the second wave period (1991-2000) for only tender 
offers. For the entire sample, 53% of deal announcements yield positive total gains, which 
suggest that the primary motive is synergy. This rate increases when the offer is tender 
(57%), and during low valuation periods (57%) and falls to 51% for non-tender offers and 
during high and neutral valuation periods (52 and 51%).    
2.2.3 Results 
 
2.2.3.1 Univariate Regression Analysis 
Table 2.4, 2.5 and 2.6 present the results of the regression analysis of target gain to total and 
bidder gain, for the entire sample, and for the sub-sample of tender offers and non-tender-
offers respectively.  In Panel B and C of each table we show how the motivations alter during 
i) different valuation periods and ii) different merger waves.  Previous studies on takeover 
motives may suffer from the confounding effects of merger related characteristics. We 
examine the potential influence of market conditions during high, neutral and low valuation 
periods and across the most significant merger waves on takeover motives, conditional on 
takeover characteristics. 
[Table 2.4] 
For the entire sample, the higher proportion of acquisitions with positive total gains, the 
negative bidder gains, positive target gains and negative total gain indicate that the main 
motivation is managerialism. In the positive total gains sub-sample, we find a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between target and acquirer gains (  ) and a negative and 
statistical significant relationship between target and acquirer gains (        consistent 
with the co-existence of synergy and hubris hypothesis. For the negative total gains portfolio, 
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there is a negative relationship between target and acquirer gains as give by both hubris and 
managerialism hypotheses. Target and total gains correlation, indicate the existence of 
synergy for the entire sample and the positive total gains sub-sample due to the statistical 
significant positive coefficients. The sub-sample of Negative total gains indicates a negative 
relationship between the target and total gains and thus suggests that in this sub-sample 
managerialism is the driving motive.  
For high and neutral valuation periods we observe an identical pattern as within the entire 
sample, except that neutral negative total gains sub-sample indicate the existence of hubris as 
the primary motive instead of managerialism. For low valuation period, the pattern differs. 
Although the gains to target gains remains positive, the total gains become positive instead of 
negative due to less severe negative bidder gains. Target and acquirer correlation is 
significantly negative and thus indicate hubris as the main motive. In the positive total gains 
sub-sample, we find evidence for the co-existence of synergy and hubris hypothesis, while 
for negative total gains sub-sample for hubris or managerialism. The correlation between 
target and total gains, show evidence of synergy overall and in the positive total gains sub-
sample, where for negative total gains sub-sample, of managerialism.   
For the three different valuation periods we observe a uniform pattern of mean gains and of 
the target and acquirer gains relationship. Overall, bidder gains are negative, target gains are 
positive and total gains are negative, which suggest that managerialism might be the primary 
motive. There is a negative relationship between target and acquirer gains which indicates 
that either hubris or managerialism is the main motive. When looking into target and total 
gains correlation, there is a difference in the first wave comparing to the two latest. The 
significantly positive coefficient of target/total gains correlation in the 1980-1990 wave 
indicate synergy as the primary motive overall but also within positive total gain sub-sample. 
In the last two waves, evidence suggest that overall and within positive total gain sub-sample, 
synergy is the primary motive but also managerialism is the motive within negative total 
gains sub-sample.  
[Table 2.5] 
Table 2.5 shows the relationship between target gains with total and acquirer gains for the 
sub-sample of tender offers. The higher proportion of acquisitions with positive total gains, 
the negative bidder gains, positive target gains and negative total gain indicate that the main 
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motivation is managerialism. Overall and in the negative total gains sub-sample, we find a 
negative and statistically significant relationship between target and acquirer gains suggesting 
that hubris or managerialism is the main driving motive, while the positive significant 
coefficient (  ) and the negative and statistical significant relationship between target and 
acquirer gains (        in the positive total gains sub-sample suggest the co-existence of 
synergy and hubris hypothesis. Target and total gains correlation, indicate the existence of 
synergy for the entire sample and the positive total gains sub-sample and the existence of 
managerialism in the negative total gains sub-sample. 
Overall, there is no relationship between target and acquirer gains in the high valuation 
period which indicates that synergy is the main motive. In the positive total gains sub-sample, 
synergy and hubris co-exist, whereas in the negative total gains managerialism is the primary 
motive. The positive coefficient between target and total gains confirm that overall synergy is 
the main motive. In the positive total gains sub-sample this relationship stays positive and 
thus support synergy hypothesis and in the negative total gains sub-sample becomes negative 
which confirms the managerialism hypothesis. In the neutral and low valuation period there is 
a negative relationship between target and acquirer gains which indicates either the existence 
of hubris or managerialism overall and in the negative total gains sub-group. Positive total 
gains sub-group coefficients indicates the co-existence of synergy and hubris. During neutral 
period, there is a positive and statistical significant relationship between target and total gains 
which suggest that overall and in the positive total gains sub-group, synergy is the primary 
motive, whereas there is no relationship in the negative total gains group which suggest 
hubris is the primary motive in this sample. During low period, there is no relationship 
between target and total gains and thus this evidence supports hubris hypothesis. In the 
positive total gains sub-group the relationship becomes positive and indicates synergy as the 
primary motive and in the negative total gains group it becomes negative and thus indicates 
managerialism as the main motive.  
Looking into different merger waves in the tender offers, it seems that the motives of the first 
and third wave are identical. Overall, the relationship between target and acquirer gains is 
negative which suggest that hubris or managerialism is the main motive. In the positive total 
gain this relationship indicates that hubris and managerialism co-exist and that in the negative 
total gain sub-group hubris is the primary motive for the first wave, and managerialism for 
the third wave. The relationship between target and total gains is positive and statistical 
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significant in both waves and in the positive total gain sub-group which shows that synergy is 
the primary motive. In the negative total gains sub-group the relationship is negative in the 
third wave which indicates that the primary motive is managerialism. In the second wave 
period the correlation between target and acquirer gains is zero which indicates that synergy 
is the primary motive. In the positive total gains sub-group synergy and hubris co-exist, 
whereas in the negative total gains sub-group the relationship is negative and thus indicates 
that is either hubris or managerialism. Overall and in the positive total gains sub-group the 
relationship between target and total gains is positive which indicates that synergy is the 
primary motive and negative in the negative total gains sub-groups which indicate 
managerialism as the main motive. 
[Table 2.6] 
In table 2.6 we present the relation between target and total gain and target and acquirer gain 
in the non-tender sample. Overall and in the negative total gains sub-group there is a 
statistically significant negative relation between target and acquirer gains which suggest that 
hubris or managerialism is the main motive. In the positive total gains sub-group there is 
evidence of the co-existence of both synergy and hubris. The relation between target and total 
gains is positive overall and in the positive total gains sub-group which indicates that synergy 
is the primary motive. In the negative total gains subgroup the relation is negative and thus 
suggest that managerialism is the primary motive in this group. This pattern remains 
unchanged through all three valuation periods and all wave periods. 
Overall, our results show that both tender and non-tender offers are driven by synergy, value-
increasing acquisitions are driven by both synergy and hubris, whereas value-decreasing by 
managerialism. The latter finding remains robust across high and low valuation periods, 
where during low valuation periods the primary motive is synergy for value-increasing 
acquisitions and managerialism for value-decreasing acquisition. Our results suggest that i. 
the hostile nature of the deal will not affect the primary merger motives and ii. the state of the 
market is an important driver of the takeover motives. The adoption of state antitakeover laws 
in the late 1980s and revisions to the Best Price Rule in 2006 made tender offers as friendly 
as mergers and therefore we do not find any differences between the two samples with the 
respect the takeover motives. Further, according to investor sentiment hypothesis, during 
extreme valuation periods, markets optimism can intensify investors’ positive expectations 
and vice versa. Thus a manager would be more optimism in high valuation periods and 
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therefore more likely to be infected by hubris or overconfidence than in a neutral valuation 
period.  
2.2.3.2 Multivariate Regression Analysis - Deal Characteristics and  
Takeover Motives 
We use multiple regression analysis to control for other deal-related factors that have been 
documented in the literature to affect acquisition process. Overall, synergy is the primary 
motivation but depending on the valuation period or the merger wave period that the takeover 
is taking place the primary motive changes. This is an extension of Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993) methodology on merger motives since we control for other variables that 
might affect the correlation of target gains with total and acquirer gains, other than market 
conditions. The dependent variable in our regressions is the Target gain. We estimate the 
following models: 
Relation between Target and Total Gain – Extended BN Approach 
9 9
0 i
k=1 1
Target Gain = (Total Gain) + (Total Gain) + k ki k ki
k
a D D   

    (2.6) 
 
Relation between Target and Acquirer Gain – Extended BN Approach 
9 9
0 i
k=1 1
Target Gain = (Total Gain) + (Acquirer Gain) + k ki k ki
k
a D D   

    (2.7) 
The intercept   and the slope    change as the characteristics of the deal change; the dummy 
variables     equal one if the k
th 
characteristic applies to case i and zero otherwise. The 
characteristics of deals that are used in the regression are measured one year before the 
announcement for the target firm.  For each portfolio we run two different regressions where 
the depended variable, Y is always Target Gain and independent variable, X is Total Gain in 
the first regression and Acquirer Gain in the second.   
[Table 2.7] 
33 
 
Table 2.7 is a summary table of the multivariate analysis. We re-run Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1993) correlation analysis but this time we take into consideration other deal 
characteristics that have been ignored in the univariate analysis in previous section. We find 
that some relations between target and total gains and target and acquirer gains change and 
we show which characteristics are important in each sub-sample. For each sub-sample (i.e. 
Entire sample, Tender Offers and Non-Tender Offers) we report the sign of    coefficient for 
the two regressions, i. Target-Total Gains, and ii. Target-Acquirer Gains. Panel A shows the 
signs for the entire sample of each sub-group, Panel B and C show the sign for each sub-
group when divided into different valuation periods (i.e. HIGH, NEUTRAL, LOW) and into 
Wave Periods (1980-1990, 1991-2000, 2001-2010) respectively. Panel A shows that the zero 
correlation between target and acquirer indicate that synergy is the dominant motive in value 
increasing acquisitions (positive total gains group). This finding holds true for all three sub-
samples, entire, tender and non-tender offers. For value decreasing acquisitions (negative 
total gains group) we show that in the entire sample and in the non-tender offers the 
correlation between target and total gains is negative and thus we conclude that are driven by 
managerialism. Univariate analysis was inconclusive as what is the primary motive of, value-
decreasing tender offers. After controlling for takeover characteristics, evidence show that 
this type of acquisitions are driven by hubris. 
There is strong evidence that in general value-decreasing acquisitions (negative total gains 
group) are driven by managerialism irrespective of the valuation period. This finding shows 
that managers who pursue their own private benefits will engage into value destroying 
acquisitions and ignore market conditions. Panel C. shows that value-increasing acquisitions 
are driven by synergy in the first and second wave, whereas hubris dominants these 
acquisitions in the third wave. The zero relationship between target and total gains within 
negative total gains group during the first and second wave indicate the existence of hubris, 
whereas during the last wave value destroying acquisitions are driven by managerialism.   
Value increasing Tender offers are driven by synergy reasons during neutral valuation 
periods. Value decreasing Tender offers seem to be driven by managerialism during high-
valuation periods, and hubris during neutral and low – valuation periods. Managers might 
feel overconfident by the market momentum during high valuation periods but alter their 
decisions during neutral and low valuation periods. Non-Tender Offers are driven by synergy 
during low valuation periods, and during the first wave period. Value-destroying non-tender 
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offers are driven either by managerialism or hubris, although managerialism seems to be the 
dominant motive. We find evidence of managerialism in high and low valuation periods and 
in the first and third wave periods.  
[Table 2.8] 
For robustness purposes we use additional proxies to capture synergy, hubris and 
managerialism. Total gains is a well-accepted proxy for synergy. We adopt Net buyer 
measure of Malmendier and Tate (2005) to capture hubris and G-Index to capture 
managerialism. Net Buyer measure of overconfidence or hubris, takes the value of 1 if the 
manager of the acquiring firm does not reduce his stock holdings across a period of at least 6 
years and zero otherwise. The Government index or G-Index or GIM shows ‘the balance of 
power between shareholders and mangers’ and therefore can be used to capture agency or 
managerialism problems. G-Index can take values from 1 to 19 and firms are categorised into 
10 groups; Firm with a G-index ≥ 14 (Dictatorship Portfolio) have the ‘weakest shareholder 
rights’ or the ‘highest management power’, while firms with a G-index ≤ 5 have the 
‘strongest shareholder rights’ or the ‘lowest management power’ (Democracy Portfolio). For 
the purpose of our analysis we create a sample of firms with G-Index ≥ 14.  
Table 2.8 is the summary of the same regression analysis (BN method) as in Table 2.7. Panel 
A shows the sign of each regression for the entire sample in tender and non-tender offers, 
similarly with Panel A of Table 2.7. Since total gains capture the synergetic acquisitions then 
in the POSITIVE TG sample then the primary motive should be synergy. The sign of the 
regression analysis of the Target to Acquirer is zero which confirms that the primary motive 
in this sample is synergy. In Panel B, there are only deals with Net Buyer measure equal to 1. 
This means that these acquirers are more likely to be overconfident and thus infected by 
hubris. We confirm based on the sign of the regression analysis that hubris is the primary 
motive within this sample. Lastly, Panel C contains only the deals with G-Index above 14, 
which means that these firms have agency problems. We find evidence that managerialism is 
the primary motive in this sample. Our results remain unchanged within tender and non-
tender offers. 
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2.3 Conclusion 
This chapter’s research objective was motivated by the need to understand what drives 
acquiring firms’ abnormal returns by considering the merger motives and the influence of 
market conditions on acquisition decisions and outcomes. We find that takeover motives are 
different in value increasing acquisitions compared to value decreasing projects after 
controlling for misvaluation effects and considering different wave periods.  
Our analysis on the takeover motives includes all tender and non-tender offers announced 
between 1980 and 2010. Despite the hostile nature of tender offers, we show that both tender 
and non-tender offers are driven by synergy, value-increasing acquisitions are driven by both 
synergy and hubris, whereas value-decreasing by managerialism. We argue that since the 
introduction of the Best Price Rule in the late 1980s the nature of tender offers is as friendly 
as mergers and therefore there are no differences between the two mode of mergers with 
respect the primary motives. Bouwman et al., (2009) show that market conditions affect 
corporate decisions and acquisition performance. We examine the potential influence of 
misvaluation on merger motives by deconstructing it into three valuation periods (high, 
neutral and low) and search whether different wave periods are linked with different takeover 
motives. We find that during extreme (high and low) valuation periods and neutral periods, 
takeover motives differ. According to investor sentiment hypothesis, during high (low) 
valuation periods markets optimism (pessimist) intensifies investors’ positive (negative) 
expectations. Therefore an acquirer is more likely to be overconfident during periods of high 
market valuation than in neutral periods and this can explain the co-existence of synergy and 
hubris during high valuation periods and pure synergy in neutral valuation periods. Finally, 
we find that motives change during different merger waves and argue that the source of the 
differences lie upon the different characteristics of each wave that affect takeover motives. 
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Table 2.1 Takeover Motives 
Hypotheses Bidder Gains Target Gains Total Gains Target to Total Target To Acquirer 
  
   
Correlation Correlation 
  
     
Panel A. Entire Sample 
Synergy Positive or Zero Positive Positive Positive Positive or Zero 
Hubris Negative Positive Zero Zero Negative 
Managerialism Negative Positive Negative Negative Negative 
  
     
Panel B. Positive Total Gains 
Synergy Positive Positive Positive * Positive -> No Hubris 
  
     
Synergy and Hubris Positive and 
Negative 
Positive Positive * 
Positive -> Synergy 
Negative -> Hubris 
  
     
Panel C. Negative Total Gains 
Hubris Negative Positive 
 
Zero ** 
Managerialism Negative Positive 
 
Negative ** 
Summary of the Implications of Different Hypotheses regarding  i. Bidder, Target and Total Gains and ii. the relation between Target Gain and Total and 
Acquirer Gains. 
* Target and Total gain correlation for (i)synergy and (ii) synergy and hubris hypotheses, both predict positive correlation. 
** Target and Acquirer gain correlation for (i) hubris and (ii) managerialism hypotheses, both predict negative correlation. 
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Table 2.2 Descriptive Statistics 
 
(Total Gain)kiD  
 
(Acquirer Gain)kiD  
 Variable Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Completion -19.451 483.168 -82.350 419.465 
Hostility -6.405 162.872 -8.157 114.728 
Competing bids -2.470 164.870 -8.016 126.579 
Toehold -22.068 195.146 -5.217 109.162 
Cash -7.321 345.551 -31.350 294.375 
Stock -16.360 267.055 -34.872 242.035 
Obs = 3533     
This table presents the summary statistics of the explanatory variables we use in our multivariate analysis.  Target gain is computed by multiplying 
the target’s CAR (-2,+2) by the market value 11 days prior to the announcement, minus the value of the target shares held by the bidder. Bidder 
gain is calculated by multiplying bidder’s CAR (-2,+2)  by the market value of the acquiring firm 11 days prior to the announcement. Total gain is 
the sum value of target and bidder gain. Completion is a dummy variable indicating whether the acquisition has completed or not, Hostility shows 
is the attitude of acquisition was unsolicited or hostile, Competing bids shows if multiple acquiring firms were interested for the target firm in the 
following six months . Toehold is a dummy variable that equals one if the fraction of the target’s common stock owned by the bidder is greater 
than 5% at the bid announcement date or zero otherwise and Cash (stock) is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer firm offers 100% 
cash (stock) to the target firm  
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Table 2.3 AR Descriptive Statistics 
PANEL A: Entire Sample 
Sample N Positive/Negative Mean Median Min Max 
ALL 3533 1878/1655 
    
Target Gains 
  
83.44 18.16 - 131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
- 93.39 - 4.51 - 1,505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
- 25.06 2.92 - 1,509.15 1,097.85 
Target CAR 
  
24.12% 19.78% - 120.57% 266.48% 
Bidder CAR 
  
- 1.56% - 1.37% - 110.06% 96.20% 
High Valuation 816 430/386 
    
Target Gains 
  
81.25 20.00 -131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
- 130.98 - 5.62 - 1,505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
-54.18 2.98 - 1,509.15 1,097.85 
Target CAR 
  
25.46% 20.71% - 102.50% 266.48% 
Bidder CAR 
  
- 2.05% - 1.42% - 74.79% 77.57% 
Neutral Valuation 1766 905/861 
    
Target Gains 
  
63.56 11.75 - 131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
- 65.00 -  2.83 - 1,505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
- 29.77 0.71 - 1,509.15 1,097.85 
Target CAR 
  
22.20% 18.46% - 120.57% 182.36% 
Bidder CAR 
  
- 1.24% -1.17% - 110.06% 96.20% 
Low Valuation 951 543/408 
    
Target Gains 
  
122.23 31.74 - 131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
- 113.83 - 11.25 - 1,505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
8.67 7.66 - 1,509.15 1,097.85 
Target CAR 
  
26.53% 21.73% -55.07% 247.38% 
Bidder CAR 
  
-1.71% -1.77% -43.42% 48.39% 
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1980-1989 837 404/433 
    
Target Gains 
  
32.78 4.62 -131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
-24.83 - 1.16 - 1,505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
-37.35 -0.86 - 1,509.15 1,097.85 
Target CAR 
  
20.24% 16.12% -54.98% 117.58% 
Bidder CAR 
  
-0.63% -0.90% -40.90% 96.20% 
1990-1999 1472 806/666 
    
Target Gains 
  
74.48 16.03 - 131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
-74.11 - 3.83 - 1,505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
- 9.24 3.62 - 1,509.15 1,097.85 
Target CAR 
  
23.25% 19.64% -102.50% 182.36% 
Bidder CAR 
  
-1.62% -1.57% -53.78% 48.39% 
2000-2010 1224 668/556     
Target Gains 
  
128.84 38.98 - 131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
- 163.44 -  16.15 - 1,505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
- 35.69 9.41 - 1,509.15 1,097.85 
Target CAR 
  
27.82% 22.45% -120.57% 266.48% 
Bidder CAR 
  
-2.12% -1.50% -110.06% 89.39% 
PANEL B. Tender Offers 
Sample N Positive/Negative Mean Median Min Max 
TENDER 891 516/375 
    
Target Gains 
  
90.17 28.33 -131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
-74.81 -1.24 -1505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
-13.99 12.49 -1509.15 1097.85 
Target CAR 
  
34.09% 29.53% -114.33% 266.48% 
Bidder CAR 
  
0.15% -0.28% -43.42% 46.30% 
High Valuation 197 115/82 
    
Target Gains 
  
109.2 29.76 -131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
-145.26 -6.05 -1505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
-34.29 12.49 -1509.15 1097.85 
Target CAR 
  
38.90% 32.41% -29.36% 266.48% 
Bidder CAR 
  
-0.36% -0.84% -31.21% 32.56% 
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Neutral Valuation 485 269/216 
    
Target Gains 
  
58.19 18.7 -131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
-34.02 0.06 -1505.38 -34.02 
Total Gains 
  
-25.83 8.06 -1509.15 1097.85 
Target CAR 
  
30.43% 26.92% -114.33% 146.54% 
Bidder CAR 
  
0.61% 0.03% -30.55% 46.30% 
Low Valuation 209 132/77 
    
Target Gains 
  
146.43 48.48 -131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
-103.04 -1.42 -1505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
32.63 24.61 -1509.15 1097.85 
Target CAR 
  
38.05% 31.30% -27.57% 234.41% 
Bidder CAR 
  
-0.43% -0.65% -43.42% 33.65% 
1980-1989 312 159/153 
    
Target Gains 
  
43.34 12.42 -131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
-17.52 -1.16 -1505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
-55.06 0.43 -1509.15 1097.85 
Target CAR 
  
27.59% 25.18% -38.76% 103.34% 
Bidder CAR 
  
-0.35% -0.44% -30.55% 29.75% 
1990-1999 310 201/109 
    
Target Gains 
  
84.87 33.46 -131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
-39.47 3.69 -1505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
46.44 24.27 -1509.15 1097.85 
Target CAR 
  
34.53% 31.00% -47.75% 145.01% 
Bidder CAR 
  
1.01% 0.52% -25.78% 46.30% 
2000-2010 269 156/113     
Target Gains   150.59 54.12 -75.66 675.67 
Bidder Gains   -181.98 -13.13 -1505.38 668.84 
Total Gains   -36 20.68 -1509.15 1097.85 
Target CAR   41.12% 32.61% -114.33% 266.48% 
Bidder CAR   -0.27% -0.88% -43.42% 33.65% 
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PANEL C. Non-Tender Offers 
Sample N Positive/Negative Mean Median Min Max 
Non-Tender 2642 1362/1280 
    
Target Gains 
  
81.17 13.93 -131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
-99.65 -5.86 -1505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
-28.8 1.16 -1509.15 1097.85 
Target CAR 
  
20.76% 16.88% -120.57% 247.38% 
Bidder CAR 
  
-2.13% -1.87% -110.06% 96.20% 
High Valuation 619 316/303 
    
Target Gains 
  
72.35 15.46 -131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
-126.44 -5.25 -1505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
-60.52 1.2 -1509.15 1097.85 
Target CAR 
  
21.18% 17.42% -102.50% 157.97% 
Bidder CAR 
  
-2.59% -1.78% -74.79% 77.57% 
Neutral Valuation 1281 636/645 
    
Target Gains 
  
65.59 9.37 -131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
-76.73 -3.49 -1505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
-31.27 -0.32 -1509.15 1097.85 
Target CAR 
  
19.09% 15.41% -120.57% 182.36% 
Bidder CAR 
  
-1.94% -1.66% -110.06% 96.20% 
Low Valuation 742 410/332 
    
Target Gains 
  
115.41 25.93 -131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
-116.87 -13.01 -1505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
1.92 4.86 -1509.15 1097.85 
Target CAR 
  
23.29% 18.59% -55.07% 247.38% 
Bidder CAR 
  
-2.07% -2.37% -35.06% 48.39% 
1980-1989 525 245/280 
    
Target Gains 
  
26.5 3.04 -131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
-29.18 -1.16 -1505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
-26.83 -1.14 -1509.15 1097.85 
Target CAR 
  
15.87% 11.95% -54.98% 117.58% 
Bidder CAR 
  
-0.80% -1.28% -40.90% 96.20% 
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1990-1999 1162 605/557 
    
Target Gains 
  
71.71 12.05 -131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
-83.35 -5.85 -1505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
-24.1 1.16 -1509.15 1097.85 
Target CAR 
  
20.24% 16.61% -102.50% 182.36% 
Bidder CAR 
  
-2.32% -2.42% -53.78% 48.39% 
2000-2010 955 512/443 
    
Target Gains 
  
122.72 35.74 -131.25 675.67 
Bidder Gains 
  
-158.22 -16.65 -1505.38 668.84 
Total Gains 
  
-35.6 7.08 -1509.15 1097.85 
Target CAR 
  
24.07% 19.46% -120.57% 247.38% 
Bidder CAR 
  
-2.64% -1.78% -110.06% 89.39% 
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the depended and independent variables we use in our regression analysis for the entire sample 
(Panel A), tender offer (Panel B) and non-tender offers (Panel C). Each panel is further divided by high, neutral and low valuation period, and the 
three merger waves that are present in our sample (1980s, 1990s, and 2000s). CAR, the cumulative abnormal returns are calculated for a five-day 
window (-2, +2) around the announcement date for all firms.  Target gain is computed by multiplying the target’s CAR by the market value 11 
days prior to the announcement, minus the value of the target shares held by the bidder. Bidder gain is calculated by multiplying bidder’s CAR by 
the market value of the acquiring firm 11 days prior to the announcement. Total gain is the sum value of target and bidder gain. 
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Table 2.4 Entire Sample - Relation Between Target - Total Gains and Target - Acquirer Gains  
This table shows the results of the univariate analysis; Target Gains are regressed against total gains and acquirer gains. Target gain is computed 
by multiplying the target’s CAR(-2,+2) by the market value 11 days prior to the announcement, minus the value of the target shares held by the 
bidder. Bidder gain is calculated by multiplying bidder’s CAR (-2,+2) by the market value of the acquiring firm 11 days prior to the 
announcement. Total gain is the sum value of target and bidder gain. The relation between Target and Total Gain is given by:               
   (            and the relation between Target and Acquirer Gain is given by (i)                  (               and (ii) 
                 (                   (                    , where Dummy = 0 if acquirer gain is positive and Dummy=1 if 
acquirer gain is negative. The numbers below estimates α and β1 are t-statistics. R2 is also reported. Panel A shows the regression results for the 
entire sample of Mergers and Acquisitions, Panel B and C shows the regression results for the sub-sample of different valuations periods (i.e. 
High, Neutral and Low valuation periods) and different Merger waves (i.e. 1980 – 1990, 1991-2000, 2001-2010) respectively. 
PANEL A. Entire Sample 
  
Target and Total Gain Target and Acquirer Gain 
Sample N α β1 R
2
 α β1 β2 R
2
 
ALL 3533 85.49*** 0.08*** 0.1 76.29*** -0.08*** 
 
0.030 
  
 
28.61 14.12 
 
24.74 -11.1 
  
Positive Total Gains 1878 32.82*** 0.34*** 0.4 119.66*** -0.01 
 
0.000 
  
 
7.72 34.81 
 
25.06 -0.43 
  
  
    
65.24*** 0.26*** -1.07*** 0.280 
  
    
14.45 14.73 -27.14 
 
Negative Total Gains 1655 8.31* -0.10*** 0.1 -18.84*** -0.20*** 
 
0.360 
  
 
1.82 -13.53 
 
-4.99 -4.99 
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PANEL B. VALUATION PERIODS 
 
 
Target and Total Gain Target and Acquirer Gain 
Sample N α β1 R
2
 α β1 β2 R
2
 
HIGH 816 84.53*** 0.05*** 0 71.90*** -0.08*** 
 
0.040 
  
 
13.97 4.35 
 
11.62 -5.99 
  
Positive Total Gains 430 22.84*** 0.35*** 0.4 110.54*** -0.03 
 
0.002 
  
 
2.82 18.22 
 
11.59 -0.9 
  
  
    
66.05*** 0.21*** -0.95*** 0.230 
  
    
7.13 5.4 -11.27 
 
Negative Total 
Gains 
386 6.69 -0.12*** 0.2 -11.41 -0.17*** 
 
0.320 
  
 
0.73 -8.68 
 
-1.38 -13.29 
  
 
        
NEUTRAL 1766 66.68*** 0.12*** 0.1 59.29*** -0.06*** 
 
0.020 
  
 
17.48 14.52 
 
14.66 -5.96 
  
Positive Total Gains 905 28.76*** 0.35*** 0.4 105.45*** 0.02 
 
0.001 
  
 
5.17 25.23 
 
16.32 0.76 
  
  
    
63.46*** 0.26*** -1.00*** 0.240 
  
    
10.33 9.82 -17 
 
Negative Total 
Gains 
861 2.34 -0.05 0 -25.83*** -0.19*** 
 
0.320 
  
 
0.41 -4.84 
 
-5.72 -20.22 
  
 
        
LOW 951 121.65*** 0.06*** 0 112.32*** -0.09*** 
 
0.040 
  
 
18.49 4.92 
 
16.8 -6.58 
  
Positive Total Gains 543 49.28*** 0.33*** 0.3 151.49*** -0.03 
 
0.002 
  
 
5.14 16.38 
 
15.3 -1.03 
  
  
    
68.09 0.29 -1.22 0.360 
  
    
7.3 9.27 -17.2 
 
Negative Total 
Gains 
408 27.14*** -0.16*** 0.2 -7.3 -0.23*** 
 
0.400 
  
 
2.58 -9.78 
 
-0.79 -16.52 
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PANEL C.WAVE PERIODS 
 
 
Target and Total Gain Target and Acquirer Gain 
Sample N α β1 R
2
 α β1 β2 R
2
 
1980 - 1989 837 40.95*** 0.22*** 0.310 30.23*** -0.10*** 
 
0.020 
  
 
9.71 19.16 
 
6.02 -4.22 
  
Positive Total Gains 404 7.72 0.53*** 0.650 86.30*** -0.06 
 
0.003 
  
 
1.35 27.22 
 
9.95 -1.1 
  
  
    
60.06*** 0.25*** -0.90*** 0.150 
  
    
6.98 4.21 -8.39 
 
Negative Total 
Gains 
433 -3.32 0.06*** 0.050 -39.50*** -0.28*** 
 
0.380 
  
 
-0.62 4.48 
 
-9.72 -16.09 
  
 
        
1990 - 1999 1472 75.46*** 0.11*** 0.090 71.47*** -0.04*** 
 
0.009 
  
 
17.63 11.99 
 
15.76 -3.74 
  
Positive Total Gains 806 30.34*** 0.34*** 0.380 105.01*** 0.03 
 
0.002 
  
 
4.86 22.31 
 
14.77 1.23 
  
  
    
52.12*** 0.29*** -1.26*** 0.330 
  
    
8.11 11.27 -19.71 
 
Negative Total 
Gains 
666 12.93** -0.07*** 0.050 -10.43* -0.15*** 
 
0.260 
  
 
2.03 -5.98 
 
-1.88 -15.13 
  
 
        
2000 - 2010 1224 130.01*** 0.03*** 0.010 115.57*** -0.08*** 
 
0.050 
  
 
22.26 3.47 
 
19.41 -7.93 
  
Positive Total Gains 668 52.38*** 0.30*** 0.310 161.19*** -0.06** 
 
0.008 
  
 
5.94 17.28 
 
18.4 -2.26 
  
  
    
87.58*** 0.22*** -0.96*** 0.280 
  
    
9.92 7.67 -15.71 
 
Negative Total 
Gains 
556 26.11*** -0.15*** 0.190 -7.62 -0.20*** 
 
0.350 
  
 
2.59 -11.25 
 
-0.82 -17.26 
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Table 2.5 Tender Offers - Relation Between Target - Total Gains and Target - Acquirer Gains 
This table shows the results of the univariate analysis; Target Gains are regressed against total gains and acquirer gains. Target gain is computed by 
multiplying the target’s CAR(-2,+2)  by the market value 11 days prior to the announcement, minus the value of the target shares held by the bidder. Bidder 
gain is calculated by multiplying bidder’s CAR (-2,+2) by the market value of the acquiring firm 11 days prior to the announcement. Total gain is the sum 
value of target and bidder gain. The relation between Target and Total Gain is given by:                  (            and the relation between 
Target and Acquirer Gain is given by (i)                  (               and (ii) 
                 (                   (                    , where Dummy = 0 if acquirer gain is positive and Dummy=1 if acquirer gain is 
negative. The numbers below estimates α and β1 are t-statistics. R2 is also reported. Panel A shows the regression results for the tender offers, Panel B and C 
shows the regression results for the sub-sample of different valuations periods (i.e. High, Neutral and Low valuation periods) and different Merger waves (i.e. 
1980 – 1990, 1991-2000, 2001-2010) respectively. 
PANEL A. Tender Offers 
 
 
Target and Total Gain Target and Acquirer Gain 
Sample N α β1 R
2
 α β1 β2 R
2
 
ALL 891 91.55*** 0.10*** 0.09 86.02*** -0.06*** 
 
0.02 
  
 
15.32 9.28 
 
13.69 -4.05 
  
Positive Total Gains 516 33.65*** 0.33*** 0.39 119.06*** 0.05 
 
0.00 
  
 
4.06 18.26 
 
12.62 1.37 
  
  
    
69.09*** 0.24*** -1.28*** 0.24 
  
    
7.56 7.56 -12.68 
 
Negative Total Gains 375 11.47 -0.07*** 0.06 -26.54*** -0.20*** 
 
0.38 
  
 
1.07 -4.69 
 
-3.25 -15.18 
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PANEL B. VALUATION PERIODS 
 
 
Target and Total Gain Target and Acquirer Gain 
Sample N α β1 R
2
 α β1 β2 R
2
 
HIGH 197 112.57*** 0.10*** 0.09 103.71*** -0.04 
 
0.01 
  
 
8.58 4.31 
 
7.3 -1.38 
  
Positive Total Gains 115 20.98 0.42*** 0.55 131.95*** 0.04 
 
0.00 
  
 
1.27 11.79 
 
6.08 0.43 
  
  
    
71.43*** 0.33*** -1.17*** 0.26 
  
    
3.37 3.94 -6.22 
 
Negative Total 
Gains 
82 15.61 -0.12*** 0.19 -6.61 -0.16*** 
 
0.35 
  
 
0.78 -4.26 
 
-0.37 -6.52 
  
  
        
NEUTRAL 485 61.83*** 0.14*** 0.19 56.89*** -0.04* 
 
0.01 
  
 
8.92 10.79 
 
7.37 -1.82 
  
Positive Total Gains 269 35.00*** 0.31*** 0.36 116.60*** -0.04 
 
0.00 
  
 
3.23 12.24 
 
9.72 -0.93 
  
  
    
74.52*** 0.14*** -1.23*** 0.22 
  
    
6.38 3.01 -8.67 
 
Negative Total 
Gains 
216 -9.36 0 - -41.92*** -0.16*** 
 
0.29 
  
 
-0.87 -0.06 
 
-5.16 -9.36 
  
  
        
LOW 209 145.82*** 0.02 0.00 139.38*** -0.07*** 
 
0.04 
  
 
10.33 0.83 
 
9.89 -2.79 
  
Positive Total Gains 132 44.21** 0.28*** 0.32 110.63*** 0.17*** 
 
0.06 
  
 
2.35 7.85 
 
5.53 2.78 
  
  
    
45.44** 0.34*** -1.81*** 0.32 
  
    
2.35 6.03 -7.14 
 
Negative Total 
Gains 
77 81.91*** -0.15*** 0.16 26.62 -0.22*** 
 
0.36 
  
 
2.73 -3.73 
 
0.94 -6.43 
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PANEL C.WAVE PERIODS 
  
Target and Total Gain Target and Acquirer Gain 
Sample N α β1 R
2
 α β1 β2 R
2
 
1980 - 1989 312 55.69*** 0.22*** 0.34 42.06*** -0.07* 
 
0.01 
  
6.81 12.6 
 
4.22 -1.63 
  
Positive Total Gains 159 18.33* 0.52*** 0.63 114.66*** 0 
 
- 
  
1.66 16.41 
 
7.17 -0.05 
  
     
79.69*** 0.28** -1.13*** 0.16 
     
4.96 2.92 -5.42 
 
Negative Total Gains 153 -13.74 0.06*** 0.05 -56.9 -0.3 
 
0.37 
  
-1.23 2.69 
 
-7.12 -9.62 
  
1990 - 1999 310 80.46*** 0.10*** 0.09 84.05*** -0.02 
 
0.00 
  
8.81 5.65 
 
8.77 -0.97 
  
Positive Total Gains 201 37.63** 0.25*** 0.30 102.40*** 0.04 
 
0.00 
  
2.93 2.93 
 
7.35 0.78 
  
     
45.29*** 0.23*** -1.75*** 0.37 
     
3.69 5.43 -10.81 
 
Negative Total Gains 109 21.41 -0.06** 0.04 -3.88 -0.13*** 
 
0.22 
  
1.24 -2.13 
 
-0.26 -5.55 
  
2000 - 2010 269 151.88*** 0.04* 0.01 141.45*** -0.05** 
 
0.02 
  
12.36 1.98 
 
11.1 -2.52 
  
Positive Total Gains 156 37.71** 0.32*** 0.37 148.59*** 0.05 
 
0.01 
  
2.05 9.54 
 
7.45 0.84 
  
     
81.60*** 0.26*** -1.14*** 0.23 
     
4.02 4.29 -6.65 
 
Negative Total Gains 113 67.01** -0.12*** 0.14 19.82 -0.18*** 
 
0.29 
  
2.77 -4.23 
 
0.84 -6.73 
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Table 2.6 NonTender Offers - Relation between Target - Total Gains and Target - Acquirer Gains 
This table shows the results of the univariate analysis; Target Gains are regressed against total gains and acquirer gains. Target gain is computed by 
multiplying the target’s CAR (-2,+2) by the market value 11 days prior to the announcement, minus the value of the target shares held by the bidder. Bidder 
gain is calculated by multiplying bidder’s CAR (-2,+2)  by the market value of the acquiring firm 11 days prior to the announcement. Total gain is the sum 
value of target and bidder gain. The relation between Target and Total Gain is given by:                  (            and the relation between 
Target and Acquirer Gain is given by (i)                  (               and (ii) 
                 (                   (                    , where Dummy = 0 if acquirer gain is positive and Dummy=1 if acquirer gain is 
negative. The numbers below estimates α and β1 are t-statistics. R2 is also reported. Panel A shows the regression results for non-Tender Offers, Panel B and 
C shows the regression results for the sub-sample of different valuations periods (i.e. High, Neutral and Low valuation periods) and different Merger waves 
(i.e. 1980 – 1990, 1991-2000, 2001-2010) respectively. 
PANEL A. Non-Tender Offers 
 
 
Target and Total Gain Target and Acquirer Gain 
Sample N α β1 R
2
 α β1 β2 R
2
 
ALL 2642 83.31*** 0.08*** 0.04 72.71*** -0.09*** 
 
0.04 
  
 
24.16 10.77 
 
20.57 -10.62 
  
Positive Total Gains 1362 32.34*** 0.35*** 0.40 119.35*** -0.03 
 
0.00 
  
 
6.53 29.66 
 
21.56 -1.39 
  
  
    
62.83*** 0.27*** -1.05*** 0.30 
  
    
12.12 12.93 -24.22 
 
Negative Total Gains 1280 7.31 -0.12*** 0.12 -16.70*** -0.20*** 
 
0.35 
  
 
1.46 -13.12 
 
-3.92 -26.35 
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PANEL B. VALUATION PERIODS 
 
 
Target and Total Gain Target and Acquirer Gain 
Sample N α β1 R
2
 α β1 β2 R
2
 
HIGH 619 74.33*** 0.03*** 0.01 61.70*** -0.08*** 
 
0.06 
  
 
11.12 2.61 
 
9.18 -6.07 
  
Positive Total Gains 316 24.57*** 0.31*** 0.38 102.58*** -0.06(*) 
 
0.01 
  
 
2.7 13.93 
 
10.01 -1.52 
  
  
    
63.80*** 0.16*** -0.86*** 0.23 
  
    
6.42 3.76 -9.44 
 
Negative Total 
Gains 
303 5.06 -0.12*** 0.15 -12.04 -0.16*** 
 
0.30 
  
 
0.49 -7.22 
 
-1.29 -11.23 
  
  
        
NEUTRAL 1281 68.72*** 0.10*** 0.07 59.97*** -0.07*** 
 
0.03 
  
 
15.03 10 
 
12.59 -6.04 
  
Positive Total Gains 636 26.00*** 0.37*** 0.44 101.36*** 0.04 
 
0.00 
  
 
4.03 22.35 
 
13.23 1.47 
  
  
    
56.96*** 0.32*** -1.00*** 0.28 
  
    
7.98 10.16 -15.47 
 
Negative Total 
Gains 
645 4.31 -0.08*** 0.06 -20.76 -0.2 
 
0.34 
  
 
0.66 -6.45 
 
-3.88 -18.23 
  
  
        
LOW 742 115.27*** 0.07*** 0.04 104.36*** -0.10*** 
 
0.05 
  
 
15.56 5.24 
 
13.75 -6.06 
  
Positive Total Gains 410 50.34*** 0.35*** 0.34 159.09*** -0.09** 
 
0.02 
  
 
4.52 14.51 
 
14.03 -2.48 
  
  
    
71.90*** 0.29*** -1.17*** 0.37 
  
    
6.7 7.39 -15.2 
 
Negative Total 
Gains 
332 17.19* -0.16*** 0.19 -12.65 -0.22*** 
 
0.40 
  
 
1.58 -8.8 
 
-1.32 -14.85 
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PANEL C.WAVE PERIODS 
 
 
Target and Total Gain Target and Acquirer Gain 
Sample N α β1 R2 α β1 β2 R2 
1980 - 1989 525 32.25*** 0.21*** 0.27 22.75*** -0.13*** 
 
0.04 
  
 
6.97 14.06 
 
4.24 -4.67 
  
Positive Total Gains 245 1.61 0.53*** 0.65 68.24*** -0.11* 
 
0.01 
  
 
0.26 21.45 
 
7.05 -1.81 
  
  
    
47.17*** 0.21** -0.75*** 0.15 
  
    
4.91 2.73 -6.26 
 
Negative Total 
Gains 
280 1.01 0.05** 0.03 -29.60*** -0.26*** 
  
  
 
0.18 2.89 
 
-6.7 -13.16 
  
  
        
1990 - 1999 
1162 74.34*** 0.11*** 0.09 67.71*** -0.05*** 
 
0.01 
  
 
15.31 10.54 
 
13.14 -3.82 
  
Positive Total Gains 605 26.86*** 0.38*** 0.43 105.78*** 0.03 
 
0.00 
  
 
3.81 21.11 
 
12.78 0.99 
  
  
    
51.74*** 0.32*** -1.23*** 0.33 
  
    
6.94 10.33 -17.32 
 
Negative Total 
Gains 
557 11.39* 
-
0.07*** 
0.05 -11.83* -0.16*** 
 
0.27 
  
 
1.66 -5.57 
 
-1.98 -14.13 
  
  
        
2000 - 2010 955 123.84*** 0.03** 0.01 108.17*** -0.09*** 
 
0.06 
  
 
18.68 2.87 
 
16.1 -7.72 
  
Positive Total Gains 512 56.56*** 0.29*** 0.29 163.11*** -0.09** 
 
0.02 
  
 
5.62 14.45 
 
16.78 -3.12 
  
  
    
88.85*** 0.21*** -0.93*** 0.29 
  
    
9.07 6.3 -14.09 
 
Negative Total 
Gains 
443 17.85* 
-
0.16*** 
0.19 -12.64 -0.21*** 
 
0.36 
  
 
1.61 -10.24 
 
-1.26 -15.65 
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Table 2.7 Summary of the Main Results from the Multivariate Analysis 
  ENTIRE SAMPLE TENDER OFFERS NON-TENDER OFFERS 
  Target to Total Target to Acquirer Target to Total Target to Acquirer Target to Total Target to Acquirer 
PANEL A. ENTIRE SAMPLE 
ALL Positive Negative Positive Zero Positive Negative 
Positive TG 
 
Zero 
 
Zero 
 
Zero 
Negative TG Negative 
 
Zero 
 
Negative 
 
PANEL B. VALUATION PERIODS 
HIGH Zero Negative Zero Negative Zero Negative 
Positive TG 
 
Zero 
 
Negative 
 
Zero 
Negative TG Negative 
 
Negative 
 
Negative 
 
NEUTRAL Positive Zero Positive Negative Positive Zero 
Positive TG 
 
Zero 
 
Positive 
 
Zero 
Negative TG Negative 
 
Zero 
 
Zero 
 
LOW Zero Zero Zero Zero Zero Zero 
Positive TG 
 
Zero 
 
Zero 
 
Positive 
Negative TG Negative 
 
Zero 
 
Negative 
 
PANEL C.  WAVE PERIODS 
1983-1989 Positive Positive Positive Positive Zero Zero 
Positive TG 
 
Positive 
 
Positive 
 
Positive 
Negative TG Zero 
 
Zero 
 
Negative 
 
1993-1999 Positive Zero Zero Zero Positive Zero 
Positive TG 
 
Zero 
 
Zero 
 
Zero 
Negative TG Zero 
 
Zero 
 
Negative 
 
2003-2007 Zero Negative Zero Zero Zero Negative 
Positive TG 
 
Negative 
 
Zero 
 
Negative 
Negative TG Negative 
 
Zero 
 
Negative 
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This table is the summary of the multivariate analysis. We extent Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) methodology on merger motives to control for other 
variables that might affect the correlation of target gains with total and acquirer gains, other than market conditions. We run two different regressions for a. 
the entire sample, b. tender offers and c. non-tender offers. Panel A, shows the sign of each regression for all mergers and acquisitions of the three samples, 
Panel B and C shows the sign of each regression for the three samples, for different valuation periods and different merger waves respectively. The depended 
variable, Y is always Target Gain and independent variable, X is Total Gain in the first regression and Acquirer Gain in the second.  We estimate the 
following models as follow: 
 
 Relation between Target and Total Gain   
9 9
0 i
k=1 1
Target Gain = (Total Gain) + (Total Gain) + k ki k ki
k
a D D   

  
  
 
Relation between Target and Acquirer Gain   
9 9
0 i
k=1 1
Target Gain = (Total Gain) + (Acquirer Gain) + k ki k ki
k
a D D   

  
.  
 
The intercept   and the slope    change as the characteristics of the deal change; the dummy variables     equal one if the kth characteristic applies to case i 
and zero otherwise. The characteristics of deals that are used in the regression are measured for the target firm and are calculated over the fiscal year prior to 
the acquisition.  Completion is a dummy variable indicating whether the acquisition has completed or not, Hostility shows is the attitude of acquisition was 
unsolicited or hostile, Competing bids shows if multiple acquiring firms were interested for the target firm in the following six months (see Officer (2003)), 
Toehold is a dummy variable that equals one if the fraction of the target’s common stock owned by the bidder is greater than 5% at the bid announcement 
date or zero otherwise (see Officer (2003)), Cash (stock) is a dummy variable that equals one if the acquirer firm offers 100% cash (stock) to the target firm 
and intra-industry is a dummy variable that shows whether acquiring and target firm belong in the same Fama and French (1997) 49-industry classification.  
 
Note: TG stands for Total Gains 
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Table 2.8 Summary of the Main Results from the Multivariate Analysis of Additional Proxies 
  ENTIRE SAMPLE TENDER OFFERS NON-TENDER OFFERS 
  Target to Total Target to Acquirer Target to Total Target to Acquirer Target to Total Target to Acquirer 
PANEL A. ENTIRE SAMPLE 
ALL Positive Negative Positive Zero Positive Negative 
Positive TG 
 
Zero 
 
Zero 
 
Zero 
Negative TG Negative 
 
Zero 
 
Negative 
 
PANEL B. NET BUYER = 1  
ALL Positive Positive Positive Zero Positive Zero 
Positive TG 
 
Negative 
 
Negative 
 
Negative 
Negative TG Zero 
 
Zero 
 
Zero 
 
PANEL C. G-INDEX ≥ 14  
ALL Zero Negative Zero Negative Zero Negative 
Positive TG 
 
Zero 
 
Zero 
 
Zero 
Negative TG Negative 
 
Negative 
 
Negative 
 
 
This table is the summary of the multivariate analysis. We extent Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) methodology on merger motives to control for other 
variables that might affect the correlation of target gains with total and acquirer gains, other than market conditions. We run two different regressions for a. 
the entire sample, b. tender offers and c. non-tender offers. Panel A, shows the sign of each regression for all mergers and acquisitions of the three samples, 
Panel B and C shows the sign of each regression for the three sample for only acquisitions with a Net Buyer Measure =1 and G- Index ≥ 14, respectively. Net 
buyer measure (Malmendier and Tate; 2005) classify the managers of a firm as overconfident is they do not reduce their portfolio exposure to firm-specific 
risk as captured by the number of stocks they held every year. Panel B contains only the firms that the managers are overconfident and therefore are more 
likely to be infected by hubris. G- Index or Government Index shows ‘the balance of power between shareholders and mangers’ (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick, 
2003) and therefore can be used to capture agency or managerialism problems. G-Index can take values from 1 to 19 and firms are categorised into 10 groups; 
Firm with a G-index ≥ 14 (Dictatorship Portfolio) have the ‘weakest shareholder rights’ or the ‘highest management power’, while firms with a G-index ≤ 5 
have the ‘strongest shareholder rights’ or the ‘lowest management power’ (Democracy Portfolio). Panel C contains only the firms that belong in the 
Dictatorship Portfolio.  
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Chapter 3: Diversified Mergers and Default Risk 
3.1 Introduction 
The implications of corporate diversification and issues related to diversification have been 
widely explored. A number of influences that induce a firm to integrate (Carleton, Harris and 
Stewart, 1980; McDougall and Round, 1984; Reed and Luffman, 1986; Ramanujam and 
Varadarajan, 1989; Penas and Unal, 2004; Grafiken and Hankins, 2011)  and the effects of 
diversification on firms’ organizational structure and economic performance (Rumelt, 1977; 
Amihud and Lev; 1981; Allen and Hamilton, 1985; Lubatkin, 1987; Kim, Hwang and 
Burgers, 1993; Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Kedia, Ravid and Pons, 2009) have been also 
extensively investigated. It has been shown that firms diversify for both proactive and 
defensive reasons (see for example Reed and Luffman, 1986), to realize technological and 
marketing synergies (Abell, 1980; Booz, Allen and Hamilton, 1985), to obtain vertical 
economies (Stewart, Harris and Carleton, 1984) and to reduce firm’s default risk (Amihud 
and Lev, 1981; Montgomery and Singh, 1984; Kim, Hwang and Burgers, 1993; Penas and 
Unal, 2004) by spreading activities across global market areas that will provide to the firm 
operational flexibilities and profit possibilities.  
In the literature of corporate finance, diversification is known as a risk management tool due 
to the operational hedging that can be accomplished via diversified mergers (Amihud and 
Lev, 1981; Hirshleifer, 1988; Penas and Unal, 2004; Grafinkel and Hankins. 2011). A recent 
study by Furfine and Rosen (2011) shows that mergers increase default risk in the long term 
(i.e. 6 months after the completion of the deal), despite the common belief that mergers 
decrease default risk through the diversification effect. Mansi and Reeb (2002) study the risk 
effects and its impact on firm value in conglomerate acquisitions. They find that ‘excess 
value is decreasing in diversification and that the diversification discount is most pronounced 
in firms with higher than average debt levels’. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find that family 
firms experience less diversification and use similar levels of debt as nonfamily firms. The 
latest findings suggest that default risk changes through diversified mergers deserve the 
interest of new empirical studies. It remains yet unclear which mergers increase default risk 
and how different types of diversification affect a firm’s default risk in the post-acquisition 
period.  
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This study adds to our understanding of diversification through mergers and acquisitions by 
studying default risk variation in different types of corporate diversification. Empirical 
studies have reported conflicting evidence on the direction of default risk after a merger in 
which several important questions remain unanswered. Realizing the diversification benefits 
of a merger greatly depend upon the manager of the acquiring firm and how capable is to 
complete the deal. An unrelated merger might be riskier than a related one, due to the 
uncertainty of entering in a new market/industry, the difficulty to correctly value the target 
firm and the information asymmetry in terms of integrating with the target firm.  Our research 
builds on previous evidence that default risk changes through a diversified merger by 
exploring the changes of default risk on related and unrelated diversification strategies. In this 
study we seek to address the following questions; Do certain types of mergers (vertical, 
horizontal, mixed vertical/horizontal, conglomerate) involve different levels of default risk? 
Is this potential default risk variation across diversification types related to other firm and 
deal’s characteristics? Do other elements such as market conditions affect default risk and 
diversification type? To answer these questions we study default risk changes for the 
acquiring firms’ prior to the acquisition announcement and post-acquisition completion, 
within four different types of diversification; vertical, horizontal, mixed vertical/horizontal 
(i.e. related diversification strategies) and conglomerate (i.e. unrelated diversification).  
The literature on corporate diversifications and factors related to diversification is dating back 
to 1970s. Diversification has gained much academic attention after the first empirical 
evidence uncovered differences in performance between related and unrelated diversified 
firms. Rumelt (1974, 1977) found that related diversified firms outperform unrelated firms 
because of the skill advantage they have when entering related areas. Other studies have 
explored the underlying reasons regarding the difference in performance between related and 
unrelated diversified firms. Bettis and Hall (1982) for example propose two alternative 
explanations; high performing related diversified firms select firms from high profit 
industries and/or these firms are able to develop and pursue strategies in their constituent 
businesses and thus are more efficient in developing and pursuing appropriate diversification 
strategies. Miles (1982) showed that the general environment, the industry’s competitive 
environment and firms’ specific characteristics and performance affect diversification 
decisions.  
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Other papers have linked diversification with firm and deal characteristics. MacDonald 
(1985) studied the inter-industry diversification and showed that large firms are more likely 
to diversify into similar industries in terms of advertising intensity and R&D intensity. 
Lecraw (1984) showed that industry and firm characteristics influence diversification strategy 
in unrelated acquisitions (conglomerate acquisitions). Levitt (1975) find that vertical firms 
prefer related diversification to grow in size and expand in related industries. Montgomery 
and Singh (1984) showed that unrelated mergers have higher systematic risk as captured by 
beta and compared to other diversification categories. Kim, Bettins and Mahajan (1985) find 
that certain diversification can reduce risk and increase returns.  
Through diversification a firm can increase returns by spreading its activities into various 
markets (regional or industrial) and thus reduce corporate risk (Hamel and Prahalad, 1985; 
Kim and Mauborgne, 1988). Lewellen (1971) argued that conglomerate mergers can sustain 
higher levels of debt because diversification reduces earnings variability. Mansi and Reeb 
(2002) study the risk effects on conglomerate acquisitions and showed that higher leverage 
firms enjoy higher diversification discount. Furfine and Rosen (2011) find that managerial 
motives outweigh asset diversification benefits and increase default risk for the acquiring 
firm. Since the significant increase, in numbers and value, of mergers and acquisitions during 
the last decades and the latest findings that risk reduction is not among the diversification 
benefits of a merger, the literature on corporate risk variation through diversification deserves 
further research.  
The success of every diversification, related or unrelated, depends mainly upon the efficiency 
of the management team in transferring resources between the two firms and how well 
integrated the two firms become. The spreading of activities across new markets (business or 
geographic) or stages of production will also expose firms to additional costs (such as the 
transferring of resources between the two firms, the new group of customers that the merged 
firm has to attract, or/and the mis-management of a larger firm), increase risk levels and thus 
decrease profitability. The question to diversify will always be a calculated risk; however the 
profitability of the merger and realizing the diversification benefits in terms of risk are greatly 
depended upon the manager of the acquiring firm and how capable is to complete the deal. 
Persuading an unrelated merger might be riskier than a related one, due to the uncertainty of 
entering a new market/industry and the information asymmetry in terms of integrating with a 
firm in an unfamiliar market/industry. The acquirer is more likely to overlook critical factors 
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and overpay the target firm and experience monitoring problems once the merger is 
completed. Information asymmetry concept dates back to Akerlof, (1970) in his article ‘The 
market for Lemons’. Akerlof’s model assumes that due to information asymmetry the buyer 
cannot tell the bad-quality products. We therefore argue that the acquirer has more difficulties 
to communicate and to verify the benefits of an unrelated acquisition and it creates a risk of 
adverse selection. On the other hand when the acquirer makes a related acquisition, he is 
familiar with the nature of the business, the industry and the production process of the target 
and therefore the choice of a firm that will be both profitable and decrease default risk, is 
easier. Since horizontal diversification is the merger of two firms that belong in the same 
industry and in the same stage of production, then information asymmetry between the 
acquirer and the target minimizes which in turn should reduce default risk for the acquiring 
firm to the minimum. To explore this hypothesis we need a measure of information 
asymmetry.  
Idiosyncratic stock volatility has been linked with issues such as portfolio diversification, 
active portfolio management, future earnings, option valuation and information asymmetry. 
Chen et al. (2001) show that level of information quality affects stock volatility and that 
higher information asymmetry increases stock volatility. Pastor and Veronesi (2003) explore 
the relation between information asymmetry and stock volatility when investors are aware 
about the uncertainty in the potential profitability of the firm and show that higher uncertainty 
induces high return volatility. Miffre (2011) finds a positive relation between high 
idiosyncratic stock volatility and poorly diversified firms. We therefore expect that the type 
of diversification which involves the higher uncertainty due to information asymmetry will 
increase volatility and the acquirer firm’s default risk. It is more likely that unrelated 
diversification will have higher uncertainty than related diversification. Following Furfine 
and Rosen (2011) we measure idiosyncratic stock volatility, as ‘the standard deviation of the 
idiosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock return, estimated by taking the square root of 
the variance of the residuals form a market model estimated over the six month period ending 
at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement.’ 
To assess the impact of default risk on different type of diversification, we need to quantify 
the credit worthiness of each firm. For the purpose of our study we adopt a recent 
econometric model which predicts corporate risk using both accounting and market data 
developed by Campbell, Hilsher and Szilagyi (2008). There is a large related literature on the 
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prediction of corporate risk which varies in the choice of variables and the methodology used. 
Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980) and Zmijewski (1984) uses a static model to 
estimate the probability to default, that includes only accounting data. Kaplan and Urwitz 
(1979) Blume, Lim and MacKinlay (1998) and Molina (2005) use accounting variables to 
predict credit ratings. However, static models involve biases and overestimations of the 
impact of the explanatory variables since they do not take into account the time-series 
evolution of the accounting variables, as noted by Shumway (2001).  
Alternative models to the static models of  Beaver (1966), Altman (1968), Ohlson (1980) and 
Zmijewski (1984) to estimate the probability of default, are the dynamic panel models of 
Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Campbell, Hilsher and Szilagyi (2008). The 
latter study developed a logit specification of a dynamic panel model which considers a wide 
range of market and accounting explanatory variables to predict a firm’s default risk. This is a 
common practise used not only by academic studies but also by large financial institutions 
that choose to build their own probability of default models, collect historical fundamental 
data from financial statements, and identify firms which defaulted to estimate a logistic 
regression model. The traditional measure of credit quality is a rating, similar to the ones 
produced by S&P, Moody’s or Fitch. For example, Furfine and Rosen (2011) use the 
Expected Default Frequency (EDF) developed by MoodysKMV (KMV) which is an estimate 
of the probability that a firm defaults in the next year. Campbell et al. (2008) model, offers a 
significantly improved alternative way to estimate default risk in various horizons. Since their 
model outperform Moody’s KMV model in periods less than one year, we choose to adopt 
this model for the purpose of our analysis which spans from one month before the 
announcement to six months after the completion. For periods more than a year, the 
predictability power of both models is comparable.  
The second obstacle to our study is the diversification categorization of our sample of 
mergers and acquisitions for the period of 1980 to 2008. Several measures have been 
employed in the literature that capture the degree of vertical integration. The dominating 
methods are the value-added approach used by Adelman (1955)
12
, Rumelt (1974) total 
product percentage approach and the input-output matrix method proposed by Maddigan 
(1981). Adelman (1955) calculates the ratio of value added over sales. Despite the simplicity 
in calculating this ratio it has a major drawback; it is influenced by both the type of 
                                                          
12
 See also Gort, (1962), Nelson (1959), Laffer (1969), and Wilder (1977) 
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integration and the firm’s profitability. Rumelt (1974) measures vertical integration as a 
percentage of total product. The problem with this measure is that it captures both vertical 
and horizontal integration, and also it requires to breakdown total value of production by 
product line, information which is not always available.  
Maddigan (1981) exploits the interactions of the Leontief (1951) input-output model and 
developed a static linear model of vertical integration index using the national input-output 
tables and information on the firms’ industries. Vertical index is treated not as a single 
processing chain, but as an interaction which is reflected by a two-dimensional matrix of the 
two firms. The main problem with this method is the possible vertical linkages that exist 
between companies and which are difficult to identify with the input – output tables. For 
example a merger between a petroleum – refining firm (SIC 29)13 and a petroleum 
exploration firm (SIC 13) is consider as a diversifying merger despite that based on the 
industry definition this is also a vertical merger. Fan and Lang (2000) and Fan and Goyal 
(2006) address the issue and provide a more sophisticated method to distinguish between 
vertical and horizontal mergers. They use industry commodity flows information in the Use 
table of Benchmark input-output tables to capture vertical integration. We follow Fan and 
Goyal (2006) method to classify mergers by the type of diversification as horizontal, vertical, 
mixed horizontal/vertical and conglomerate.   
We find that not all mergers increase default risk of the acquiring firm; horizontal 
diversification when combined with other characteristics can diversify default risk. We also 
find that larger acquirers increase risk less than smaller ones. The increase in default risk 
surrounding mergers is driven by public firms, firms with higher idiosyncratic risk, and deals 
announced and completed during the second merger wave. Our results remain robust after 
controlling for other factors related to acquisition process and performance.  
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 SIC stands for Standard Industrial Classification which is a system for classifying industries by a four-digit 
code.  
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3.2 Literature Review 
3.2.1 Mergers and Default Risk 
There is a strong connection between periods of high market uncertainty and thus elevated 
risk levels, and merger activity. The most recent example is the US credit crisis of 2008 that 
dramatically affected the number of mergers and acquisitions which decreased in value by 
more than 50% in the year 2009 compared with 2007. More than ever, firms will now 
strategically position themselves in risk-reducing projects, such as diversified mergers. There 
was a common presumption in the literature of corporate finance that certain types of mergers 
(i.e. conglomerate mergers) decrease risk. Amihud and Lev (1981) showed that conglomerate 
mergers can reduce risks through the diversification effect. More recently, Furfine and Rosen 
(2011) show that mergers increase default risk due to aggressive managerial actions that 
increase risk at a level which outweighs the risk-reducing benefits of diversification. 
A number of studies have discussed the potential economic benefits and motivations of 
diversified mergers. Early papers (Carleton, Harris and Stewart, 1980; McDougall and 
Round, 1984; Reed and Luffman, 1986; and Salter and Weinhold, 1979) suggest that a 
number of influences may be at work that induce a firm to diversify. One of the first papers, 
Levy and Sarnat (1970) explains that mergers might reduce risk through the diversification 
effect, but will also destroy value for shareholders. This finding was later confirmed by 
Amihud and Lev (1981) who also suggest that managers engage in conglomerate mergers to 
reduce their unemployment risk. Geneen (1984), and Little (1984) study the rationale and 
effectiveness of conglomerate acquisitions, while other studies explored other 
motives/relationships behind diversification. For example, Lecraw (1984) finds that the 
industry and firm characteristics of a firm influence its diversification strategy. Risk variation 
has been also empirically studied with respect other types of diversification; Williamson 
(1971) and Carlton (1979) discuss how vertical integration may reduce risk during periods of 
uncertainty and Levitt (1975) finds that vertical firms evolve into related-diversified firms 
(they grow in size and expand in related industrial sectors). Some other studies have explored 
wealth creation and other benefits or drawbacks in related versus unrelated mergers.  
Lubatkin (1987) finds that conglomerate acquisitions outperform related acquisitions in terms 
of stock market’s valuation while Bettis and Hall (1982) and Bettis and Mahajan (1985) 
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studied risk-return trade-off of diversified firms and find that certain diversification postured 
can reduce risk and increase returns.  
More recent studies present a reverse pattern regarding risk variation through the 
diversification effect of mergers. Ghosh and Jain (2000) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2008) 
find that the default risk of the bidding firm increases due to changes in financial leverage. 
Furfine and Rosen (2011) study the impact of mergers on default risk and find that on 
average, mergers increase default risk due to managerial risk-increasing motivations with 
respect to the structure of compensation which outweigh the diversification effects. They find 
greater risk increases at firms where the CEOs have large option-based compensation, where 
the recent equity performance is low and where idiosyncratic volatility is high. Shareholder 
can benefit from risk-increases but at the same time the previous proposition points into large 
“agency issues” due to private benefits of the managers.  
Other studies have explored issues related to distress acquisitions; Hotchkiss and Mooradian 
(1998) find that distress acquisitions are in related industries and bidders are related with the 
targets. They also show that this type of acquisitions result in positive abnormal returns and 
improve operating performance. Clark and Ofek (1994) find that distressed firms are more 
likely to engage in related acquisitions and will not be hostile. Carapeto et al (2009) confirm 
that distress acquisitions result in positive AR for both the bidder and the target. Bruland and 
De Maeseneire (2011) studies the relationship of stock equity volatility of the acquirer firm 
and default risk for mergers that the target firm is distressed and find that growth bidders, 
low-risk bidders, acquirers who offer high premiums and acquisitions during or close to 
booming markets increase bidder post-acquisition default risk. They attribute this effect on 
acquirer’s performance and risk before the acquisitions and to the high market valuations.. 
This paper focuses on risk variation over different types of integration.  Although the 
literature on mergers and acquisitions has extensively studied diversification effects on 
mergers, yet no study to our knowledge has ever compared acquirer firm’s default risk 
variation prior to the announcement and after the merger completion by the type of 
diversification. Diversification has been linked to the spread of risk through the firm’s 
expansion in different stages of production, in new products (related or unrelated with the 
firm’s main business line), and in other industries or geographic areas (Hamel and Prahalad, 
1985; Kim and Mauborgne, 1988; Clark and Ofek, 1994). It has been also viewed as a 
solution against the alternative of bankruptcy (Carapeto et al., 2009), or to access sources of 
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financing, debt and equity beyond its reach due to acquirer’s small size (Lewellen, 1971; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1992). There are also tax advantages associated with diversified mergers 
condition upon the future operating gains which can be increased through cost and resources 
reduction (Lewellen, 1971). Nevertheless, irrespective to the abovementioned motives behind 
diversification, one of the main benefits is the reduction of default risk, or at least this was the 
expectation until recently.  
3.2.2 Diversified Mergers 
Diversification through mergers is a corporate restructuring strategy which creates value by 
improving efficiency and productivity. There are different types of diversification and each 
type serves specific corporate targets. Diversification strategies can be classified into related 
and unrelated; a related diversification is a merger of two firms with common core skills and 
an unrelated is the one where the firms involved belong in different industries or geographic 
areas. Unrelated diversification is also called external or conglomerate diversification. There 
is a common presumption that unrelated diversification will reduce risk due to the expansion 
in a different country or in another product range and thus it can improve the profitability of 
the acquiring firm. However, it is unlikely that such mergers will create value for either the 
bidder or the target firm (Rumelt, 1974, 1977; Bettis and Hall, 1982) 
Diversification strategies can also be classified by the direction of the diversification. Vertical 
integration (or related) is the merger of two firms that belong in different stages of the same 
production path. There are three types of vertical integration, backward and forward 
integration and balanced. A firm that expands backward on the production line (upstream) is 
backward intergraded, while a firm that expands forward on the production line 
(downstream) is forward integrated. A balanced vertical integration is both upstream and 
downstream merger. Vertical integration can help companies reduce costs, increase 
productivity/efficiency of corporate resources through operating synergies, improve 
competitive positioning accruing from increased size of business and receive additional 
profits by decreasing transportation expenses, average costs and reducing turnaround time in 
the long-run. However, the merged firm needs to be fully efficient with respect their 
distribution systems, production facilities or research operations to receive the additional 
profits. On the other hand, concentrating on one product might result into smaller earnings if 
demand for the product falls, or a substitute product displaces the product in the marketplace 
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and the entire organization may suffer. Market conditions are also important drivers of the 
success of a vertical merger. Fan and Goyal (2006) finds that on vertical mergers result in 
positive gains due to imperfect competition. Kedia et al., (2011) extent Fan and Goyal (2006) 
sample which spans until 1996, and show that vertical mergers yield positive wealth effects 
until 1998. This effect reverses after 1998 and up to 2002 in line with Moeller et al., (2005). 
Williamson (1971) and Carlton (1979) discuss how vertical integration, in specific, may 
reduce risk during periods of uncertainty.  
Horizontal integration is the most common form of related corporate expansion and it is the 
merger of two firms that belong in the same industry or in the same stage of production. 
Essentially, the ultimate purpose of the bidding firm which initiated the merger is to increase 
its share of the market for a particular product or service. The success of a merger may 
depend not only of how integrated the joining firms become, but also on how well suited the 
managers to handle the growth of the firm. Eckbo (1983, 1985) was one of the first studies 
that investigate horizontal mergers and the wealth effect creation. McGuckin, Warren-
Boulton and Waldstein (1988), Salinger and Schumann (1988), Fee and Thomas (2004), 
Shahrur (2005) and Gugler and Sieber (2007), among others, investigate horizontal mergers 
and the underlying reasons for any wealth effect changes through this type of mergers. In 
general, horizontal or related mergers lead to operational synergies due to cost reduction, as 
well as financial synergies. Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) find that distress acquisitions 
are in related industries and bidders are related with the targets. They also show that this type 
of acquisitions result in positive abnormal returns and improve operating performance. Clark 
and Ofek (1994) find that takeovers that involve distressed firms would belong in the same 
industry and will not be hostile. Carapeto et al (2009) confirm that distress acquisitions result 
in positive AR for both the bidder and the target.   
Mixed vertical – horizontal mergers occurs when a firms diversifies both vertically and 
horizontally. It is unclear how this type of diversification would affect acquirer firms in terms 
of risk due to the simultaneously vertical and horizontal effects that they will receive. The 
success of every diversification would greatly depend upon the efficiency of the management 
team in transferring resources between the two firms and how well integrated the two firms 
become. In sum, the direction of the diversification would essentially modify firm’s business 
objectives so as to better satisfy the desired performance of the firm. However, the spreading 
of activities across new markets (business or geographic) or stages of production will also 
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expose firms to additional costs (such as the transferring of resources between the two firms, 
the new group of customers that the merged firm has to attract, or/and the mis-management 
of a larger firm), increase risk levels and thus decrease profitability. The question to diversify 
will always be a calculated risk. Unrelated diversification is probably riskier than related 
diversification since the acquirer will enter an unfamiliar industry. Due to the uncertainty and 
the information asymmetry (Akerlof; 1970) it is possible that the acquirer will overlook 
critical factors and overpay the target firm. Finally, once the merger is completed the acquirer 
will most likely have trouble monitoring the new acquisition’s performance.  
3.2.3 Default Risk Explanatory Variables 
This paper seeks to shed light on risk variation in diversified mergers in the post-acquisition 
period. We compare default risk levels prior to the acquisition announcement and after the 
acquisition completion, in four different types of diversification (vertical, horizontal, mixed 
vertical/horizontal, conglomerate) and search how default risk is related with three groups of 
explanatory variables; the first set of variables is target related. We look at target’s ownership 
status, target’s country, target’s industry and the size of the target in relation with the 
acquirer’s size. The second group of variables include information regarding the method of 
payment used, acquirer’s debt level and acquirer’s size. The next group of variables are 
related with the profitability of the merger and the managerial compensation.  Finally, we 
also see how default risk varies in the three most important merger waves of our sample; 
1980s, 1990s and 2000s.  
3.2.3.1 Merger Waves 
The history of mergers and acquisitions is divided into six periods based on the merger 
activity and the market conditions. For example, from 1897-1904 was the first wave, also 
known as the horizontal wave. Then from 1916-1929 was a vertical merger, followed by a 
conglomerate merger until 1969 and a hostile wave in the 1980’s. The 1990’s wave was 
overpopulated by cross-border merger and the last known wave in the 2000’s involved 
private equities and LBOs.   
The 1960’s conglomerate wave increase the size of the firms, which instead of becoming 
more efficient they were under-performing and lead to the next merger wave of 1980’s which 
is the beginning of our sample period. According to the literature, the period of 1980 - 1989 
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is known as a divestiture merger wave.
14
 During that period, a lot of firms were large and 
highly inefficient being in fact sub-products of the 1960’s conglomerate wave. Most of the 
firms were under-performing due to industry shocks they experienced and were also 
considered as undervalued. This wave initiated a large increase in loans and thus increased 
debt levels, which spurred a high default rate among firms. Finally, banks stopped this 
lending frenzy, thus ended the wave. The 1980’s wave is very large in terms of activity and 
the size of the target firms. Most of the acquisitions during this period were hostile, the 
medium of payment was cash (through leveraged takeovers) rather than stock and they were 
characterized by heavy use of leverage.
15
 Ghosh and Jain, 2000 shows that when a firm 
increase its leverage through a merger, its default risk also increases. Also the larger the 
target firm is, the bigger its impact on the acquirer. We therefore expect that during the first 
merger wave that most firms were high-leveraged and targets were very large is size, default 
risk levels will be elevated.  
The next wave period in the 1990’s, was characterised by technological advances involves 
larger cross-border mergers, and high stock valuations that initiate the use of stock as a 
method of payment. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that managers prefer to engage into 
mergers and pay with stock when their stock is overvalued. Such acquisitions benefit the 
shareholders of the acquiring firms. However, there are no predictions in the literature for the 
direction of the risk in overvalued acquisitions. Furthermore, cross-border acquisitions can 
take the direction of the risk both ways; buying a foreign target, the acquirer enters a new 
market with cheaper sources of production, gains greater bargaining power and diversify its 
country’s and/or market’s risk. However, there is more uncertainty and information 
asymmetry involved by entering a new country. Due to the conflicting theories, we have no 
prior expectation regarding the level of default risk of the acquiring firms during this wave.  
Finally, the last wave period is the beginning of global markets as we know it today. This 
wave is characterized by large private equity players, high market valuations, large 
premiums, low interest rates and a financial crisis that started from the loan market and 
spread to the house market. In 2007 the crisis hits a peak in the US market and around banks 
are forced to follow a stingiest credit which sinks the market into a depressing period. Due to 
the elevated market risk during this period, we expect that default risk levels of the acquiring 
firms will also be elevated. 
                                                          
14
 See for example Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) 
15
 See for example Bhagat, Shleifer and Vishny (1990) and Kaplan (1997) 
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3.2.3.2 Target-related Characteristics 
The first set of explanatory variables is target-related characteristics. We investigate how 
default risk changes in the four types of diversification by the target’s status (i.e. public, 
private and subsidiary), the target’s country (i.e. foreign and domestic target’s), the target’s 
industry (i.e. same or different industry) and finally the size of the target in relation with the 
acquirer’s size (relative size). 
Target type is an important factor of the acquisition success in terms of wealth creation. 
Several studies report positive abnormal returns for private and subsidiary acquisitions and 
zero or negative for public acquisitions (Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988; Jarrell and Poulsen, 
1989; Lang, Stulz and Walking, 1989; Servaes, 1991; Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; 
Mulherin and Boone, 2000). The primary characteristic of a public firm is the dispersed 
ownership of the target entity. More specific, in a public merger there will be no identifiable 
party to stand behind the obligations of the target after closing. The deal happens between the 
managerial teams of the two firms involved and it is subject to shareholder approval. This 
creates a level of uncertainty. In a private merger, the deal is typically negotiated directly 
with the shareholders of the target and thus such acquisitions are more profitable and less 
risky. We therefore expect that non-public acquisitions will involve smaller increases of 
default risk.  
The literature on cross-border acquisitions (CBA) concentrated on the performance 
differences when acquiring a foreign target compared with a domestic target. Datta and Puia 
(1995) shows that CB acquirers experience negative abnormal returns and attribute this to the 
high costs that such acquisitions has, the cultural differences, and the integration problems 
that the managerial team faces. Moeller and Schlingermann (2004) find that US bidders 
experience lower performance in cross-border acquisitions compared with the domestic ones.  
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) find that acquisitions of domestic firms result in negative 
insignificant abnormal returns, while cross-border acquisitions result in significant positive 
returns. Conn et al., (2005) uncover significant wealth differences between domestic and 
cross-border acquisitions after controlling for target status and the method of payment. Cross 
border acquisitions do not increase wealth (Doukas and Travlos, 1988) but acquirers who 
choose to expose themselves internationally by taking over a foreign target in the absent of 
information asymmetry, they can take advantage from (1) the gains from diversification, (2) 
the synergies, (3) the strategic planning, (4) the access to research and development, (5) the 
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access to cheaper sources of production, (6) the incomplete markets and information 
asymmetries, (7) diversify specific country’s and/or market’s risk , and finally (8) the greater 
bargaining power. We expect that if the acquiring firm is well prepared and aware of risks 
and possibilities of the new market which is entering, it can decrease risk in the post-
acquisition period.  
Relative size is the ratio of the deal’s value to the market value of the acquirer. The smaller 
the target compared to acquirer the less likely the merger will have an impact on the 
acquirer’s firm (Asquith et al., 1983). Similarly, we expect that the smaller relative size deals 
would involve smaller increases of risk. 
3.2.3.3 Method of Payment, Acquirer’s Leverage and Size 
The method of payment in an acquisition affects the asset volatility of the firm as well as the 
market reaction around the announcement and the success of the merger (Travlos, 1987). 
There are three main methods of payments; cash, stock and a combination of cash and stock, 
known as mixed payments. Usually, an acquirer will offer stock if he thinks that his stock is 
overvalued (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Evidence on wealth creation by the method of 
payment offered in a merger suggest that equity acquisitions are perceived negatively by the 
market and that shareholders of the acquiring firm experience negative abnormal returns, 
while shareholders in cash acquisitions experience small positive or zero abnormal returns 
(Asquith et al., 1990; and Eckbo, Giammarino, Heinkel; 1990). Method of payment is one of 
the strongest drivers of the success and the profitability of the acquisition. However, we have 
no prior expectation for the direction of the risk by the method of payment. 
Furfine and Rosen (2011) find that there is a positive relationship between the leverage level 
and default risk. We also include leverage as an explanatory variable and explore how 
diversification strategies are affected if the acquirer increases its leverage level. 
Acquirer size also affects takeover process in terms of wealth creation but also in terms of the 
change in risk. Vassalou and Xing (2005) for example, show that smaller high default risk 
firms (value stocks) yield higher returns compared with bigger firms (growth stocks). We 
expect that the larger the acquirer is, the more diversified he will be and therefore its risk will 
be less affected by the acquisitions.  
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3.2.3.4 Merger Profitability and Managerial Compensation 
The ultimate goal of any healthy firm should be to maximize shareholder’s wealth by taking 
profitable project. We therefore investigate how risk levels change before and after the 
acquisition in different types of diversification. Rumelt, (1974), (1977), Montgomery (1979) 
and Bettis (1981) show that different type of diversification strategies yield different wealth 
gains. More specific they find that related mergers outperform unrelated mergers. High risk 
projects are usually high return projects. We therefore expect that profitable acquisitions will 
also be risk-enhancing projects and visa versa.   
Furfine and Rosen (2011) include OPTIONS as a managerial compensation measure and an 
explanatory variable of the risk-increasing mergers. They argue that greater option 
compensation will be correlated with risk-increasing projects. We want to test their finding 
and see how it changes when we split the sample by the type of diversification.  
The remainder of this paper presents our data, explains risk measure, vertical integration 
methodology, the explanatory variables we incorporate in univariate and multivariate analysis 
and presents our empirical results. Overall our research provides a new perspective in the 
default risk associated with the different diversification strategies. We find a strong 
relationship between idiosyncratic stock volatility and default risk increase. Idiosyncratic 
stock volatility is an indicator of information asymmetry; horizontal acquisitions involve less 
information asymmetry than other diversification strategies due to the familiar nature of the 
industry and thus reduce default risk for the acquiring firm after the merger completion.  
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Sample Description 
The US Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) sample is from Thompson One Banker database. 
We choose all the mergers and acquisitions which are selected announced and completed 
between 1980 and 2008. The deals involve public US bidders and domestic or foreign targets. 
Neither the bidder nor the target is a government, a healthcare, a utility, a bank, a real estate 
or a financial institution. To ensure that a merger has a significant impact on acquirer’s firm 
default risk, we examine only those where the acquirer owns less than 10% prior to the deal 
and obtains more than 50% after the deal, similar with other studies (see for example Fuller et 
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al., 2002).  We apply the minimum restrictions on deal value (deal value is the total value 
minus fees and expenses paid by the bidder > 5%) and relative size (ratio of deal value to the 
bidder market value > 5 million dollars) in order to eliminate the deals that have little or no 
influence on the bidder’s firm default risk.16 After these restrictions are applied our sample is 
reduced to 8046 completed mergers.  
We also require that within the selected period of our analysis (1980-2008): i. accounting and 
market data are available from COMPUSTAT and CRSP, respectively, so we can calculate 
acquiring firm’s default risk 1 and 6 months prior the announcement, and 6 months after the 
completion of the merger and ii. commodity flow data are available for the selected deals 
from the U.S. input-output (IO) tables so we can construct the IO-based measures to measure 
the vertical integration of the deals as Fan and Lang (2000). The final sample comprise of 
8046 completed mergers. We then calculate the acquiring firm’s default risk between 6-
months prior the announcement and 6-months after the completion, and between 1-month 
prior the announcement and 6-months after the completion
17
 and we end up with 2203 
completed mergers and acquisitions. 
Finally, we construct the explanatory variables
18
 used by Furfine and Rosen (2011) to explore 
the relationships between the acquirer default risk and: i. the target default risk, ii. the 
managerial compensation, iii. asymmetric information, and iv. stock valuation. To do so, we 
require stock market information from CRSP, balance sheet changes from COMPUSTAT and 
executive compensation data from Execucomp. Due to the number of information we require 
from CRSP and COMPUSTAT to construct the variables, and Execucomp data 
unavailability, our final sample comprise of 1382 observations.   
3.3.2 Estimating Default Risk 
We estimate default risk 6 months (and 1 month) before the announcement and 6 months 
after the merger completion, using Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) dynamic panel 
                                                          
16
 To ensure that the findings are not sensitive to the relative size or the value of the deal, we perform the 
analysis excluding from the sample the 5% and 10% smaller relative size deals and deals that have deal value 
less than 5, 10 and 50 million dollars. We find that further restrictions do not influence our findings and thus are 
not applied.  
17
 Our analysis is contacted for both period of default risk; since our findings are not influenced by this period 
we report only the results for the default risk calculated between 1-month prior the announcement and 6-months 
after the completion similar to Furfine and Rosen (2011). 
18
 You can find detailed explanations of the explanatory variables we construct as given in the Rosen and 
Furfine (2011) paper at section 3.3.3. 
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logit model of distress. To measure the probability of default, the authors extent previous 
work of Shumway (2001) and Chava and Jarrow (2004) by considering a wide range of 
explanatory monthly accounting and daily market variables from COMPUSTAT and CRSP.
19
 
They also examine the model’s predictability into various horizons. The proposed model is 
significantly improved in terms of explanatory power and compared with previous work of 
Shumway (2001) and thus we adopt this model for the purposes of our analysis.  
The logistic distribution probability of bankruptcy during the next period is given by: 
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where     is an indicator that equals one if the firm goes bankrupt in month t, and        is a 
vector of all explanatory variables at the end of the previous month. The higher           is 
the higher the probability of bankruptcy. We obtained the values for the     indicator from 
BankruptcyData.com database.
20
  
Then we construct the explanatory variables of the model for each firm, using quarterly 
accounting data from COMPUSTAT and monthly and daily equity market data from CRSP.  
The variables are defined as follows: 
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19
 Campbell et al., (2008) find that a measure to distance to default based on Moody’s KMV model adds little 
explanatory power to their model.  
20
 We would like to thank Neofytos Lambertides for providing this data. 
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All eight variables in the Campbell et al., (2008) bankruptcy model enter significantly and 
with the expected signs at the period 1980 to 1998, which is the closest period to Campbell’s 
bankruptcy model 2 (1963 – 1998), pp. 2910.   
To estimate acquiring firm’s default risk one month and six months before the announcement 
and six months after the completion of the merger, we first estimate default risk for each firm 
for each month. We annualized the monthly probability for each firm similar to MoodysKMV 
Expected Default Frequency (EDF). In order to limit the influence of outliers with extremely 
low or high default risk values we winsorize the monthly default risk probabilities at the 1
st
 
and 99
th
 percentiles of their polled distributions. We basically replace any observation below 
the 1
st
 percentile with the 1
st
 percentile, and any observation above the 99
th
 percentile with 
the 99
th
 percentile.
21
 Finally, we construct the difference of acquirer’s default risk between 
six months after the merger completion (       and one month prior to the merger 
announcement date (      :                   
where   is the month in which the merger is completed and a is the announcement month of 
the merger.
22
  
                                                          
21
 Our results are robust to other winsorization windows (5
th
 / 95
th
 percentiles and 1
st
 /99
th
 percentiles) as well as 
to no winsorization.  
22
 We also estimate the change of default risk between six months before the announcement and six months after 
the merger completion and our results remain qualitatively the same. 
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Since our measure of default risk includes market and accounting data, the six month period 
after the completion of the merger ensures that all the necessary information of the merger 
will be reflected in the accounting data.   
3.3.3 Explanatory Variables 
Following Furfine and Rosen (2011) we estimate the following variables as are described in 
their study: 
Target Public: is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the target is publicly 
traded and 0 otherwise 
Target Sub: is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the target is a subsidiary 
and 0 otherwise 
Vol: is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock return, 
estimated by taking the square root of the variance of the residuals from a market model 
estimated over the six month period ending at the end of the month prior to the merger 
announcement 
Run up net mkt: is the buy-and-hold return of a company’s stock in the 12 months ending at 
the end of the month prior to the merger announcement in excess of the return of the CRSP 
value – weighted index over the same period. 
Mkt-to-book: is the ratio of acquirer’s market value of equity to the book value of equity as 
of the last quarterly balance sheet prior to the month of the merger announcement. 
Stock: is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the acquisition is financed 
at least partially with stock. 
Diff ind: is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the target and the 
acquirer are in different industries.  
Ratio: is the ratio of the deal’s value to the market value of the acquirer 
Mkt val: is the natural log of the market value of the acquiring firm at the end of the month 
prior to the merger announcement.  
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Car: is the cumulative abnormal return abnormal return for the acquiring firm’s stock from 
the day prior to the merger announcement through the day after the announcement.  
Car resid: is the estimated residual from the regression of CAR on RETURN INTERIM, 
defined as the buy-and-hold return for an acquirer’s stock between the end of the month prior 
to the merger announcement and at the end of the month six months after the merger is 
effective  
Dist from desired risk: is defined as the residual from a regression of acquirer default risk on 
balance sheet determinants of target risk level . Following Usyal (2011), target risk model 
regresses observed default risk on acquirer market-to-book, EBITA/SALES, ASSETS, 
R&D/SALES ratio, an R&D dummy, and PPE (property, plant, and equipment expenditures).  
Market-to-book: is Market Value (liabilities [Item LT] minus balance sheet deferred taxes 
and investment tax credit [Item TXDITC] plus Preferred Stock (Preferred Stock is equal to 
liquidating value [Item PSTKL] if available, else redemption value [Item PSTKRV] if 
available, else carrying value [Item PSTK]) plus Market Equity [Item CSHO x Item 
PRCC_F]) over Total Assets [Item AT].  
Sales: the natural logarithm of net sales [Item SALE] 
Assets: Total Assets [Item AT] 
Ratio of R&D/Sale: is defined as R&D expenses [Item XRD] over Sales [Item SALE]. 
R&D dummy - R&D Dummy is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if COMPUSTAT 
reports R&D expense [Item XRD] as missing, and of zero otherwise. 
PPE – property, plant, and equipment expenditures [Item PPENT] 
Ind cf vol diff: is the risk in the acquirer’s industry minus the risk in the target firm’s 
industry, where industry risk is the standard deviation of the ratio of annual total cash flow to 
total assets in an industry in the five years prior to the merger announcement. Industry 
definitions are obtained from SDC, which separates firms into six broad industry groups. 
Cash flow measure is operating cash flows from COMPUSTAT, which are sales minus the 
sum of cost of goods sold, selling and administrative expense, and the change in working 
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capital. Cash flows and assets are then aggregated by the six SDC industry groups and we 
then take the standard deviation over a 5-year period. 
Execucomp sample: is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the acquirer is in 
the Execucomp data for the year prior to the merger announcement. 
Options: is defined as the fraction of the acquiring CEO’s compensation that is derived from 
executive stock options if EXECUCOMP SAMPLE equals 1 and is zero otherwise. 
We extend Furfine and Rosen (2011) analysis by incorporating: i. the three most important 
merger waves during our sample period (1980s, 1990s and 2000s), ii. the four types of 
diversification (i.e. vertical, horizontal, mixed and conglomerate), and iii. cross border 
mergers identification variable.  
Diversification type: Horizontal is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the 
acquirer diversifies horizontally, while Mixed and Conglomerate are defined analogously for 
the acquirers who diversify both vertically and horizontally (mixed) and for the acquirers 
who make an unrelated acquisitions (conglomerate) respectively. 
Wave1, Wave2 and Wave3 is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the 
acquisitions was announced and completed during the first merger wave (1980-1989), during 
the second (1990-1999) and during the third (2000-2008) respectively. 
CBA is an indicator that takes the value 1 if and only if the target firm is not a US firm and 0 
is the target firm is a US firm. 
3.3.4 Measuring Vertical Integration 
To classify the mergers and acquisitions into the four main types of integration we follow a 
methodology applied by Fan and Goyal (2006), Acemoglu et al. (2009) and Kedia et al. 
(2011). To calculate the vertical integration coefficient for each acquisition we have to use 
the industry commodity flow information in the ‘UseTable’ of Benchmark Input-Output 
Accounts for the U.S. Economy which are available by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Using the dollar amount of input transfer between industries, given by the IO data,
23
 we 
                                                          
23
 Maddigan (1981), Caves and Bradburd (1988), and Davis and Morris (1995) used IO data to measure vertical 
integration. McGuckin et al. (1991) used IO data to classify the relationship between merging firms into vertical, 
horizontal or conglomerate. 
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construct vertical relatedness index between industries. The ‘UseTable’ is a matrix which 
contains the value of commodity flows between each pair of roughly 500 private-sector, 
intermediate IO (Input-Output) industries. The tables are updated every five years and are 
available from 1982 until 2002. There are 3 different types of files depending on the I-O 
code; the sector level (2 digit I-O code), the summary level (4 digit I-O code) and the detailed 
level (6 digit I-O code). We choose to use the detailed level IO code for the purpose of our 
analysis as it provides all the necessary details of each industry and thus it reduces the 
possibility of making any mistakes when matching vertical coefficients with the merger 
sample by industry. We estimate the relatedness coefficients for the years 1982, 1987, 1992, 
1997 and 2002. 
Each table reports for each pair of industries, i and j, the dollar value of i’s output required to 
produce industry j’s total output, denoted as aij. In addition, for the matrix format tables, the 
total industry j’s output and the total industry i’s output were computed by adding the column 
and row sums of the data on the “UseTable” respectively for j and i industry. Pivot tables 
have been used in order to calculate the total industry j’s output and the total industry i’s 
output for the non-matrix format tables. The aij value is divided by the dollar value of 
industry j’s total output to get vij, representing the dollar value of industry i’s output required 
to produce 1 dollar’s worth of industry j’s output.  
Conversely, we divide aji by the dollar value of industry i’s total output to get vji, 
representing the dollar value of industry j ’s output required to produce 1 dollar’s worth of 
industry i’s output: 
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We then take the average of the two input requirement coefficients to obtain the vertical 
relatedness coefficient of industries i and j
24
:  
    
 
 
 (         
To match the merger sample with the vertical coefficients we have to convert the acquirer 
and the target Standard Industry Classification (SIC) codes into the industry codes (IO) used 
in the U.S. input-output tables. We obtain the tables needed to convert the Standard Industry 
Classification (SIC) codes and the industry codes (IO) used in the U.S. input-output tables for 
the years 1982, 1987 and 1992 from Joseph Fan’s analysis. The above tables are not available 
for the years 1997 and 2002 and thus we use a table which shows the relationship between 
the industry codes (IO) and the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). We 
convert the NAICS codes to SIC codes using the tables which are published by the United 
States Census Bureau.
25
 We deleted all codes where we could not match the IO codes with a 
representative NAICS code or SIC codes. Finally, we used Fan’s conversion table to match 
any unmatched IO codes.
26
 Our vertically related coefficients have been matched with Joseph 
Fan’s coefficients.  
We then classified our sample of mergers and acquisitions as vertically related if the 
corresponding vertical coefficient was larger than a certain cutoff. For robustness, we 
consider three alternative cutoffs: 1%, 5% and 10%.
27
 Kedia et al. (2011) used three 
alternative classifications; Fama and French (1988) industry classifications, four-digit CRSP 
SIC codes and two-digit SIC codes to test the strength and robustness of their results. They 
find that the four-digit SIC classification to be more precise and a 1% cutoff. We follow 
Kedia et al. (2011) four-digit SIC classification and a 1% cutoff. Our merger sample is 
significantly reduced, due to data availability when calculating default risk. Given this 
                                                          
24
 Following Fan and Goyal, (2006), Acemoglu et al., (2009) and Kedia et al., (2011), we take the average of the 
two input requirement coefficients to avoid any bias of our analysis in the event where the industries are selling 
in both directions.  
25
 http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/concordances/concordances.html 
26
 The inter industry relatedness measures for IO Tables of 1982, 1987 and 1992 are available from the webpage 
at Joseph P.H. Fan webpage under Relatedness Project. 
27
 These cut-off points are similar to Fan and Goyal (2006)  
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reduction we do not use the strictest definition of vertical relatedness (10% cut-off) which 
further reduces our sample.
28
 
To classify mergers by the type of integration we take into consideration: i. the four-digit 
CRSP SIC code
29
  and ii. the vertical relation coefficient. If the acquirer and the target firm 
have the same four-digit CRSP SIC code then the merger is horizontal. However it can also 
be vertical so we have to look at the vertical coefficient to distinguish pure horizontals (we 
refer to these mergers as horizontal) and mixed vertical/horizontal. Vertical mergers (1) are 
those that are classified as vertically related as captured by the vertical coefficient, and the 
acquirer and the target firm belong in a different industry (i.e. they have different SIC codes). 
Horizontal mergers (2) are the ones which belong in the same industry based on the four-digit 
CRSP SIC code that are not vertically related. If they are vertical but they belong in the same 
industry (same SIC code), then they are classified as mix horizontal and vertical (3). Finally, 
if we cannot classify a merger as vertical or horizontal, then it is classified as a conglomerate 
merger (4).  
3.3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 displays the summary statistics on acquirer and public target firms’ default risk. We 
estimate default risk for both the target and the bidder firms, six months before the 
announcement (      ), one month before the announcement (     ), and six months after 
the completion of the merger (     ). We then calculate the change of default risk between 
these periods for the target and the bidder firms.      is the difference of default risk 
between six months before the announcement and six months after the completion and       
is the difference of default risk between one month before the announcement and six months 
after the completion (                 ).  
We find that, on average, mergers lead to an increase in default risk for the acquiring firm. 
The mean increase between one month or six months prior to the announcement and six 
months after the completion of the merger is about the same (~ 0.014) across all mergers in 
our sample. To gain perspective of this risk increase after the merger completion, consider 
that the mean level of default risk six (one) months before the announcement is 0.018 (0.017) 
                                                          
28
 For robustness purposes we run our analysis using 5% and 10% cut-offs and it does not affect our main 
findings.  
29
 Kedia et al. (2011) concludes that the four-digit SIC classification is more precise than the two-digit SIC or 
Fama and French (1988) industry classification.  
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and 0.031 after the merger completion. The increase of default risk between the two periods 
is almost a 82% increase. Acquirer’s default risk one month before the announcement is 
0.001 at its lowest value and 0.404 at its highest, and takes values from 0.001 to 1.174, six 
months after the completion. Initially we had 337 public target firms in our sample with 
available default risk data before the announcement. After we have calculated the post-
acquisition default risk we ended up with 86 public target firms with a 0.047 mean level of 
default risk six months before the announcement and 0.056 one month before the 
announcement. Default risk for the target increases to 0.135 six months after the completion 
of the deal, which is around an 241% increase. Evidently, the level of increase of default risk 
for the target firms exceeds the corresponding increase for the acquiring firms and although, 
it would have been interesting to explore the target sample, we have decided to focus our 
analysis on the acquiring firms mainly due to the limited sample of the target firms.  
[Table 3.1] 
In this study we concentrate on the importance role of diversification types on default risk 
changes. Diversification is a form of growth strategy to increase performance through the 
expansion of a firm’s operations into a new market, product, services or stages of production. 
Although asset pricing literature has established a strong relationship between profitability 
and default risk
30
, often, other diversification benefits outperform wealth creation. One of the 
most important factors which affect the overall market risk, and in turn acquisition decisions 
and process (i.e. merger characteristics and deal numbers) are the market conditions at the 
time of the announcement. To investigate default risk changes by the type of diversification 
and the market conditions, we report at table 3.2 the summary statistics for default risk by the 
type of diversification and the aggregate default risk changes over the three most important 
merger waves of our sample period, 1980’s, 1990’s and 2000’s. We also display acquiring 
firm’s default risk one month before the announcement (          six months after the 
completion (      ), the risk change between the two periods (      ) and the % risk 
change (       ) in table 3.3, by the type of diversification during the three merger waves. 
From Table 3.2, Panel A, we can see that mixed vertical/horizontal and conglomerate 
mergers are the two most popular types of diversification for the entire sample period. 
Default risk increases by 86% across mixed mergers and 81% across conglomerate ones.
31
 
                                                          
30
 See for example Merton, 1973; Chan and Chen, 1991; Fama and French, 1996 
31
 All of our results are statistical significant at 1%. 
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Pure horizontal acquisitions seem to be the less popular type of diversification, despite the 
fact that they increase default risk the least by 53% overall. Vertical mergers increase default 
risk the most compared with all the other types of diversification by 124%. Panel B shows 
default risk changes within the three major merger waves in our sample period. We can 
clearly see that the number of deals increase in each decade and that although during the first 
wave the average default risk prior to the announcement is the highest (0.022), it is during the 
second wave that default risk increases the most by 103%. During the third merger wave, 
default risk increases the least by 76%.   
[Table 3.2] 
When we look at default risk changes more closely in each merger wave (see Table 3.3), we 
find that there are certain diversification types in each wave that either maximise or minimise 
risk. During the first wave, the lowest mean value of default risk one month before the 
announcement is 0.006 in the horizontal deals. However, horizontal diversification increases 
default risk levels the most compared within and across all waves, at a surprising percentage 
of 442%. Vertical deals involve the lowest level of default risk change during this wave 
(22%). Although all of our variables are winsorized, the results in this portfolio might be 
driven by some observation due to the small number of observations; there are only 19 
vertical acquisitions and 15 horizontal deals. The most popular type of diversification is 
conglomeration during this period probably following the trend of the previous wave and the 
common belief that conglomerate acquisitions reduce risk exposure. However, the larger a 
firm becomes as a result of the acquisitions the more the performance of the entire firm can 
suffer. This type of diversification increase default risk by 70%.  
During the second wave period, the lowest average default risk prior to the acquisition 
announcement (0.012) in vertical deals, which also increase default risk the least by 48% as 
in the first wave period. Vertical integration has been linked to risk reduction in many studies 
(see for example Arrow; 1975, Williamson; 1975, and Carlton 1978). Accordingly, during 
periods of uncertainty firms diversification on specialized and known business areas can 
increase performance and efficiency of their resources by cutting costs and expenses and 
improve their competitive positioning by increasing in size. Vertical integration can increase 
profitability and thus decrease default risk (Rumelt, 1974, 1977). More recent papers support 
that vertical deals are profitable but do not make any predictions about default risk and 
vertical diversification. Fan and Goyal (2006) for example, find that on vertical yield positive 
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abnormal returns due to imperfect competition. Kedia et al., (2011) extent Fan and Goyal 
(2006) sample and show that vertical mergers yield positive wealth effects until 1998. This 
effect reverses after 1998 and up to 2002 in line with Moeller et al., (2005). We also find that 
mixed vertical/horizontal increase default risk levels the most by 164%. Horizontal deals 
default risk prior to the announcement is 0.013 and it is increased by 71% during the six 
months period after the merger is completed. Conglomerate acquisitions also increase default 
risk by about the same percentage as horizontal deals, 76% and remain the most popular 
diversification type. A conglomerate merger is a merger between two unrelated firms. This 
kind of merger will create larger firms. The larger the firm, the larger its market share, 
synergy, cross selling and the smaller its risk exposure.  
Mixed vertical/horizontal type is the most popular type of diversification during the third 
merger wave, 2000 -2008. This type of deals increase default risk by 43% and they are the 
second less risky type. The first is horizontal diversification which increase risk by only 11%. 
Vertical deals involve the highest levels of default risk prior to the announcement (0.021) and 
they also increase risk the most by 180%. Conglomerate deals also increase risk a lot, by 
100% although the mean level of default risk is the lowest before the announcement (0.012).  
On average, we find that conglomerate acquisitions are the most popular type of 
diversification during the first two periods and mixed during the last one. Default risk – wise, 
we find mixed evidence; for example horizontal deals are the riskier in the first period but the 
safer strategy during the last period. More comprehensive analysis follows to uncover the 
relationships between diversification strategies and default risk changes.  
[Table 3.3] 
Table 3.4 presents the mean value of idiosyncratic stock volatility for the number of firms 
that engage in vertical, horizontal, mixed vertical/horizontal and conglomerate acquisitions. 
As explained in the previous section, we expect that related diversification should involve 
less uncertainty and thus smaller levels of stock volatility. We find that horizontal 
diversification involves the lowest levels of idiosyncratic stock volatility and thus we expect 
that this type of diversification would involve lower default risk for the acquiring firm.  
[Table 3.4] 
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3.3.6 Results – Risk Variation and Vertical Integration 
In general the ‘law of diversification’ says that the more you diversify the lower your risk and 
the higher your return. However, the most recent empirical study on mergers and default risk, 
Furfine and Rosen (2011) finds that mergers are on average risk increasing activities for the 
acquiring firms. They attribute their finding mainly on managerial motivations which 
outweigh the risk-reducing benefits of asset diversification. We investigate how each type of 
diversification (vertical, horizontal, mixed vertical/horizontal and conglomerate) affects 
default risk for the acquiring firms’ prior to the acquisition announcement and post-
acquisition completion. Then we test whether Furfine and Rosen (2011)’s explanatory 
variables are robust across our analysis. We also seek to link certain merger characteristics 
with specific types of diversification and in turn the change of default risk. To the extent that 
specific firm/deal characteristics and diversification have been found to affect acquisitions 
process and success, we aim to uncover which factors dominate default risk increase. We 
split our sample by target type, method of payment, the size of the deal and acquirer’s 
leverage. We also look how stock past performance, industry risk and managerial 
compensation affects acquirer’s default risk levels. Table 3.5 presents the summary statistics 
for the explanatory variable we incorporate in our analysis and tables 3.6 to 3.8 report the 
results of this analysis. Finally tables 3.9 and 3.10 present the multivariate analysis of this 
study. 
So far we find that mergers are generally risk increasing, irrespective of the diversification 
strategy. We also find that certain strategies seem to be more or less popular in each merger 
wave. Each strategy involves different levels of risk prior and post-acquisition in each wave 
and thus there is evidence that there is a relationship between the market conditions at the 
time of the announcement and the diversification strategy the acquirer chooses. Default risk 
change between the announcement period and the acquisition completion period can vary 
from 11% to 442% depending on the type of diversification period that the acquirer chooses 
and the period that the merger is announced. To further explore how acquirer’s default risk 
changes after a merger, we examine the default risk change between the announcement 
period and the completion period within different portfolios in tables 3.6 -3.8. The choice of 
the explanatory variables we use in our analysis is guided by the literature of corporate 
finance and previous closely related studies such as Rosen and Furfine (2011). Summary 
statistics for default risk and the independent variables are presented in Table 3.5. All 
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variables are winsorised at the 5
th
/95
th 
level to control for outliers and our results are robust at 
the 1
st
/99
th
 level winsorization.  
[Table 3.5] 
The first set of explanatory variables in the univariate analysis (Table 3.6) is related with the 
target firm. The target’s ownership status, the target’s country, industry, and the size of the 
target in relation with the acquirer’s size are all factors that have been found to affect 
acquisition process. The literature on merger diversification and the ownership status of the 
target prior to the merger is quite limited. Faccio and Masulis (2005) and Conn, Cosh, Guest 
and Hughes (2005) find that non-public acquisitions create value for the acquiring firm. Also 
the level of information asymmetry and the transparency regarding the market value of public 
and private firms differs and thus we expect that the level of risk will also be different 
between the two types of targets.  We include dummy variables to control for the target type; 
TARGET_PUBLIC, TARGET_PRIVATE and TARGET_SUB which take the value 1 if the 
target is public, private or a subsidiary respectively. Next, we want to see how default risk 
changes depending of the target’s country of origin; CBA – cross border acquisitions dummy 
takes the value of  0 if the target is domestic firm and 1 if it is a foreign firm. Although the 
type of diversification accounts for the industry that the target and the acquirer firms are, as 
in previous studies, we also include a broader definition that shows whether the target and the 
acquirer belong in a different industry. To account for size we use the variable RATIO which 
is the ratio of the deal’s value to the market value of the acquirer. 
The second set of explanatory variables (Table 3.7), include information regarding the 
method of payment used, acquirer’s debt level, and acquirer’s size. We account for the 
method of payment used in the acquisition; STOCK, CASH, MIX are dummy variables that 
takes the value 1 if and only if the acquisitions is financed with equity, cash or a combination 
of cash and equity. Leverage changes are closely associated with the firm’s default risk. 
Acquirers tend to increase leverage through a merger and thus increase default risk (Ghosh 
and Jain, 2000; Morellec and Zhdanov, 2008). We therefore measure the leverage change 
over the same period that we measure default risk change. LEV is a variable that takes the 
value of 1 if the leverage of the deal is above the median value. Acquirer size also affects 
takeover process in terms of wealth creation but also in terms of the change in risk (see for 
example Vassalou and Xing, 2005). The larger the firm is the more likely it will be 
diversified and therefore the acquisitions will not affect it risk mutch. We incorporate 
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acquirer’s size using MKT_VAL, the natural log of the acquirer’s market value at the end of 
the month prior to the merger announcement.   
The last group of variables (Table 3.8) are related with the profitability of the merger and the 
managerial compensation. The ultimate goal of any healthy firm should be to maximize 
shareholder’s wealth by taking profitable project. We therefore investigate how risk levels 
change before and after the acquisition in different types of diversification. Rumelt, (1974), 
(1977), Montgomery (1979) and Bettis (1981) show that different type of diversification 
strategies yield different wealth gains. More specific they find that related mergers 
outperform unrelated mergers. We estimate CAR, the cumulative abnormal return for the 
acquiring firm’s stock, between two days before the announcement and two days after the 
announcement and split our sample into value-add deals with positive abnormal returns and 
value-destroy deals with zero or negative abnormal returns. We also account for the acquiring 
firm’s stock performance as captured by the MKT-TO-BOOK which is the ratio of the 
acquirer’s market value of equity to the book value of equity as of the last quarterly balance 
sheet prior to the month of the merger announcement.  Finally, we include firm’s stock 
idiosyncratic volatility as a measure of information asymmetry between management and 
shareholders; VOL is defined as the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the 
acquirer’s stock return, estimated by taking the square root of the residuals from a market 
model estimated over the six month period ending at the end of the month prior to the merger 
announcement. Managers of high-volatility firms might undertake riskier projects since 
shareholders can not sufficiently monitor their actions. We expect that volatility should be 
positively related with default risk.  
The literature on mergers and acquisitions finds significant differences on acquisitions 
(especially on the profitability of the merger) depending on the type of firm being acquired. 
Several studies report that public acquisitions result in negative abnormal returns or break-
even around the acquisition’s announcement day.32 On the other hand, the vast majority of 
studies report significant positive abnormal returns for private
33
 and subsidiary
34
 acquisitions. 
                                                          
32
 See for example Jensen and Ruback (1983), Ascquith (1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1987a), Bradley, Desai, and 
Kim (1988), Jarrell, Brickley and Netter (1988), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins 
(1990), Servaes (1991), Kaplan and Weisbach (1992), Hansen and Lott (1996), Chang (1998), Mulherin and 
Boone (2000), Schwert (2000), Ang and Kohers (2001), and Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002). 
33
 See for example: Chang (1998), Ang and Kohers (2001), Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002). 
For evidence from other countries (Australia) see for example: Da Silva Rosa, Limmack, Supriadi, and Woodliff 
(2001). 
34
 For evidence see Fuller et al (2002), Faccio and Masulis (2005), Antoniou et al (2007). 
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Private targets are usually smaller in size, family-owned firms which are less likely to affect 
the acquirer. On the other hand, acquisitions which involve public targets are more uncertain 
about the outcome of the deal due to the fact that the merger is negotiated with the managers 
but it is subject to the approval of the shareholders. We therefore expect that the more the 
uncertainty of the target firm (i.e. public mergers) the greater the increase of risk. The first 
empirical evidence from Table 3.6 - Panel A suggest that although public acquisition involve 
the lowest levels of default risk before the announcement, they increase default risk the most 
(by 0.019 ~127%), whereas private and subsidiary acquisitions which involve higher levels of 
default risk before the announcement increase default risk much less, 90% and 49% 
respectively. Looking at public acquisition group by the diversification type, we find that 
vertical public acquisitions have the lowest levels of default risk increase (21%) and mixed 
vertical/horizontal the greatest increase (165%). In the private acquisition sample, the 
previous patter reverses; vertical private mergers increase risk the most by 206% and mixed 
the least by 42%. The average default risk increase in private acquisitions is 90%. Vertical 
acquisitions remain the most risky type of diversification when the target is a subsidiary firm 
with a 79% increase. However, horizontal deals involve the lowest levels of default risk and 
actually increase risk at -8%. Subsidiary deals increase risk the least by 49% compared with 
the other two target types.  
The acquisition process is very complex with many dimensions influencing its outcome and 
the risk change. Adding another dimension on diversification such as the target status shows 
that default risk changes are not affected solely by the type of diversification but also by other 
characteristics which interact with the diversification type. The primary characteristic of a 
public firm is the dispersed ownership of the target entity. More specific, in a public merger 
there will be no identifiable party to stand behind the obligations of the target after closing. 
The deal happens between the managerial teams of the two firms involved and it is subject to 
shareholder approval. This creates a level of uncertainty. In a private merger, the deal is 
typically negotiated directly with the shareholders of the target and thus such acquisitions are 
more profitable and less risky (remember the average increase in private and subsidiary 
mergers is only 90% and 49%, whereas in public mergers is 127%).  
A horizontal merger is the merger of two firms from the same business or market. Such type 
of diversification benefits the firms due to economies of scale. A horizontal merger will 
normally increase the total market share of the combined entity due to the combination of 
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facilities, technologies, and operations, the reduction of competition and other costs and the 
increase of the working capital. In general, this type of diversification should not increase 
default risk compared with other types of diversification since the acquirer increases its share 
value but remains in a familiar environment business line. We do confirm this prediction and 
we even find that subsidiary horizontal acquisitions decrease risk at -8%. A vertical merger is 
the merger of two firms from different stages of the same industry or operation. Usually, 
there is a pre-existence buyer-seller or supply chain relationship before the merger between 
the two firms. Such acquisitions benefit both firms from a reduced inventory and a more 
efficient allocation working capital. Private and public firms are different in terms of 
information availability and quality and this influence the acquirer’s choice of target as well 
as the diversification strategy and thus we can see that a vertical public merger decreases risk 
whereas a private vertical merger maximized default risk, 21% and 206% respectively. 
Conglomerate mergers are when two firms that operate in different or unrelated business 
lines merge to benefit from expanding into new markets and different business, create a 
diverse portfolio of products that reduce its default risk. We find that conglomerate 
acquisitions do not maximise default risk irrespective of the target type.  
Firms engage in cross – border acquisitions (CBA) to take advantage of the diversification 
premium, access new research and development, cheaper sources of production, diversify 
specific country’s and/or market’s risk, information asymmetries and gain greater bargaining 
power.  All else equal a foreign target should decrease default risk more than a domestic 
target due to the diversification benefits. We find in panel B – Table 3.6 that foreign 
acquisitions increase default risk less than domestic acquisitions (79% compared with 88% in 
domestic targets). We also find that horizontal foreign acquisitions decrease default risk at -
19%. We argue that due to the information asymmetry in terms of business restructuring of 
the target firm after the announcement is completed, all other types of diversification result in 
higher default risk levels than horizontal acquisitions where the acquirer is familiar with the 
nature of the business. At a more theoretical level this hypothesis can be better explained with 
the information economics which views information asymmetry as significant obstacle that 
exists in markets and which creates constrains in the selection of the right targets (Akerlof, 
1970). Capron and Shen (2007) empirically find that acquirers are more likely to engage in a 
private and related acquisition or a private acquisition in a similar industry or in an industry 
that the acquirer feels that is experienced in. Given that horizontal acquisitions is a form of 
related acquisition where the target and the acquirer belong in the same business and in the 
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same stage of production, the acquirer holds the knowledge and the experience to make a 
successful and a profitable acquisition that will eventually decrease default risk. 
Relative size is the ratio of the deal’s value to the market value of the acquirer. The larger the 
acquirer, the smaller this ratio and the less likely the merger with have an impact on the 
acquirer’s default risk. We therefore expect smaller default risk increases in the portfolio with 
smaller deals. We confirm that acquisitions with relative size below median increase default 
risk less than acquisitions with relative size above median (39% and 171% respectively - see 
Table 3.6, Panel C). We also find that the choice of diversification can further decrease or 
increase default risk in both groups. Horizontal deals decrease default risk at -14% which is 
the largest decrease we have found so far. 
[Table 3.6] 
At table 3.7, Panel A presents default risk changes by the method of payment. We find that 
stock acquisitions increase default risk the least by 67% as expected, and cash the most by 
102%. The type of strategy chosen can further reduce default risk in both portfolios. For 
example, default risk change is reduced to 11% in horizontal cash deals and in 49% in 
horizontal stock deals. In the event of mixed payment, vertical integration which is a related 
type of diversification has the lowest levels of risk-increase (11%). Panel B, displays two 
portfolios based on the acquiring firm’s leverage level as captured by the equity-to-asset 
ratio. We expect that default risk should increase as the use of debt increase in a firm’s capital 
structure. We confirm our expectations and find that default risk increase at 109% in the 
portfolio with deals that have leverage above median whereas low leverage firms experience 
only a 12% increase in default risk. The choice of horizontal diversification by low leverage 
firms decreases default risk by -43%.  
Acquirer size also affects takeover process in terms of wealth creation but also in terms of the 
change in risk (see for example Vassalou and Xing, 2005). The larger the firm is, the more 
diversified it will be and consequently its risk will be affected less by the acquisition. Thus 
we expect that acquisitions with market value above median to result in smaller levels of risk-
increase. Panel C in table 3.7, displays risk changes by acquirer’s market value. We have split 
the sample into two sub-samples; acquisitions that have MV above median and acquisitions 
that have MV below median. We confirm that larger acquirers’ default risk increase by 42% 
compared with smaller acquirers who have an increase of risk by 115%. We also find that the 
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choice of diversification will further reduce risk-increase; for larger acquirers who choose a 
mixed vertical/horizontal default risk will increase by 21%. In the sample of acquisitions with 
smaller MV acquirers’, horizontal mergers increase default risk the least by 59% and vertical 
the most by 133%.  
[Table 3.7] 
In table 3.8, default risk changes are investigated in profitable and non-profitable mergers and 
based on and acquirer’s recent stock performance. In panel A we split our sample based on 
the cumulative abnormal returns five-days around the announcement. We find that value-
destroying acquisitions compensate acquirers with lower levels of risk-increase, 42%, 
compared with a 105% increase for acquisitions which yield zero or positive AR. Looking at 
the different diversification strategies in each sample, we find that horizontal acquisitions 
increase risk the least (by 30%) in the non-profitable acquisitions. We also account for the 
acquiring firm’s stock performance using MKT-TO-BOOK which is the ratio of the 
acquirer’s market value of equity to the book value of equity as of the last quarterly balance 
sheet prior to the month of the merger announcement. Rau and Vermaelen (1998) and more 
recently Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) find that market to book ratio can be used to 
measure growth opportunities and has been found as an important driving factor of 
acquisition process. We find that acquisitions by firms with undervalued stock increase risk 
by 104%, compared with overvalued ones which increase risk by only 55%. Our results are 
consistent with Rosen and Furfine (2011). We also find that the choice of diversification 
strategy significantly reduced default risk levels. For example, in the group of undervalued 
acquirers, horizontal acquisitions increase risk by 55% whereas in the group of overvalued 
acquirers, horizontal and mixed vertical/horizontal increase risk by 47% and 31% 
respectively.  Finally we use idiosyncratic stock volatility (VOL) to account for the 
information asymmetry. VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the 
acquirer’s stock return. Managers of high-volatility firms might signal that these managers 
undertake riskier projects or do not have the knowledge well integrate with the target firm. 
We expect that volatility should be positively related with default risk. We confirm our 
expectation since the group of firms with volatility above median increase default risk by 
96% whereas lower volatility group increase default risk by 84%.  
[Table 3.8] 
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In tables 3.6 to 3.8 we have presented evidence on which type of diversification increase 
acquiring firm’s default risk the least and how diversification interacts with target 
characteristics, method of payment and leverage information, acquirer’s size, merger 
profitability and idiosyncratic stock volatility, and in turn affect default risk. In the next part 
of this study, we contact a multivariate analysis of the risk-increasing determinants in a 
regression framework. We run a standard regression model where the dependent variable is 
the change of risk one month before the announcement, and six months after the completion. 
To understand better how well our explanatory variables contribute to the risk change, we 
first run a correlation matrix in order to avoid multicollinearity.
35
 Table 3.9 and 3.10, presents 
our regression results.  
We first, replicate the regression analysis of Furfine and Rosen (2011) and match the sign and 
significance of the coefficients on all explanatory variables. Then, we include several other 
variables that might influence the change in acquiring firms’ default risk. We include two 
dummy variables, TARGET_PUBLIC and TARGET_SUB, to control for the public and 
subsidiary targets. Since private targets behave the same as subsidiary targets, in the 
regressions we omit the private target category. The primary characteristic of a public firm is 
the dispersed ownership of the target entity. Due to the nature of public acquisitions there is 
more uncertainty involved in such deal. Although private targets are considered riskier than 
public targets, in a private merger, the deal is negotiated directly with the shareholders of the 
target and thus the information asymmetry of the two parties can reduced and achieve an 
agreement which will be profitable for both parties. Univariate analysis shows that public 
acquisitions increase risk more than private or subsidiary acquisitions. We find the coefficient 
on TARGET_PUBLIC positive and significant and the coefficient on TARGET_SUB 
negative but insignificant, as predicted (see regression 1, Table 3.9). 
[Table 3.9] 
VOL captures the idiosyncratic volatility of the acquiring firm’s stock and it is a managerial 
compensation measure; higher stock volatility means not only higher returns for managers 
who hold options on firm’s stock but can also increase default risk. Moeller et al., 2007 
explains that high idiosyncratic volatility in a firm’s stock can be a sign of information 
                                                          
35
 We find two collinear pairs, MTBV with MV and Industry Dummy with Conglomerate 
acquisitions. We run our regressions with all variables and with only one of each pair. Our results 
remain robust.  
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asymmetry between the managers and the shareholders that might undertake risk increasing 
projects to increase their returns. We therefore expect a positive relationship between 
idiosyncratic volatility and default risk. We confirm this sign which is also statistical 
significant at 1%. 
Two measures are used to capture the firms’ stock performance; RUNUP_NET_MKT and 
MKT_TO_BOOK. RUNUP_NET_MKT is the buy-and-hold return of the firm 12 months 
before the month of the announcement. MKT_TO_BOOK is the ratio of the market value of 
equity to the book value, over the last quarter end before the announcement. Both variables 
are used to capture over valued or under valued stocks. Overvaluation has been linked with 
risk-increasing project (Rau and Vermaelen; 1998 and Jovanovic and Rousseau; 2002). We 
find a positive and statistical significant coefficient on the RUNUP_NET_MKT as expected 
while the coefficient of MKT_TO_BOOK is insignificant; MKT_TO_BOOK is correlated 
with MRK_VAL so we omit this variable in the next regressions to avoid multicollinearity.    
We also include dummy variables, to account for the method of payment. STOCK, is an 
indicator that takes the value 1 if and only if the acquisition is financed with stocks, 0 
otherwise. MIX CASH/STOCK is an indicator that takes the value 1 if and only if the 
acquisition is financed with both stock and cash. Method of payment has been linked with the 
market reaction but also with the success of a merger. Travlos (1987) discuss how the 
valuation of a firm’s stock will affect the reaction of the market and the success and 
profitability of the merger. We expect that overvalued stock will be correlated with greater 
risk after the merger is completed since the market perceives overvalued stock as a negative 
signal and makes a correction on the firm’s stock value. Further, stock acquisitions do not 
increase firm’s leverage levels and thus should not increase risk. On the other hand cash 
acquisitions are more likely to be debt increasing projects, and therefore can increase risk 
(Amihud and Lev; 1981). We find a negative sign for stock acquisitions, consisting with our 
univariate analysis, although statistical insignificant.  
DIFF_IND is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the target and the 
acquirer are in different industries. Acquiring a firm in a different industry offers 
diversification benefits that might decrease default risk. We find a negative coefficient on 
DIFF_IND, although statistical insignificant. This implies that if the firms involved in the 
acquisition belong in a different industry, default risk decreases. Although the exposure of a 
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firm in a new business/market might increase risk due to the unknown nature of the merger, it 
can also decrease risk due to the diversification benefits. 
We also include relative size, RATIO, as an explanatory variable of default risk. Relative size 
is the ratio of the deal value to the bidder market value. The size of the target relative to the 
acquirer can affect the market reaction to a deal announcement (Asquith et al., 1983). The 
bigger this ratio is, thus the larger the target firm the bigger the impact of the particular 
acquisition on the acquirer and the greater the market reaction. We therefore expect and find 
a positive statistical significant relationship between relative size and default risk. We 
confirm the direction of this variable. MRK_VAL is the natural log of the market value of the 
acquiring firm at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement. The larger the 
acquirer the more likely it will carefully choose profitable projects that will diversify its risk. 
We find a negative and statistical significant coefficient of MRK_VAL supporting the view 
that default risk increases less for larger acquirers. 
CAR_RESID is the estimated residual from the regression of CAR on RETURN INTERIM, 
defined as the buy-and-hold return for an acquirer’s stock between the end of the month prior 
to the merger announcement and at the end of the month six months after the merger is 
effective. Furfine and Rosen (2011) use this variable instead of CAR as it excludes the part of 
abnormal return that is affected by the announcement and isolates the component at the exact 
period we measure default risk. We find a positive but statistical insignificant coefficient for 
CAR_RESID which means that this variable cannot help in explaining default risk changes. 
IND_CF_VOL_DIFF is the risk in the acquirer’s industry minus the risk in the target firm’s 
industry, where industry risk is the standard deviation of the ratio of annual total cash flow to 
total assets in an industry in the five years prior to the merger announcement. This variable 
captures the difference of the acquiring firm’s cash flow volatility and the target’s industry. 
We find a negative sign, although statistical insignificant that shows that if the target’s 
industry is riskier than the acquirer’s, then acquirer’s risk will increase after the acquisition. 
Finally, DIST_FROM_DESIRED_RISK is defined as the residual from a regression of 
acquirer default risk on balance sheet determinants of target risk level. We follow Usyal’s 
(2011) capital structure model to estimate the firm’s target default risk. We find a positive 
and statistical significant value which means that mergers are used as mechanisms to increase 
their leverage. 
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Following Furfine and Rosen (2011) we run a second regression and include data on the 
acquiring firm’s manager options to investigate whether executive compensation impacts 
default risk. High risk projects can increase not only a firm’s default risk but also the value of 
the executive stock options and therefore we expect a positive sign. EXECUCOMP is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the acquirer is in the Execucomp data for 
the year prior to the merger announcement. OPTIONS is defined as the fraction of the 
acquiring CEO’s compensation that is derived from executive stock options if EXECUCOMP 
equals 1 and is zero otherwise. We match the direction of both variables, but both coefficient 
are statistically insignificant. The problem with these variables lies on the Execucomp which 
does not provide these information about all firms in our sample. However, these two 
additional variables, improve the significant level of almost all coefficients on the 
abovementioned variables and we decide to keep them in our analysis. 
In regression 4 to 6 in Table 3.9, we introduce variables on firm’s diversification strategy (i.e. 
vertical, horizontal, mixed and conglomerate). We include these data to investigate whether 
diversification type significantly affects the level of default risk after an announcement. In 
general the ‘law of diversification’ says that the more you diversify the lower your risk and 
the higher your return. However, this law might not apply to mergers and acquisitions. Firms 
do not treat the acquired business as investors treat stocks. The more a firm diversifies in an 
unrelated industry the greater the possibility is to increase its default risk and to destroy 
value. Related acquisitions seem to return greater profit for the acquirer, whereas unrelated 
seem to destroy value. In the literature of corporate finance, there is a common presumption 
that despite the risky nature of conglomerate acquisitions (unrelated) and value destruction 
for the acquirer firm,
36
 they reduce risk through the expansion of a firm’s activities in a 
different country or in another product range. An unrelated acquisition is the expansion in a 
completely new area to widen the acquirer’s firm field of operations.  However, the lack of 
knowledge, skills and expertise by the managerial team
37
 or a hubris infected manager who 
overestimates his abilities to handle such an acquisitions, can destroy value and increase risk 
in both unrelated and related acquisitions. Unrelated acquisitions or related acquisition 
(excluding horizontals) need heavy investment in human and technical resources to be 
successful in terms of risk and also profit. Related acquisitions seem to outperform the 
unrelated in terms of value creation, since the managerial team can simply transfer the skills, 
                                                          
36
 See for example Rumelt, (1974, 1977) and Bettis and Hall, (1982) 
37
 See Berger and Ofek (1995) and Lang and Stulz (1994)  
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the technological experience, and the marketing plan in a closely related industry.  In terms of 
default risk levels, we expect that such and acquisitions are ‘safer’ than the unrelated 
acquisitions. Based on information economic theory (Akerlof, 1970), we argue that due to the 
information asymmetry in terms of business restructuring of the target firm that belong either 
in a different industry or in a different market or in a different stage of production, default 
risk might be greater than in acquisitions where the target and the bidder belong in the same 
industry and production stage (i.e. horizontal acquisitions). Empirical evidence suggest that 
acquirers are more likely to make private related acquisitions or choose a firm in an industry 
where the acquirer feels that has the experience to grow (Capron and Shen; 2007).  
HORIZONTAL is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the acquirer 
diversifies horizontally, while MIXED and CONGLOMERATE are defined analogously for 
the acquirers who diversify both vertically and horizontally (mixed) and for the acquirers 
who make an unrelated acquisitions (conglomerate) respectively. We omit VERTICAL 
diversification since our results remain unchanged with the addition of this variable. We find 
a negative and statistical significant coefficient for the HORIZONTAL variable, while the 
coefficient for MIXED and CONGLOMERATE variables are not different from zero. In 
regressions 5 we exclude DIFF_IND variable which is correlated with diversification 
variables and in regression 6 we exclude MKT_TO_BOOK which is found correlated with 
market value (MRK_VAL). Our result remains robust in both regressions and the coefficient 
of HORIZONTAL variable remains negative and statistical significant.  
Table 3.10 presents additional evidence on default risk change by incorporating cross-border 
acquisitions (regression 1), the leverage level (regression 2) and merger waves (regression 3). 
The coefficients of the previously mentioned variables are essentially unchanged when 
incorporating CBA and leverage which suggest that these variables are not the only factors 
driving the change in acquirer default risk. Regression 3 is essentially regression 2 of table 
3.9 with the addition of merger waves. WAVE1 is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 
if and only if the acquisitions was announced and completed during the first merger wave 
(1980-1989), and WAVE 2 is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the 
acquisitions was announced and completed during the second wave period (1990-1999). 
From univariate analysis we find that default risk increases were greater during the second 
merger wave. We confirm this finding since we find a positive and statistical significant 
coefficient for WAVE2, and a negative sign for WAVE1. Then we want to see how 
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diversification variables and merger wave improve our model’s prediction (regression 4) and 
whether our results remain robust if we exclude DIFF_IND variable (regression 5) and 
MKT_TO_BOOK (regression 6). The sign of the coefficients and the statistical significance 
of all variables remain in regressions 4, 5, and 6.
38
   
[Table 3.10] 
To sum up, the regression analysis in this section confirms our findings in the univariate 
analysis. The increase in default risk between the period before the announcement and after 
the completion is driven by public firms and firms with higher idiosyncratic risk.  More 
importantly, we find that larger acquirer and acquirers who choose a horizontal mergers, 
diversify default risk. The second wave, i.e. 1990 – 1999, is the more risk-increasing period 
in our sample. These results remain robust after controlling for other factors related to 
acquisition process and performance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
38
 We also incorporate interactions in our regression analysis between the diversification types and i.merger 
waves, and ii. method of payment. The coefficient for the horizontal variable remains significant, but not for the 
interaction variables.  
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3.4 Conclusion 
We examine the impact of default risk on different types of diversification. Although existing 
research shows that default risk changes after a merger, the evidence is not conclusive as to 
the direction of the change. It has been also theorised that certain types of diversification lead 
to lower levels of default risk for the combined entity.  We analyse changes in default risk, in 
the pre- and post- acquisition period, on four different types of merger integration; vertical, 
horizontal, mixed horizontal/vertical and conglomerate. We use the sample of US takeovers 
announced during the period 1980-2008. Default risk is estimated using accounting and 
market variables through a dynamic logit model.  We find that not all mergers increase 
default risk of the acquiring firm; horizontal diversification when combined with other 
characteristics can diversify default risk. We also find that larger acquirers increase risk less 
than smaller ones. The increase in default risk surrounding mergers is driven by public firms, 
firms with higher idiosyncratic risk, and deals announced and completed during the second 
merger wave. Our results remain robust after controlling for other factors related to 
acquisition process and performance.  
We argue that the source of the differences we find in default risk within different portfolios 
is associated with the information asymmetries regarding the nature of each diversification 
strategy. Akerlof (1970) introduces information asymmetry into the market mechanism and 
explains that ‘lemons’39 which is a defective product will be bought if the buyer knows less 
about a product than what he should know for the quality of the product. Similarly, in our 
study there is less information asymmetry in a related merger and especially in horizontal 
mergers where the acquirer is buying a firm which is exactly identical with the acquiring firm 
and thus the manager has the knowledge how to manage the combined entity. Therefore a 
horizontal merger makes the most of the risk-reducing diversification benefit.  
Our argument finds support on papers concentrating on stock volatility; according to Chen et 
al., (2001) poor information quality induces high stock volatility and Miffre (2011) finds a 
positive relation between high idiosyncratic stock volatility and poorly diversified firms. 
Horizontal diversification involves the lower levels of idiosyncratic stock volatility, thus less 
uncertainty and decrease default risk levels after the merger is completed. 
 
                                                          
39
 In Akerlof’s (1970) paper, a lemon is an American slang term for a car that is found to be defective only after 
it has been bought 
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Table 3.1 Summary Statistics of Acquirer and Target Firms’ Default Risk. 
Variable obs Min Mean Median Max Std Dev 
       1376 0.001 0.018 0.006 0.376 0.040 
       1382 0.001 0.017 0.006 0.404 0.041 
       1382 0.001 0.031 0.007 1.174 0.106 
       1376 -0.358 0.014 0.000 1.151 0.096 
       1382 -0.303 0.015 0.001 1.168 0.088 
       337 0.001 0.047 0.011 0.641 0.114 
       318 0.001 0.056 0.010 1.000 0.151 
       86 0.001 0.135 0.010 4.936 0.625 
       86 -0.613 0.095 0.001 4.294 0.556 
       86 -0.082 0.087 0.001 3.936 0.476 
 
The table displays the summary statistics on acquirer and target firms’ default risk for the sample 
1382 deals announced and completed from January 1980 to December 2008.       ,       , 
       is the acquiring firm’s default risk 6-months and 1 month prior the acquisition and 6 months 
after the completion of the acquisition respectively.        and        is the change in the 
acquiring firm’s DF 6-months prior the announcement to 6-months after the completion and 1-month 
prior the announcement to 6-months after the completion of the merger. The same variables are 
reported for the public target firms.        ,       ,        is the target firm’s default risk 6-
months and 1 month prior the acquisition and 6 months after the completion of the acquisition 
respectively.        and        is the change in the acquiring firm’s DF 6-months prior the 
announcement to 6-months after the completion and 1-month prior the announcement to 6-months 
after the completion of the merger. 
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Table 3.2 Default Risk Descriptive Statistics by the Diversification Type and Merger Waves 
Panel A. DF by diversification type 
Diversification Obs                      
  mean median Std.dev. mean median Std.dev. mean median Std.dev. % change 
Vertical 227 0.017 0.006 0.045 0.039 0.008 0.147 0.021 0.001 0.120 124 
Horizontal 166 0.013 0.005 0.037 0.020 0.007 0.040 0.007 0.001 0.044 53 
Mixed 574 0.018 0.006 0.046 0.034 0.007 0.117 0.016 0.000 0.098 86 
Conglomerate 415 0.015 0.006 0.032 0.027 0.007 0.078 0.012 0.001 0.062 81 
Panel B. DF by merger waves 
1980 – 1989 201 0.022 0.008 0.048 0.042 0.011 0.106 0.020 0.001 0.080 94 
1990 – 1999 450 0.015 0.006 0.038 0.031 0.008 0.107 0.016 0.001 0.094 103 
2000 - 2008 731 0.016 0.005 0.041 0.028 0.006 0.105 0.012 0.000 0.087 76 
This table displays the number of deals by the type of diversification, and the three merger waves in our sample period. Merger wave 1 spans from 1980 to 
1989, the next one from 1990 to 1999 and the most recent from 2000 to 2008.  We use the target and the acquirer four-digit SIC from CRSP as the basis for 
classification. Transactions are classified as horizontal if the acquiring and the target firm are in the same industry. Mixed transactions are the ones that are 
classified both as vertical and horizontal. Vertical transactions are the ones that are classified as pure vertical but not horizontal and the remaining are 
classified as conglomerate. The required cut-off for the vertical integration coefficient is 1%.        is the acquiring firm’s mean default risk one month 
before the announcement.        is the acquiring firm’s mean default risk six months after the merger completion. The change of the risk between the two 
periods is captured          where                   and %        is the percentage change between the two periods, where        
     
      
 
 . 
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Table 3.3 Default Risk Changes During the Merger Waves by Type of Diversification  
 
Diversification  Type 
Default Risk Vertical Horizontal Mixed Conglomerate 
Panel A: Period 1980-1989 
       0.023 0.006 0.028 0.020 
       0.028 0.033 0.063 0.034 
       0.005 0.027 0.035 0.014 
        22 442 125 70 
obs 19 15 61 106 
Panel B: Period 1990-1999 
       0.012 0.013 0.022 0.014 
       0.017 0.022 0.057 0.024 
       0.006 0.009 0.036 0.010 
        48 71 164 76 
obs 97 72 118 163 
Panel C: Period 2000-2008 
       0.021 0.015 0.016 0.012 
       0.059 0.017 0.023 0.024 
       0.038 0.002 0.007 0.012 
        180 11 43 100 
obs 111 79 395 146 
 
This table displays the acquiring firms’ default risk changes by the type of diversification during the 
three merger waves, (i.e. 1980s, 1990s and 2000s) of our sample.         is the acquiring firm’s 
mean default risk one month before the announcement.        is the acquiring firm’s mean default 
risk six months after the merger completion. The change of the risk between the two periods is 
captured          where                   and %        is the percentage change between 
the two periods, where       
     
      
  .  
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Table 3.4 Idiosyncratic Stock Volatility by Type of Diversification  
 
Diversification  Type 
 
Vertical Horizontal Mixed Conglomerate 
VOL 0.029 0.024 0.030 0.025 
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
obs 227 166 574 415 
 
This table displays the acquiring firms’ idiosyncratic stock volatility by the type of diversification. 
VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock return, estimated 
by taking the square root of the residuals from a market model estimated over the six month period 
ending at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement. 
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Table 3.5 Summary Statistics of Default Risk’s Explanatory Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
       0.017 0.041 
       0.015 0.088 
        164.803 843.348 
TARGET_PUBLIC 0.318 0.466 
TARGET_PRIVATE 0.404 0.491 
TARGET_SUB 0.277 0.448 
OPTIONS 0.116 0.275 
VOL 0.028 0.016 
RUNUP_NET_MKT -0.003 0.358 
MKT_TO_BOOK 2.044 0.872 
STOCK 0.247 0.432 
CASH 0.557 0.497 
MIX 0.415 0.493 
DIFF_IND 0.249 0.433 
RATIO 0.251 0.676 
MRK_VAL 7.102 1.766 
CAR 0.008 0.086 
CAR_RESID 0.000 0.085 
IND_CF_VOL_DIFF 0.000 0.014 
DIST_FROM_DESIRED_RISK 0.001 0.040 
LEV -103.134 324.537 
CBA 0.155 0.000 
Obs =1382   
 
This table displays the summary statistics for the risk explanatory variables.        is the acquiring firm’s 
mean default risk one month before the announcement.        is the acquiring firm’s mean default risk six 
months after the merger completion. TARGET_PUBLIC, _SUB, and _PRIVATE are dummy variables that take 
the value of 1 if and only if the target firm are public, subsidiary and private firms respectively and 0 otherwise. 
OPTIONS is defined as the segment of the acquiring CEO’s compensation as derived from executive stock 
options. VOL is the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock return, estimated 
by taking the square root of the residuals from a market model estimated over the six month period ending at the 
end of the month prior to the merger announcement. RUNUP_NET_MKT is the buy-and-hold return of a firm’s 
stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement in excess of the return 
of the CRSP value-weighted index over the same period. MKT-TO-BOOK is the ration of the acquirer’s  market 
value of equity to the book value of equity as of the last quarterly balance sheet prior to the month of the merger 
announcement. STOCK, CASH, MIX are dummy variables that takes the value 1 if and only if the acquisitions 
is financed with equity, cash or cash and equity respectively. DIFF_IND is an indicator that takes the value 1 if 
and only if the target and the acquirer belong in a different industry. RATIO is the ratio of the deal’s value to the 
market value of the acquirer. MKT_VAL is the natural log of the acquirer’s market value at the end of the 
month prior to the merger announcement. CAR is the cumulative abnormal return for the acquiring firm’s stock, 
between two days before the announcement and two days after the announcement. Car resid: is the estimated 
residual from the regression of CAR on RETURN INTERIM, defined as the buy-and-hold return for an 
acquirer’s stock between the end of the month prior to the merger announcement and at the end of the month six 
months after the merger is effective.  IND_CF_VOL_DIFF is the risk in the acquirer’s industry minus the risk in 
the target firm’s industry, where industry risk is the standard deviation of annual cash flows in the five years 
prior to the merger announcement. Dist from desired risk: is defined as the residual from a regression of acquirer 
default risk on balance sheet determinants of target risk level. LEV is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the acquiring firm’s leverage value is above the median value. CBA is an indicator that takes the value 1 if and 
only if the target firm is not a US firm. 
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Table 3.6 Diversification, Risk and Target Related Characteristics 
 
Vertical obs        p-val        p-val        p-val         
Panel A. Type of Target 
 
Public 1 66 0.015 <.0001 0.018 <.0001 0.003 0.456 21 
 
2 76 0.011 <.0001 0.021 <.0001 0.009 0.056 84 
 
3 185 0.018 <.0001 0.048 0.000 0.030 0.003 165 
 
4 113 0.014 <.0001 0.032 0.000 0.018 0.022 132 
 
ALL 440 0.015 <.0001 0.035 <.0001 0.019 <.0001 127 
Private 1 91 0.020 0.001 0.061 0.008 0.041 0.032 206 
 
2 46 0.007 <.0001 0.019 0.003 0.012 0.051 166 
 
3 271 0.017 <.0001 0.025 <.0001 0.007 0.033 42 
 
4 151 0.014 <.0001 0.025 <.0001 0.011 0.011 83 
 
ALL 559 0.016 <.0001 0.030 <.0001 0.014 0.000 90 
Subsidiary 1 70 0.016 0.008 0.029 0.009 0.013 0.051 79 
 
2 44 0.024 0.027 0.022 0.000 -0.002 0.099 -8 
 
3 118 0.022 <.0001 0.035 0.001 0.013 0.187 61 
 
4 151 0.017 <.0001 0.025 0.000 0.008 0.047 47 
 
ALL 383 0.019 <.0001 0.028 <.0001 0.009 0.013 49 
Panel B. CBA 
Domestic 1 188 0.019 <.0001 0.043 0.000 0.024 0.014 126 
 2 138 0.012 <.0001 0.021 <.0001 0.009 0.007 75 
 3 489 0.019 <.0001 0.036 <.0001 0.017 0.000 89 
 4 353 0.015 <.0001 0.026 <.0001 0.011 0.000 73 
 ALL 1168 0.017 <.0001 0.032 <.0001 0.015 <.0001 88 
Foreign 1 39 0.008 <.0001 0.018 0.011 0.011 0.112 138 
 2 28 0.021 0.138 0.017 0.005 -0.004 0.021 -19 
 3 85 0.015 0.004 0.025 0.008 0.009 0.243 60 
 4 62 0.013 <.0001 0.032 0.020 0.019 0.130 146 
 ALL 214 0.014 <.0001 0.025 <.0001 0.011 0.040 79 
Panel C. RELATIVE SIZE 
Below median 1 173 0.015 <.0001 0.031 0.003 0.016 0.038 110 
 2 109 0.015 0.001 0.013 <.0001 -0.002 0.078 -14 
 3 453 0.015 <.0001 0.018 <.0001 0.003 0.091 23 
 4 308 0.011 <.0001 0.016 <.0001 0.005 0.015 43 
 ALL 1043 0.014 <.0001 0.019 <.0001 0.005 0.002 39 
Above  median 1 54 0.026 0.003 0.064 0.014 0.038 0.098 149 
 2 57 0.010 <.0001 0.035 <.0001 0.025 0.002 251 
 3 121 0.032 <.0001 0.094 <.0001 0.062 0.001 196 
 4 107 0.025 <.0001 0.057 <.0001 0.032 0.002 129 
 ALL 339 0.025 <.0001 0.067 <.0001 0.043 <.0001 171 
Summary mean statistics for the sample of firms with acquisitions from January 1980 to December 
2008.       ,         is the acquiring firm’s default risk 1 month prior the acquisition 
announcement and 6 months after the completion of the acquisition.        is the change in the 
acquiring firm’s DF 1-month prior the announcement to 6-months after the completion of the merger 
and %        is the percentage change in default risk. Acquirer’s default risk and change to default 
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risk are reported within the four levels four levels of vertical integration; 1= vertical, 2=horizontal, 
3=mix and 4=conglomerate mergers. Panel A displays the results broken down by target type, i.e. 
public, private and subsidiary targets. Panel B, by cross border acquisitions, i.e. 0 = Domestic and 1= 
Foreign, and Panel C by the relative size of the target to acquirer firm as captured by the ratio of the 
deal value to the acquirer’s market value.  
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Table 3.7 Diversification, Risk, Method of Payment, Acquirer’s Debt level and Size 
 
Vertical obs        p-val        p-val        p-val         
Panel A. Method of Payment 
Cash 1 122 0.012 0.002 0.028 0.012 0.016 0.052 128 
 2 105 0.015 0.001 0.020 <.0001 0.005 0.297 33 
 3 322 0.012 <.0001 0.029 <.0001 0.017 0.002 138 
 4 221 0.013 <.0001 0.024 <.0001 0.011 0.007 84 
 ALL 770 0.013 <.0001 0.026 <.0001 0.013 <.0001 102 
Stock 1 65 0.028 0.000 0.072 0.008 0.044 0.062 156 
 2 38 0.010 <.0001 0.016 0.004 0.005 0.254 49 
 3 136 0.027 <.0001 0.036 <.0001 0.008 0.244 30 
 4 103 0.014 <.0001 0.022 <.0001 0.008 0.056 56 
 ALL 342 0.022 <.0001 0.036 <.0001 0.015 0.007 67 
Mix 1 40 0.014 <.0001 0.016 <.0001 0.002 0.602 11 
 2 23 0.012 <.0001 0.032 0.008 0.021 0.067 178 
 3 116 0.026 0.000 0.048 0.001 0.023 0.051 88 
 4 91 0.019 <.0001 0.038 0.002 0.018 0.032 95 
 ALL 270 0.021 <.0001 0.039 <.0001 0.018 0.002 87 
Panel B. Leverage Level 
 
Below median 1 52 0.010 <.0001 0.024 0.007 0.014 0.093 136 
 2 31 0.025 0.056 0.014 0.000 -0.011 0.066 -43 
 3 129 0.020 <.0001 0.014 <.0001 -0.006 0.058 -28 
 4 87 0.014 <.0001 0.025 0.000 0.011 0.072 74 
 ALL 299 0.017 <.0001 0.019 <.0001 0.002 0.463 12 
Above median 1 175 0.019 <.0001 0.043 0.001 0.024 0.020 122 
 2 135 0.011 <.0001 0.022 <.0001 0.011 0.002 105 
 3 445 0.018 <.0001 0.040 <.0001 0.022 <.0001 121 
 4 328 0.015 <.0001 0.027 <.0001 0.012 0.001 82 
 ALL 1083 0.016 <.0001 0.034 <.0001 0.018 <.0001 109 
Panel C. ACQUIRER MV 
Below median 1 115 0.024 <.0001 0.056 0.003 0.032 0.033 133 
 2 84 0.016 0.004 0.026 <.0001 0.009 0.132 59 
 3 293 0.021 <.0001 0.049 <.0001 0.028 0.000 131 
 4 215 0.019 <.0001 0.036 <.0001 0.018 0.001 96 
 ALL 707 0.020 <.0001 0.044 <.0001 0.023 <.0001 115 
Above median 1 112 0.010 <.0001 0.021 0.000 0.010 0.049 102 
 2 82 0.011 <.0001 0.015 <.0001 0.005 0.101 44 
 3 281 0.016 <.0001 0.019 <.0001 0.003 0.202 21 
 4 200 0.011 <.0001 0.016 <.0001 0.006 0.048 52 
 ALL 675 0.013 <.0001 0.018 <.0001 0.005 0.001 42 
Summary mean statistics for the sample of firms with acquisitions from January 1980 to December 
2008.       ,         is the acquiring firm’s default risk 1 month prior the acquisition 
announcement and 6 months after the completion of the acquisition.        is the change in the 
acquiring firm’s DF 1-month prior the announcement to 6-months after the completion of the merger 
and %        is the percentage change in default risk. Acquirer’s default risk and change to default 
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risk are reported within the four levels four levels of vertical integration; 1= vertical, 2=horizontal, 
3=mix and 4=conglomerate mergers. Panel A displays the results broken down by the method of 
payment, i.e. cash, stock and mixed cash/stock payment. Panel B show results by the acquirer’s 
leverage level as captured by the debt level. Leverage is estimated by taking the difference of the 
equity-to-asset ratio between the period six months after the merger completion and one month before 
the merger announcement. Finally in Panel D results are divided by the size of the acquirer as 
measured by the market value (MV), i.e. above and below median MV. 
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Table 3.8 Diversification, Risk, Acquirer’s stock performance, MTBV and Managerial 
compensation 
 Vertical obs        p-val        p-val        p-val        
Panel A. ACQUIRER AR(-2,+2) 
 
CAR<0 1 106 0.016 0.000 0.028 0.017 0.012 0.145 76 
 
2 76 0.017 0.007 0.022 <.0001 0.005 0.365 30 
 
3 287 0.021 <.0001 0.034 <.0001 0.012 0.019 58 
 
4 178 0.016 <.0001 0.035 <.0001 0.019 0.004 118 
 
ALL 647 0.018 <.0001 0.032 <.0001 0.013 <.0001 72 
CAR>0 1 121 0.018 <.0001 0.048 0.002 0.030 0.026 160 
 
2 90 0.011 <.0001 0.019 <.0001 0.009 0.043 83 
 
3 287 0.016 <.0001 0.035 <.0001 0.019 0.003 123 
 
4 237 0.014 <.0001 0.021 <.0001 0.007 0.002 49 
 
ALL 735 0.015 <.0001 0.031 <.0001 0.016 <.0001 105 
Panel B. MARKET-TO-BOOK  
 
Below median 1 127 0.019 0.000 0.044 0.003 0.025 0.035 131 
 
2 101 0.018 0.000 0.027 <.0001 0.010 0.077 55 
 
3 295 0.022 <.0001 0.049 <.0001 0.026 0.000 120 
 
4 292 0.017 <.0001 0.031 <.0001 0.015 0.000 88 
 
ALL 815 0.019 <.0001 0.039 <.0001 0.020 <.0001 104 
Above  median 1 100 0.015 <.0001 0.032 0.012 0.017 0.105 112 
 
2 65 0.007 <.0001 0.010 0.001 0.003 0.255 47 
 
3 279 0.015 <.0001 0.019 <.0001 0.005 0.139 31 
 
4 123 0.011 <.0001 0.016 0.001 0.006 0.168 55 
 
ALL 567 0.013 <.0001 0.020 <.0001 0.007 0.008 53 
Panel C. VOL 
 
Below median 1 97 0.031 <.0001 0.072 0.0016 0.042 0.0253 136 
 
2 45 0.027 0.0084 0.025 <.0001 -0.003 0.7471 -9 
 
3 265 0.031 <.0001 0.055 <.0001 0.023 0.0023 73 
 
4 128 0.028 <.0001 0.055 <.0001 0.027 0.003 99 
 
ALL 535 0.030 <.0001 0.055 <.0001 0.025 <.0001 84 
Above  median 1 130 0.007 <.0001 0.014 <.0001 0.006 0.0059 86 
 
2 121 0.008 <.0001 0.019 <.0001 0.011 0.0046 131 
 
3 309 0.007 <.0001 0.017 <.0001 0.010 0.0203 132 
 
4 287 0.009 <.0001 0.014 <.0001 0.005 0.0013 56 
 
ALL 847 0.008 <.0001 0.016 <.0001 0.008 <.0001 96 
 
Summary mean statistics for the sample of firms with acquisitions from January 1980 to December 
2008.       ,         is the acquiring firm’s default risk 1 month prior the acquisition 
announcement and 6 months after the completion of the acquisition.        is the change in the 
acquiring firm’s DF 1-month prior the announcement to 6-months after the completion of the merger 
and %        is the percentage change in default risk. Acquirer’s default risk and change to default 
risk are reported within the four levels four levels of vertical integration; 1= vertical, 2=horizontal, 
3=mix and 4=conglomerate mergers. Panel A displays the results broken down by acquirer’s 
abnormal returns in a five-days window around the announcement date, i.e. CAR>=0 for deals with 
positive abnormal returns and CAR<0 for deals with negative abnormal return, and Panel B by 
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acquirer’s stock profitability as  captured MARKET-TO-BOOK value. MARKET-TO-BOOK is the 
ratio of acquirer’s market value of equity to the book value of equity as of the last quarterly balance 
sheet prior to the month of the merger announcement. Panel C presents results by VOL the standard 
deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock return, estimated by taking the square 
root of the variance of the residuals from a market model estimated over the six month period ending 
at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement.  
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Table 3.9 Regression Analysis on the Determinants of the Change in Risk – Diversification 
 Dependent variable =        
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept 0.050*** 0.050*** 0.049*** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
TARGET_PUBLIC 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 
 (0.0819) (0.0812) (0.0832) (0.0572) (0.0612) (0.0444) 
TARGET_SUB -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 
 (0.2639) (0.2462) (0.2643) (0.2339) (0.2354) (0.2853) 
VOL 0.430** 0.428** 0.431** 0.422** 0.413** 0.354* 
 (0.0271) (0.0281) (0.0271) (0.0318) (0.0356) (0.0572) 
RUNUP_NET_MKT 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 
 (0.2168) (0.2299) (0.2172) (0.2583) (0.2511) (0.1687) 
MKT_TO_BOOK -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003  
 (0.3142) (0.3136) (0.3186) (0.3491) (0.350)  
STOCK -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 (0.2002) (0.1747) (0.2055) (0.1711) (0.1584) (0.1353) 
MIX CASH/STOCK -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.6031) (0.5545) (0.6037) (0.5722) (0.5192) (0.5364) 
DIFF_IND -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.013   
 (0.2068) (0.2009) (0.2094) (0.069)   
RATIO 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.6815) (0.6797) (0.682) (0.6711) (0.6416) (0.5996) 
MRK_VAL -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.006** -0.006*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0029) (0.002) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0001) 
CAR_RESID  0.042 0.041 0.042 0.043 0.042 0.043 
 (0.1295) (0.1336) (0.1291) (0.1161) (0.1255) (0.1192) 
DIST_FROM_DESIRED_RISK  0.322*** 0.321*** 0.322*** 0.327*** 0.322*** 0.329*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
IND_CF_VOL_DIFF -0.041 -0.042 -0.041 -0.039 -0.045 -0.037 
 (0.7994) (0.7945) (0.7987) (0.8117) (0.7804) (0.8186) 
EXECUCOMP  -0.006     
  (0.3902)     
OPTIONS  0.005 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.6398) (0.9362) (0.9958) (0.8712) (0.8208) 
HORIZONTAL    -0.020** -0.016* -0.016* 
    (0.0287) (0.0699) (0.0697) 
MIXED    -0.012 -0.008 -0.008 
    (0.0907) (0.2319) (0.2206) 
CONGLOMERATE    -0.005 -0.010 -0.009 
    (0.5355) (0.1708) (0.1889) 
Observations 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 
R-squared 0.070 0.070 0.070 0.073 0.071 0.070 
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Regressions on the determinants of the change in risk in the four type of integration; vertical, 
horizontal, mix, and conglomerate. The dependent variable        is the change in the acquiring 
firm’s default risk from the end of the month prior to the merger announcement to the end of the 
month six months after the completion of the merger. TARGET_PUBLIC: is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if and only if the target is publicly traded and 0 otherwise. TARGET_SUB: is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the target is a subsidiary and 0 otherwise. VOL: is 
the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock return, estimated by 
taking the square root of the variance of the residuals from a market model estimated over the six 
month period ending at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement. RUNUP_NET_MKT: 
is the buy-and-hold return of a company’s stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior 
to the merger announcement in excess of the return of the CRSP value – weighted index over the 
same period. MKT_TO_BOOK: is the ratio of acquirer’s market value of equity to the book value of 
equity as of the last quarterly balance sheet prior to the month of the merger announcement. STOCK: 
is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the acquisition is financed at least partially 
with stock. DIFF_IND: is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the target and the 
acquirer are in different industries. RATIO: is the ratio of the deal’s value to the market value of the 
acquirer. MRK_VAL: is the natural log of the market value of the acquiring firm at the end of the 
month prior to the merger announcement. CAR_RESID: is the estimated residual from the regression 
of CAR on RETURN INTERIM, defined as the buy-and-hold return for an acquirer’s stock between 
the end of the month prior to the merger announcement and at the end of the month six months after 
the merger is effective. DIST_FROM_DESIRED_RISK: is defined as the residual from a regression 
of acquirer default risk on balance sheet determinants of target risk level.S IND_CF_VOL_DIFF: is 
the risk in the acquirer’s industry minus the risk in the target firm’s industry, where industry risk is the 
standard deviation of the ratio of annual total cash flow to total assets in an industry in the five years 
prior to the merger announcement. EXECUCOMP: is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if and 
only if the acquirer is in the Execucomp data for the year prior to the merger announcement. 
OPTIONS: is defined as the fraction of the acquiring CEO’s compensation that is derived from 
executive stock options if EXECUCOMP equals 1 and is zero otherwise. HORIZONTAL: is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the acquirer diversifies horizontally, while 
MIXED and CONGLOMERATE are defined analogously for the acquirers who diversify both 
vertically and horizontally (mixed) and for the acquirers who make an unrelated acquisitions 
(conglomerate) respectively1%, 5% and 10% significance levels are reported with ***, ** and * 
respectively. P-values are in parentheses below each coefficient.  
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Table 3.10 Regression Analysis on the Determinants of the Change in Risk - Merger Waves, 
Diversification and Other Determinants 
 
 Dependent variable =        
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.044*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0036) (0.0007) (0.001) (0.0012) 
TARGET_PUBLIC 0.011** 0.011** 0.009 0.010* 0.010* 0.010* 
 (0.0494) (0.0449) (0.1193) (0.0871) (0.0865) (0.0733) 
TARGET_SUB -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 
 (0.2889) (0.2659) (0.2145) (0.1921) (0.1961) (0.2262) 
VOL 0.353* 0.351* 0.491** 0.478** 0.462** 0.422** 
 (0.0578) (0.0593) (0.0142) (0.0176) (0.0217) (0.0297) 
RUNUP_NET_MKT 0.009 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009 
 (0.1611) (0.2148) (0.2107) (0.2499) (0.2483) (0.1763) 
MKT_TO_BOOK   -0.003 -0.002 -0.003  
   (0.4444) (0.4712) (0.4502)  
STOCK -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.1287) (0.1483) (0.1742) (0.1471) (0.1404) (0.1194) 
MIX CASH/STOCK -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.5206) (0.5452) (0.4639) (0.438) (0.4289) (0.414) 
DIFF_IND   -0.008 -0.013*   
   (0.1658) (0.071)   
RATIO 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.6052) (0.5834) (0.6285) (0.6206) (0.5963) (0.5592) 
MRK_VAL -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.006*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0008) (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.002) (0.0003) 
CAR_RESID  0.042 0.044* 0.044* 0.046* 0.045* 0.045* 
 (0.1222) (0.100) (0.1002) (0.0959) (0.1003) (0.0992) 
DIST_FROM_DESIRED_RISK  0.329*** 0.334*** 0.313*** 0.317*** 0.314*** 0.319*** 
 (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
IND_CF_VOL_DIFF -0.040 -0.033 -0.048 -0.045 -0.051 -0.045 
 (0.8066) (0.8396) (0.7683) (0.7827) (0.7522) (0.7805) 
OPTIONS -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.8359) (0.9299) (0.9385) (0.8841) (0.9702) (0.9431) 
CBA -0.002      
 (0.7351)      
LEV  0.000     
  (0.3628)     
HORIZONTAL -0.016* -0.017*  -0.019** -0.016* -0.016* 
 (0.0702) (0.0596)  (0.0319) (0.0758) (0.0764) 
MIXED -0.008 -0.009  -0.012* -0.008 -0.008 
 (0.2188) (0.2057)  (0.092) (0.2355) (0.2251) 
CONGLOMERATE -0.009 -0.010  -0.006 -0.011 -0.011 
 (0.1871) (0.1777)  (0.4432) (0.1338) (0.1408) 
WAVE1   -0.027 -0.026 -0.029 -0.028 
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   (0.1618) (0.1866) (0.1398) (0.148) 
WAVE2   0.034* 0.032* 0.034* 0.034* 
   (0.069) (0.0826) (0.0696) (0.0649) 
Observations 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 1382 
R-squared 0.07 0.071 0.071 0.076 0.073 0.073 
 
Regressions on the determinants of the change in risk in the four type of integration; vertical, 
horizontal, mix, and conglomerate. The dependent variable        is the change in the acquiring 
firm’s default risk from the end of the month prior to the merger announcement to the end of the 
month six months after the completion of the merger. TARGET_PUBLIC: is a dummy variable that 
takes the value 1 if and only if the target is publicly traded and 0 otherwise. TARGET_SUB: is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the target is a subsidiary and 0 otherwise. VOL: is 
the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic component of the acquirer’s stock return, estimated by 
taking the square root of the variance of the residuals from a market model estimated over the six 
month period ending at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement. RUNUP_NET_MKT: 
is the buy-and-hold return of a company’s stock in the 12 months ending at the end of the month prior 
to the merger announcement in excess of the return of the CRSP value – weighted index over the 
same period. MKT_TO_BOOK: is the ratio of acquirer’s market value of equity to the book value of 
equity as of the last quarterly balance sheet prior to the month of the merger announcement. STOCK: 
is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the acquisition is financed at least partially 
with stock. DIFF_IND: is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the target and the 
acquirer are in different industries. RATIO: is the ratio of the deal’s value to the market value of the 
acquirer. MRK_VAL: is the natural log of the market value of the acquiring firm at the end of the 
month prior to the merger announcement. CAR_RESID: is the estimated residual from the regression 
of CAR on RETURN INTERIM, defined as the buy-and-hold return for an acquirer’s stock between 
the end of the month prior to the merger announcement and at the end of the month six months after 
the merger is effective. DIST_FROM_DESIRED_RISK: is defined as the residual from a regression 
of acquirer default risk on balance sheet determinants of target risk level.S IND_CF_VOL_DIFF: is 
the risk in the acquirer’s industry minus the risk in the target firm’s industry, where industry risk is the 
standard deviation of the ratio of annual total cash flow to total assets in an industry in the five years 
prior to the merger announcement. EXECUCOMP: is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if and 
only if the acquirer is in the Execucomp data for the year prior to the merger announcement. 
OPTIONS: is defined as the fraction of the acquiring CEO’s compensation that is derived from 
executive stock options if EXECUCOMP equals 1 and is zero otherwise. HORIZONTAL: is a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the acquirer diversifies horizontally, while 
MIXED and CONGLOMERATE are defined analogously for the acquirers who diversify both 
vertically and horizontally (mixed) and for the acquirers who make an unrelated acquisitions 
(conglomerate) respectively. WAVE1 and WAVE 2 is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if 
and only if the acquisitions was announced and completed during the first merger wave (1980-1989), 
and the second (1990-1999) respectively. CBA is an indicator that takes the value 1 if and only if the 
target firm is not a US firm. Leverage is estimated by taking the difference of the equity-to-asset ratio 
between the period six months after the merger completion and one month before the merger 
announcement. 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels are reported with ***, ** and * respectively. P-
values are in parentheses below each coefficient.  
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Chapter 4: Valuation Errors and the UK Takeover Profitability 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Empirical studies on mergers and acquisitions report substantial gains for the combined entity 
(i.e. Dodd 1980; Franks et al., 1991; Andrade et al., 2001). Target firms enjoy the majority of 
wealth created through the merger, whereas shareholders of the acquiring firms suffer from 
wealth loss or at best, they break even (for UK evidence on takeover gains please see 
Sudarsanam et al., 1996; and Higson and Elliott, 1998). Despite the value destruction for the 
acquiring firms, mergers remain a very popular restructuring strategy for the firms as 
evidence shows that every year, deals increase in numbers and in value. However, the 
corporate finance literature remains inconclusive on what drives mergers and the reasons 
behind acquirer firm returns’ variation.  
This paper contributes to the literature of corporate finance by providing new supporting 
evidence on the misvaluation theory of mergers from the UK market. We study how firm, 
market, or industry valuation errors affect the acquiring firms’ returns both in the short run 
and in the long run and after controlling for multiple deals, the method of payment, the 
target’s firm status, the relative size, the acquirer’s size and for cross-border acquisitions. We 
find that, during high market/industry valuation periods mergers increase returns for the 
acquiring firms and although returns are reversed in the long-run, these mergers are less value 
destroying compared with mergers during low market/industry valuation periods. We also 
show that undervalued firms, high relative size deals, multiple and cash acquisitions are more 
profitable in both short and long run period, while undervalued firms, public and stock 
acquisitions decrease acquirers’ value.  
There are a plethora of theories investigating a number of influences that induce a firm to 
engage in a merger (i.e. economies of scale, economic disturbance theory and agency costs of 
free cash flows). Through mergers, firms expect to realize technological and marketing 
synergies by expanding in a new stage of production, a new industry and/or a new 
geographical area (diversification), to redeploy excess corporate cash or avoid double 
taxation of dividends to shareholders, to reduce costs, increase productivity and/or efficiency 
of corporate resources, and improve competitive positioning. Efficiency theory (Bradley et 
al., 1983), neoclassical theory (Gort, 1969; Harforf, 2005), hubris theory (Roll, 1986) and 
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managerial theory (Jensen, 1986) are a few schools of thought that have extrapolate upon 
traditional theories and suggest alternative motives in explaining takeover activity, such as 
assets misvaluation or valuation errors, mismanagement or ‘hubris’. Whilst each theory offers 
significant insights in understanding and explaining mergers, none of the predictions of each 
theory are a necessary condition in a merger. In reality most mergers are a result of a number 
of different motivations and cannot be attributed solely to one incentive. 
Having said that, we cannot ignore the periodically patterns in takeover activity and we have 
to recognize the link between the state of the market/industry and the activity of mergers. 
Nelson (1959) initiated the misvaluation theory of merger; he discusses that mergers are 
‘highly concentrated in time, that they cluster during periods of high stock market valuation 
and that during these periods stock is more likely to be used as a method of payment.’ 
However, Nelson’s theory assumes that several industries experience shocks at the same time 
to explain aggregate merger waves which is not always the condition. Gort, (1969) argues 
that takeover activity intensifies during periods of ‘dramatic economic changes’. He also 
assumes that due to information asymmetry shareholders have in general differing options 
about the true value of an equity.  
The emergence of the market timing theory of mergers has intensified the debate on what is 
driving acquisitions (Stein, 1988,1989,1996; Morck et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1990; 
Baker and Wurgler 2000, 2002, 2006; Baker et al., 2003; Jenter, 2002; and Polk and 
Sapienza, 2004). Behavioural finance and market timing theory sees investment projects as a 
result of the mispricing in the markets. Shleifer and Vishny, (2003) offers a theoretical model 
of this behavioral approach in mergers; the model recognize that investors can misvalue the 
firms especially during a booming or a depressed market but the managers of the firms 
(assuming that they are rational) should be aware of the market imperfections and at the same 
time should be able to value their firms correctly. If this is the case, then managers will try to 
take advantage of stock market inefficiency and engage in stock acquisitions in high market 
valuation periods. Empirical evidence confirm that periods of intense (low) takeover activity, 
coincide with periods of high (low) market valuations and also show that there is a positive 
correlation between high (low) market valuation periods and the use of stock (cash) as a 
takeover currency (see for example Maksimovic and Phillips 2001; Jovanovic and Rousseau, 
2002; and Ang and Cheng, 2006).   
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A comprehensive study by Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, (2005) decomposed valuation 
into three main sources; the market, the industry and the firm. Any deviations from 
fundamentals should motivate firms to persuade a merger. Dong et al., (2006) shows that 
firms’ market valuations significantly affect the method of payment, the premium, and the 
returns of the merger. Ang and Cheng (2006) provide evidence that stock acquisitions are 
correlated with possible firms’ misvaluation supporting Shleifer and Vishny (2003) 
theoretical model on misvaluation. Antoniou, Guo and Petmezas (2008) show that the 
momentum on UK acquirers returns during high market valuation periods are driven by 
investor sentiment. Finally, Petmezas (2009) finds that UK acquirers outperform their 
counterparts when they engage in mergers in booming markets and after controlling for the 
target type and method of payment.  
Behavioral theories have concentrated not only on the market and the firm valuations but also 
on the acquiring firms’ managers and whether their beliefs affect the acquiring firm’s 
performance. Roll (1986) with the famous ‘hubris hypothesis’ is one of the first papers which 
recognize the importance of managers’ beliefs on influencing the acquisition decisions and 
returns. Hubris-infected managers over-estimate their abilities to create value in a merger, 
and overestimate the potential synergies. Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that firms with 
non-overconfident managers will perform better in an acquisition than acquirers with 
overconfident managers. Croci, Petmezas and Vagenas-Nanos (2010) find that firms with 
non-overconfident managers gain more than those with overconfident managers during high 
valuation periods. These results find support on anecdotal evidence which suggest that firms 
take advantage of misvaluation ex-post mistakes to correct their value.
40
  
In this study we control for the overconfidence of the acquiring firms’ managers by 
differentiating our sample in multiple and single acquirers. Doukas and Petmezas (2007) use 
the frequency that each acquirer makes acquisitions as a measure of overconfidence. The 
authors argue that managerial overconfidence results from self-attribution bias and that 
although overconfident managers are more capable than their peers, they tend to overestimate 
the potential synergy of a merger deal or underestimate the riskiness of the project. It is more 
likely that an overconfident manager would make multiple acquisitions in a short period than 
a non-overconfident manager. Studies on the performance of multiple acquirers show that 
                                                          
40
 For example, in 2000 American Online (AOL) completed its $164bn acquisition of Time Warner using its 
then hyper-inflated stocks. In the following year, when the market corrected the error, Time Warner experienced 
a mega-loss of $99bn. 
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although there is not much difference between multiple and single acquirers (or overconfident 
and non-overconfident), the performance of multiple acquirer declines with each subsequent 
acquisitions.
41
  Fuller et al., (2002) finds that multiple acquirers’ performance varies by the 
target type, the relative size and the method of payment. By including a measure that captures 
the acquirers’ overconfident we would like to see how the acquiring firms’ performance 
during high or low valuation periods will change. We find that undervalued acquirers 
outperform overvalued acquirers irrespective of the manager’s overconfidence (or whether 
the acquirer makes multiple announcements) while both multiple and single acquirers gain 
much more when making acquisitions in high market or industry valuation periods. 
Multivariate analysis confirms these results and also shows that method of payment, target 
status, relative size and valuation errors stemming either the firm, the market or the industry 
significantly affect acquiring firm’s performance.    
Consistent with previous studies, our results suggest that information asymmetry and 
investors’ sentiment may play an important role in explaining the acquiring firms’ returns. 
Antoniou, Guo and Petmezas (2008) shows that the performance of UK acquirers during high 
market valuation periods, is driven by investors’ sentiment. We argue that since investors 
value firms based on the availability of relevant information (information asymmetry), during 
booming markets optimism can intensify investors’ positive expectations (investor sentiment 
hypothesis). A merger announcement releases information to the market and helps investors 
to adjust their views on the firms’ value. Deal and firm characteristics of the merger also 
work as a signaling tool in the market (Myers and Majluf, 1984). For example an acquirer 
offering his stock as the method of payment, is usually perceived as a signal that the acquirer 
is overvalued or a cash acquisitions is viewed positively by investors (Schlingemann, 2004; 
Martynova and Renneboog, 2007). At the same time, investors’ expectations can be elevated 
during periods of extreme market/industry valuations and drive up or down the stock market 
price around the announcement. Finally, the high takeover activity during booming markets 
can be explained by the information asymmetry hypothesis. Information is in general more 
transparent and accessible at a market level. Thus during periods of high market valuations, 
the target firms might overestimate market misvaluation and due to investor sentiment, 
expect higher returns during these periods. Consequently, the likelihood of the target firms 
accepting a merger offer should be higher than during a low market valuation period and 
therefore takeover activity increases analogously with market/industry valuation.   
                                                          
41
 See for example Conn et al., (2004) 
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4.2 Literature Review 
 
4.2.1 Value Creation and Mergers  
Much of the focus in the literature of corporate finance has been on whether mergers are 
profitable, and if so for whom. In general Mergers and Acquisitions should be attractive to 
the acquiring and the target firms’ shareholders only if they maximise the value of their share. 
Value creation in mergers may result from a number of reasons such as distribution and 
management, economies of scale in production, new technological knowledge, new 
distribution channels and cross-selling of each other’s products. Empirical evidence shows 
that merger synergies are difficult to attain and their size can be disappointing.
42
 The 
announcement returns of the target and the acquirer vary depending upon various firm- and 
transaction characteristics. There is substantial evidence that target firm shareholders enjoy 
significantly positive announcement abnormal returns of about 30% irrespective of the 
takeover mode (i.e. friendly or hostile), while the acquirer firm shareholders generally gain 
either significant negative, zero or positive announcement- and post- acquisition returns.
43
  
Existing studies propose various reasons in explaining the variation in bidder and target 
firms’ announcement returns. Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner, (1997) finds that the abnormal 
returns to target firm shareholders for successful tender offers have rose 22% during the 
1960s and more than 50% in the early due to the high premiums the acquiring firms offer. 
Other contributing factors to the increase in target’s returns include the improvement of 
takeover defences, the regulations and deregulations, and the good financial performance of 
the target (or the anticipation).
44
 For the same reasons, returns on shareholders of the 
acquiring firms have slightly declined over time. Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) 
document that although acquirers experience positive returns during the 1990s, especially 
during 1990-1997, gains were offset by the losses during the later period, 1998-2001.   
                                                          
42
 See for example Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Sirower (1997). 
43
 For evidence on announcement and post acquisition returns see Asquith (1983), Jensen and Ruback (1983), 
You, Caves, Smith and Henry (1986), Dennis and McConnell (1986), Jarell, Brickley and Netter (1988), 
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), Lang, Stulz and Walking (1989), Jarell and Poulsen (1989), Franks, Harris and 
Titman (1991), Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992), Bhagat and Hirshleifer (1996), Schwert (1996), Cotter, 
Shivdasani and Zenner (1997), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Rau and Vermaelen (1998), Ghosh and Lee (2000), 
Mulherin and Boone (2000), Akhigbe, Borde and Whyte (2000), Bruner (2002), Fuller, Netter and Stegemoller 
(2002), Billet, King and Mauer (2004), and Fee and Thomas (2004). 
44
 Ghosh and Lee, 2000 
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Studies on the post-merger performance provide conflicting evidence about the long-term 
impact of mergers on the acquiring firms’ returns. Although some find that mergers increase 
shareholders wealth, others find that the majority of the acquirers underperform their industry 
peers.
45
 Sample and time period selections, firm and deal specific factors, (i.e. the 
overpayment of growth target firms, sale of stocks around merger announcement dates, the 
method of payment), the methodology used or factors that are not related to the merger have 
been employed to explain the variation in the post-merger findings.
46
   Most likely, the longer 
the period after the completion of the merger, the higher the likelihood that other factors 
which are not related to the merger will affect the abnormal returns of the acquirer.  
4.2.2 Timing of Mergers 
Another distinct feature of the takeover market is the cyclic move of the deals and the trends 
of each period, known as merger waves. High merger activity is usually followed by periods 
of lower merger activity. The US market for example has over a 100-year history in merger 
waves, the UK activity started around the 1960s, while the EU merger history is fairly new 
and only started around 1980s. The UK merger market is considered the leader in terms of 
takeover activity within the EU as it accounts for about 31% of all EU Deals.
47
 Since 1984, 
the EU merger waves are paralleling those in the US market. Therefore, UK merger activity 
is an ideal and attractive testing sample of the European market.   
The UK market experienced two small merger waves in the 1890s and the 1920s. Then due to 
the 1940’s War, UK market sank into a major depression which lasted until late 1950s.  In the 
1960s, the deal value of the UK takeovers reaches £1.95bn, and rose even higher to £2.5bn in 
1973. The 1980’s wave has an astonishing deal value of £27bn and an the average deal value 
is 10 times more compared with the previous waves (£20.4m comparing to £2m) and twice 
the total value of acquisitions. In terms of wave characteristics, the 1960s wave was 
overpopulated by horizontal acquisitions due to a new industrial policy (IRC) that was 
adopted to help strengthen UK firm and make them more competitive. The trend of 
horizontal mergers continues during the next wave that peaked in 1972 but on a smaller scale. 
                                                          
45
 See for example, Barber and Lyon (1997), Fama (1998), and Lyon, Barber and Tsai (1999). 
46
 For a review of key findings on factors affecting long-term M&A performance, see for example Anslinger 
and Copeland (1996), Loughran and Vijh (1997), Sirower (1997), Lajoux (1998), Agrawal and Jaffe (1992), 
Linn and Switzer (2001), Frick and Torres (2002), and Heron and Lie (2002).  
47
 Thompson Financial SDC database ranks Germany as the second country in terms of merger deals with 16% 
of all EU deals, France third with 14%, Netherlands forth with 7% and Italy fifth with 6%. 
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Conglomerate mergers are increasing in numbers in this wave.  The 1980s merger wave 
occurred during a booming market period and the market crash in 1987. During the 1990s, 
new sectors in the UK were being privatized and deregulation of the telecom industry led to a 
new wave. In 2000s the deal value of UK mergers reached £107bn and for the first time the 
value of acquisitions taken by foreign firms exceeds domestic ones. This is also the time of 
the one of the worst financial crises. The bursting US house bubble in 2006 initiated the 
beginning of a great depression which is characterized by extreme credit control worldwide, 
decrease in international trade which damaged investors’ confidence that had an impact on 
global stock markets. The EU and UK had responded to this crisis with strictness measures in 
all aspects of the economy and increase taxes.  
Until recently, there was no unified theory of mergers or at least a theoretical model 
explaining takeover waves or the timing of waves and the returns of the deals. A notable 
exception is a study by Gort (1969), which argues that, ‘at certain times, shareholders have 
differing options as to the true value of a share because of imperfections in the information 
available and how it is assessed. These differences in valuation can lead to takeover 
transactions and become greater at times of dramatic economic change.’ Only recently, the 
literature on mergers and acquisitions has provided a theoretical base and empirical evidence 
to support the link between market conditions and takeover activity.  Shleifer and Vishny, 
(2003) explain that there is a strong connection between aggregate takeover activity, the 
quality and the outcome of the deals (in terms of profit) and mis-valuation or valuation errors. 
More specific the authors discuss how the stock market can misvalue the acquirers, the target 
firms, and the combined entity. Assuming that managers are rational, then mergers can be 
used as a form of arbitrage by the acquirers to correctly value their firms by taking advantage 
of stock market inefficiency. Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, (2005) decomposed valuation 
errors into three main sources; the market, the industry and the firm. Potential value 
deviations from either source works as a motivation for the firms to engage in a merger and 
to take advantage of investors’ (false) expectations and beliefs regarding the true value or the 
potential of the firms, especially during periods of flourishing or depressing stock markets. 
The misvaluation theory recognizes the link between the cyclic nature of takeovers activity 
and the valuations of the market, the industry and the firms at the time of the announcement.    
Sporadic empirical evidence appears to be consistent with several implication of the 
misvaluation theory of mergers. For example Andrade et al. (2001) and Jovanovic and 
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Rousseau (2002), find that merger activity increases when the market is booming, and also 
show that the prevalence of stock acquisitions is greater during these periods. Systematic 
evidence of higher levels of merger activity in bull markets is also found by Verter (2002). 
The author also shows these acquisitions are more likely to use stock and to result into low 
market returns, suggesting that these firms are overvalued. Further, Titman, Wei and Xie 
(2004) and Polk and Sapienza (2004) find that high investment is more likely to result into 
lower stock returns in the cross section, and Lamont (2000) shows a similar pattern for 
planned investment in the time series. Finally Ang and Cheng (2006) provide evidence that 
stock acquisitions are correlated with possible firms’ misvaluations supporting Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) theory, while Dong et al., (2006) show that there is a relationship between the 
firms market valuation, transaction characteristics, and firms’ abnormal returns variation in 
the us mergers. 
4.2.3 Other Explanatory Variables  
Several transaction and acquirer specific characteristics are also reported in the literature of 
mergers as major determinants of acquisition process and performance. For example the 
target’s firm ownership status has been found to affect the acquiring firms’ abnormal returns. 
Ang and Kohers (2001) find that public acquisitions yield lower abnormal returns than 
private acquisitions. Fuller et al., (2002) show private acquisitions result in 2.08% abnormal 
returns, while a public target generates -1% for the bidder during the period of 1990 to 2000. 
Further Moeller et al., (2004) confirms that private acquisitions are profitable deals for the 
acquirer, and public acquisitions destroy value. Similar results are documented for the UK 
and European merger markets by Conn et al., (2005), Draper and Paudyal (2006) and Faccio 
et al., (2006). Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) suggest that performance differences between 
these two types of acquisitions might be caused by differences in managers’ motivation and 
bargaining power. Barney (1986, 1988) and Reuer and Ragozzino (2006) suggest that the 
level of private information drives acquisition performance. This is the most prominent 
explanations for the growth differential between private and public acquisitions; information 
on public firms is more widely available, whereas private targets typically do not disclose all 
relevant information. Furthermore, market is constantly pricing public firms, while private 
firms are less visible and transparent and therefore more risky and more difficult to value 
(Deeds, Decarolis and Coombs, 1999; and Becchetti and Trovato, 2002). Since the 
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information about a public firm is available, potential bidders may compete and therefore 
overpay such targets (Draper and Paudyal, 2006).  
A growing amount of research has examined the role of method of payment in the 
acquisitions process. Hansen (1987) and Fishman (1989) suggest that acquirers will offer 
stock in an acquisition when there is high information asymmetry about target’s value. 
Further, Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest that, given the information asymmetry arising from 
superior managers’ internal information, managers think that their overvalued equity is the 
best method of payment. Conversely, investors might recognize the adverse selection 
problem, re-value their initial beliefs based on the new information about the method of 
payment and drive equity prices down. Therefore stock public acquisitions are result in value 
destroying projects for the acquirer.
48
 The method of payment also affects acquirers’ 
performance in domestic and cross-border acquisitions. Accordingly, Conn et al. (2005) 
shows that cash acquirers buying domestic public targets outperform their peers buying 
foreign public targets; this pattern reverses when the acquirers offer non-cash
49
 payments. 
When the target is a private firm, domestic acquisitions outperform foreign acquisitions when 
the method of payment is cash or non-cash. In addition, acquirers engaging in cross-border 
acquisitions of public firms using non-cash methods do not experience losses, whilst private 
firms’ domestic deals generate higher abnormal returns than for cross-border deals. These 
results reflect that target origin is highly relevant in addition to method of payment in the 
determination of abnormal returns. 
Furthermore, the relative size of the target to bidding firm and the bidder’s size are both 
significant factors in the acquisitions process (Asquith et al. (1983), Jensen and Ruback 
(1983), Jarrell and Poulsen (1989), Kang (1993) and Fuller et al. (2002)). The larger the size 
of the target firm the more severe the generated abnormal returns as a result of the changes in 
structure for the acquiring firm as a result of the acquisition. More specific, Jensen and 
Ruback (1983) finds that the acquiring firms’ abnormal returns increase with the size of the 
target relative to the size of the acquirer. In addition, Loderer and Martin (1990) find that 
larger firms tend to overpay targets and this will reduce their share price performance. 
Finally, single acquirers have been found to enjoy higher abnormal returns than multiple 
                                                          
48
 See for example: Travlos (1987), Wansley, Lane and Yang (1987), Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990), Servaes 
(1991), Brown and Ryngaert (1991), Martin (1996), Ghosh and Ruland (1998), Draper and Paudyal (1999, 
2006), and Fuller, Netter, Stegemoller (2002), Conn et al. (2005). 
49
 Non-cash offers include stock offers, stock and cash offers, and other offers. 
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acquirers (Ismail, 2008 and Doukas and Petmezas, 2007). Fuller et al., (2002) defines 
multiple acquirers as ‘the firms that make five or more acquisitions within a 3-year period’. 
Doukas and Petmezas (2007) argue that such acquirers are infected by overconfidence who 
choose projects that decrease shareholders’ value compared with rational managers who 
make better choices and thus increase shareholders’ wealth.    
This paper contributes to the literature of mergers and acquisitions by building on the existing 
literature of takeovers which incorporates the misvaluation theory in explaining the returns of 
the mergers.  We investigate how acquiring firm’s returns varies in the UK takeover market 
across over- and under- valuation errors stemming either from the firm, the market and the 
industry. We control for several deal and firm characteristics such as multiple deals, the 
method of payment, the target status, the relative size, the acquirer’s market value and cross 
border acquisitions and see whether our results change.   
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Sample Description 
The UK Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) sample is from Thompson One Banker database. 
54,895 deals are announced and completed between 1986 and 2006. We include successful 
offers which are announced and completed between 1986 and 2006. The acquirer is a UK 
company listed in the London Stock Exchange (LSE). The target firm is a public or private 
firm, domestic or foreign firm. The vast majority of UK takeovers involve private targets. 
The method of payment is 100% cash or equity or a combination of cash and equity.  The 
price, return data, P/E ratio of the acquiring firms, market P/E ratio and industry P/E ratio 
must be available from the DataStream database. The value of the transaction is £1 million or 
more to avoid results being driven by extremely low value transactions. The market value of 
the acquirer a month prior to the bid announcement is at least £1 million or more. To ensure 
that a merger has a significant impact on acquirer’s firm default risk, we examine only those 
where the acquirer owns less than 10% prior to the deal and obtains more than 50% after the 
deal, similar with other studies (see for example Fuller et al., 2002). Neither the bidder nor 
the target is a government, a healthcare, a utility, a bank, a real estate or a financial 
institution. After these restrictions, our final sample comprise of 3622 completed UK mergers 
and acquisitions. 
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4.3.2 Valuation Techniques 
This study investigates, acquiring firm’s returns in the short and long run subject to firm, 
market and industry valuation. We also see how multiple deals, the target firm’s ownership 
status and the method of payment affect profitability. We use market-based valuation 
techniques to estimate the firm, market and industry valuation.  
In an efficient capital market, the best estimation of a firm’s value is given by its current 
share price multiplied by the number of shares in issue. In reality stock market valuations do 
not always reflect the fair value of the firms and thus various techniques have been developed 
in order to capture any value divergence from its fundamental. Several approaches
50
 have 
been used in the literature to estimate a firm’s valuation, with the most popular ones being 
Cash flows valuation
51
 and Relative valuation.
52
  
Market-based valuation methods or relative valuation models, assume that a firm’s market 
value can be found using an indicator of value for comparable firms, comparable 
transactions, or comparable industry averages. The principle here is that capital markets are 
consistently price firms, and a common market based pricing mechanism for all firms should 
reflect their true value. Such indicators can be the firm’s earnings, cash flow, sales or book 
value. The most common ratios multiply those statement numbers. The most common models 
that are used in practice are the price-earnings ratio (P/E), the price-to-book ratio (P/B) or its 
reciprocal market-to-book ratio (M/B), the price-to-sales ratio (P/S), the ratio of price-to-cash 
flows from operations (P/CFO) and market-to-net worth (Tobin’s Q). Most of these pricing 
techniques rely upon some benchmark valuation from either the market as a whole or for a 
reference firm or industry. Market-based valuation methods are popular for three reasons; 
first, the simplicity of these methods in calculations, relatively cash flow valuation techniques 
which require much more assumptions and information about the firm.  Second, relative 
valuation is easier to explain than DCF methods and third, market-based methods will most 
likely reflect the current market conditions.  
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 Damodaran, 2001; Copland, Koller and Murrin, 2002; and Levy, 2006 
51
 Examples of Cash flow valuation is FCFF (free cash flow to the firm) which reflects cash from operating and 
investing activities, or FCFE (free cash flow equity valuation) which includes cash from operating, investing 
and financing activities.  
52
 Other approaches to valuation of a firm are asset valuation (where a summary of the assets less the liabilities 
of the firm are valued on some agree basis) and contingent valuation (where the firm is valued in terms of the 
present value of the expected cash flows plus some premium for any future growth options. 
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Accordigly, Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) document that M/B explains mean stock 
returns by conjectures that is a proxy for risk or mispriced stocks. Similarly, Fama and 
French (1992) argued that firm size and market-to-book value better explain the variation in 
average stock returns. More specifically, they posit that the market-to-book ratio is a proxy 
for ‘unobservable common risk factors’ and empirically find that this ratio has a significant 
relationship with realised returns. An alternative explanation for the predictive power of 
financial ratios and more specific for market-to-book ratio, that it is consistent with Fama and 
French (1992), is provided by Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) who argue that 
‘financial ratios are capable of predicting share returns, because they capture the systematic 
errors of investor expectation of future returns and the inefficiency of stock market’.  
We use the ratio of market price to book value (or the price-to-book ratio or the market-to-
book ratio) to compare the market value of a firm’s equity to its book value. This ratio 
assumes that there is a consistent relationship between market value and the net book value of 
the firm. Several studies use the market-to-book ratio as a predictor of the cross-sectional 
stock returns and as an indicator of misvaluation on a firm specific level (e.g., Chen and 
Jindra, 2001, Ang and Cheng, 2006, Daniel and Titman, 2006 and Dong et al., 2006). P/B 
ratios and its reciprocal M/B ratios are obtained directly from Datastream database (data-type 
PB).  
P/B ratio is calculated as follow: 
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[1] Where current book value can be calculated as under: 
 
 
2
2
tan ( )
it
LatestBookValue
BV
TotalSharesOuts ding allclasses atBalanceSheetDate
 
  
 
 
[2] The current book value is the latest book value shown on the balance sheet before the 
announcement and total shares outstanding are as of latest balance sheet date before the 
announcement, adjusted for capital changes found in company interim and annual reports or 
local stock exchange documents. 
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The general idea to capture any mispricing of an equity is to first calculate the firm’s ratio 
and then identify an appropriate benchmark to compare the firm’s ratio. Following Chen and 
Jindra, (2001) and Ang and Cheng (2006), the misvaluation of stock i at time t is calculated 
as follow using the appropriate industrial sector’s P/B ratio for each firm in our sample in the 
month prior to the announcement: 
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is the price-to-book ratio of stock i at t 
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P
B
 
 
 
is the median price-to-book ratio of industry j to which i belongs at t.  
 
Accordingly, ‘differences among industries, due to varying growth opportunities and risks, 
are accounted for through industries medians. For each firm, we use the stock price and the 
number of shares outstanding at t to derive its market value. The book value is the most 
recent value of common equity before t. For any event firm, we compute the price-to-book 
ratios of all firms in its industry. The Fama and French (1997) 48-industry classification is 
first used, and we require that there be at least 5 companies in the industry to derive the 
median, if this is not satisfied, the Fama and French 38-industry classification is used’. The 
sample is ranked based on the P/B ratio in three equally weighted sub-groups as high, neutral, 
and low valued announcements.  
We use the FTSE ALL share P/E ratio to control for the aggregate stock market performance 
and monthly P/E of the 10-industries as classified by Fama and French (1993)
53
 to control for 
industry valuation. The price to earnings ratio (P/E) compares the current price with earnings. 
The price shows the market’s anticipation as given by the future sales or earnings whereas the 
denominator is current earnings. So the P/E ratio shows the forecasted future sales/earnings in 
                                                          
53
 Fama and French (1993) 10 industries include Oil&Gas, Industrial, Financials, Health Care, Consumer 
Services, Consumer Goods, Materials, Technology, Telecom and Utility and are identified according to ICBN 
Industry Classification.  
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relation with the current earnings. If market participants anticipate higher future earnings than 
current earnings, the P/E ratio will increase and if they expect lower future earnings than 
current earnings, the P/E ratio will decrease. As with any relative valuation method, the 
historical P/E ratios, or the average P/E ratio of the industrial sector can be used as 
benchmarks. P/E ratios are obtained directly from the Datastream Database (data-type PE) 
and are derived by dividing the total market value by the total earnings (earnings-weighted 
average of the P/E of the constituents).  
Accordingly, P/E ratio is calculated as follows:  
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where:   
it
P
E
 
 
 
 is the price-to- earnings ratio of stock i at day t 
tP  is the unadjusted share price i on day t 
tN is the number of shares i in issue on day t 
tE  is the earnings per share i on day t
54
  
 n is the number of constituents in index 
 
We define each calendar month as high- or low- valuation month based on the Value-
weighted market index P/E ratio (TOTMKUK) of FTSE ALL SHARE. To do so, we first 
detrend the market P/E ratio by removing the best straight line fit from the actual P/E ratio of 
the month in question and the five preceding years. We define high (low) market valuation 
periods as the top (bottom) third of all detrended P/E and the rest as neutral valuation periods. 
Analogously, the same method is used to define each period as high-, neutral- and low- based 
on industry valuation but using the Value-weighted industry P/E ratio of the 10 industries as 
identified by Fama and French.
55
  
                                                          
54
 Note that negative earnings per share are treated as zero. 
55
 Market and Industry valuation periods are also classified as high, neutral and low following Bouwman et al., 
(2009) classification. Each month is classified into a high- (low-) valuation if its detrended P/E is above (below) 
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4.3.3 Acquisitions Returns 
To investigate how firm, market and industry valuations are related to the returns of the 
acquisitions around the announcement but also the long-run returns of the acquisition, we 
calculate the announcement-period returns and the long-run returns for 12 and 36 months 
after the merger is completed.. Event studies were introduced by Fama et al. (1969) aiming to 
produce evidence on how stock prices respond to information, in our case ‘date of acquisition 
announcement’. Empirical work on mergers has focus on various windows around the event 
date and different event study methodologies but most studies report approximately similar 
abnormal returns.
56
 This is mainly due to the use of daily data that seem to adjust rapidly 
within a day around the new information (i.e. acquisition announcement).    
We follow calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for a five-day window around the 
acquisition announcement [-2, +2] using the market adjusted returns. Fuller et al. (2002) 
reports that the 5-day window around the event is wide enough to capture the first stock price 
reaction when this new information enters the market.  
After selecting our sample through SDC, stocks daily price data (RI)
57
 for the sample period 
were collected, using the SDC’s SEDOL through DataStream. We first calculate the daily 
return for each company as shown in equation (1): 
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R  (1) 
We define tiR , as the return for acquiring firm’s security i at day t and it is given by the 
percentage change of the price between time t and the previous one (t-1). In the same way we 
calculate the daily benchmark return,
tmR ,  for the FTSE all share market index for the sample 
period we are interested in. We use the modified market adjusted model to capture the 
announcement period abnormal return of the bidding firm’s security i.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the past five-year average. The sample is ranked based on the detrended P/E ratio and each month which is 
greater than the past-five year average is classified as a high-valuation period, whereas each month that is below 
its past average as a low-valuation period. Our results are robust against Bouwman et al., (2009) classification. 
56
 Bradley, Desai and Kim, 1988; Jarrell and Pulsen, 1989; Lang, Stulz and Walking, 1989; Servaes, 1991; 
Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Mulherin and Boone, 2000 
57
 This not only accounts for any capital changes during out testing period but also incorporates any dividends 
paid by firms throughout this period.  
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Accordingly, for every firm’s security i, the abnormal return 
tiAR , at day t is calculated using 
the following formula: 
 tmtiti RRAR ,,,   (2) 
 
Following Fuller et al.’s (2002) simple event study methodology, we calculate the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) for the five-day period [-2, +2] around the announcement day (day 
0) of each takeover. CARs are calculated by summing the daily abnormal returns over the 
examined window as shown in equation (3): 
 
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2
,,
t
t
tiTi ARCAR  (3) 
 
where T is the examined five-day period [-2, +2]. 
Alternative models can be used to calculate the abnormal returns, such as the market adjusted 
return method. According to Brown and Warner (1980), weighting the market return by the 
firm’s beta in event studies, does not add any significant improvement to the estimation of the 
abnormal returns. 
Long-run analysis is performed for 12 and 36 months after the acquisition announcement. We 
calculate one and three year holding period excess returns after controlling for risk factors as 
they have been identified by Fama and French (1996). The calendar-time portfolio excess 
returns are estimated with calendar time portfolio regression (CTPR) as shown in equation 
(4): 
    , , , ,p t f t p p m t f t p t p t tR R a R R s SMB h HML         (4) 
Where pa measures the monthly average risk adjusted excess returns after controlling for the 
three risk factors. The dependent variable  , ,p t f tR R is the monthly excess return of the 
calendar-time portfolio of bidders over the risk free rate;  , ,m t f tR R is the excess return of 
the market portfolio; SMB stands for small minus big and is the excess return of a portfolio 
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of small firms over a portfolio of large firms and finally HML stands for high minus low and 
is the excess return of a portfolio of value firms over glamour firms. SMB and HML are 
estimated following Fama and French (1996) methodology.  
4.3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.1 displays the summary statistics for the entire sample of the 3622 mergers and 
acquisitions. The mean and median values of the deal value, the bidder market value and the 
relative size of the offer are reported yearly.  Deal value is the total value of the merger minus 
fees and expenses paid by the bidder, market value is the market value of the acquiring firm 
at the end of the month prior to the merger announcement and relative size is the ratio of deal 
value to the bidder market value. The average deal value ranges from 22.69 million to 181.33 
million UK pounds, with a total sample mean of about 68.94 millions. There are some 
noticeable mean fluctuations with regards deal value and size around the peaks of 1990’s and 
2000’s merger waves. Also bidders seem to be much larger than the targets firms. 
[Table 4.1] 
Table 4.2 presents the yearly acquisition activity in numbers and as a percentage, of our 
sample by the type of the deal (i.e. multiple and single), the target status (i.e. private and 
public firms), the method of payment (i.e. cash, stock and mix), the market that the target 
firm belongs to (domestic versus foreign) and the acquirer and target firm industry (intra 
stands for the deals where the bidder and the target belong in the same industry and inter 
stands for the deals where the bidder and the target belong in a different industry). Multiple 
acquirers are defined as the acquirers who make at least five completed acquisitions within a 
three year period (see Fuller et al., 2002). We try a "more refined definition" of multiple 
acquisitions that basically not only focuses on the acquirer but also on the amount of 
acquisitions within a specified time frame. Accordingly, multiple deals are defined as the 
deals which are completed within a 3 year period by the same bidder. All other acquisitions 
from this bidder are defined as single acquisitions.
58
 We find that 6% of our sample is 
multiple deals and 94% is single deals. There is an increase in multiple deals around 1986, 
1993, and 2000 which is the peak of the 1980s wave, the beginning of the 1990s and 2000s 
wave. We also see that the takeover market experienced a boom in the late 1980s, then a 
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 We match the sample size of multiple acquirers with previous UK studies, such as Doukas and Petmezas 
(2007) and Antoniou et al., (2007). 
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second boom between 1996 and 2001, and a smaller peak in 2005. Our sample is thus 
representative of the transactions occurring within the UK takeover market of 1980s, 1990s, 
and 2000s waves. Acquisitions of private targets represent the 85% of the overall activity, 
whereas public acquisitions only the 15%. The most popular method of payment is mix 
payments (51%), although there are periods where either cash or equity outweighs mix 
payments.  In general, stock payments are considered as a sign of acquirer’s overvaluation 
and have been closely linked with high market valuation (see for example Petmezas, 2009 
and Antoniou et al., 2008). 68% of our targets are domestic firms, and 48% belong in the 
same industry as the acquirer firm.  
[Table 4.2] 
Table 4.3 presents the mean and median valuation values by firm, market and industry 
valuation of the entire sample of acquisitions (Panel A). The overall sample has mean 
valuation of 0.49*** under firm-specific, -0.18*** under market valuation, and 0.21 under 
industry valuation. This pattern remains through all our panels (i.e. multiple deals, method of 
payment and target status), although there are some significant increases or decreases in 
specific sub-groups. For example mean firm valuation in the multiple deals increases to 0.67.  
Panel B shows the mean valuations of multiple and single deals. We find that firm and 
industry valuations are positive and significant higher than those of single deals, whereas 
under market valuation both types of deals have negative mean valuations. Panel C shows the 
mean valuations by method of payment. We find that stock acquirers have higher mean 
valuation values than cash acquirers. This is in line with Shleifer and Vishny, (2003) who 
explains that cash deals will be associated with undervaluation. Finally, Panel D shows the 
mean valuations by target status. The results here show that public acquisitions are in general 
less overvalued than private acquisitions under market and industry valuation. When the 
market or the industry are undervalued then acquirers might be less infected by hubris and 
thus choose to make public acquisitions that are more transparent in terms of information. 
However, when the acquirer is overvalued then is more likely to be infected by 
overconfidence or hubris (Petmezas, 2009) and thus persuade private acquisitions despite the 
fact that private targets are more difficult to value than public targets.  
[Table 4.3] 
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4.3.5 Results – Returns In The Presence Of Misvaluation 
The main aim of this project is to examine the performance of UK bidding firms both around 
the announcement and during the post-acquisitions period based on the possible misvaluation 
effects of the firm, the market and the industry and by controlling for the type of deals (i.e. 
multiple versus single), the method of payment and the target type. The methodology that we 
use to capture the source of misvaluation assigns each month in the sample period as high, 
neutral and low, according to the P/B ratio for possible firm misvaluation, the detrended 
market P/E ratio for market misvaluation and the detrended industry P/E ratio for industry 
misvaluation.  
A limited number of studies have investigated the performance of bidders by looking at the 
source of misvaluation. In this study we seek to examine acquirer’s performance under the 
presence of misvaluation as captured by market, industry and film and how other 
determinants that have been identified in the literature of mergers to affect acquisition 
process, affect acquirer’s performance. Along this framework, this section presents the five-
day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to all bidders by firm valuation  as captured by P/B 
ratio one month before the announcement  (Table 4.4), market valuation as capture by the 
detrended FTSE ALL SHARE P/E ratio one month before the announcement (Table 4.5) and 
industry valuation as captured by the detrended P/E industry ratio one month before the 
announcement (Table 4.6). We also report the differentials in CAR between low and high 
valuation portfolios in each panel.  
4.3.5.1 Acquiring Firms Announcement Returns 
Table 4.4 presents the five-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for acquisitions 
classified by acquirers’ P/B ratio into high, neutral low valuation periods and by multiple 
deals, method of payment and target type. Abnormal return differentials between high and 
low portfolios are also reported in each panel. Panel A presents the CARs for the entire 
sample and then the sample is further sub-grouped by multiple deals (Panel B), method of 
payment (Panel C) and target status (Panel D). Panel E report abnormal returns differentials 
by several portfolio combinations to uncover any significant patterns. We find that on 
average the acquiring firms’ gains are positive and statistically significant (1.07%). As we 
move along the three portfolios, the gains of the portfolio with the undervalued firms are 
1.70%, statistical significant at 1%, and the gains of the overvalued acquirers are positive, 
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0.28% and statistical significant. The differential between high and low portfolio is -1.42% 
and statistical significant at 1%, indicating that when not taking into consideration any other 
performance determinants, undervalued acquirers outperform their overvalued counterparts.
59
  
Acquirers who engage into multiple deals, offer cash or mix cash/equity
60
 and choose private 
firms
61
 enjoy on average higher abnormal returns than their counterparts. Both single and 
multiple deals by undervalued acquirers are more profitable than single or multiple 
overvalued acquirers (see Panel B).  Panel C shows that undervalued acquirers earn 
significantly more than overvalued acquirers irrespective of the method of payment.
 62
 
However, undervalued stock acquirers earn the most (2.80%) compared with undervalued 
acquirers who offer cash or a combination of cash and stock.  On the other hand, overvalued 
acquirers who offer cash or stock loose, -0.04% and -0.65% respectively.   Finally, Panel D 
shows that private acquisitions outperform public acquisitions by 2.50%. Undervalued 
acquirers earn 2.08%, whereas overvalued acquirers earn 0.73%, both statistically significant 
at 1%. Public acquisitions on the other hand, destroy value from -0.45% when the acquirer is 
undervalued to -1.78% when it’s overvalued.  
[Table 4.4] 
Overall, these findings indicate that acquirers enjoy significantly higher positive abnormal 
returns (or lower negative) within lower valuation periods. This pattern holds true 
irrespective to multiple deals, the method of payment and target status. Although firm 
valuation seems to amplify the patterns of the gains that have already established in the 
literature of mergers and acquisitions (i.e. undervalued cash acquirers gain more than 
overvalued cash acquirers), valuation alone is not enough in explaining acquirers’ returns but 
the combination of valuation with other acquisition characteristics can help us explaining 
these patterns. Draper and Paudyal (2006) explain that an acquisition announcement reduce 
the information asymmetry surrounding bidding firms. Investors re-optimize their views 
about the acquirer once learning the newly released information. The direction of this 
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 Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) also finds similar results for a smaller UK sample. 
60
 For studies that report positive abnormal returns in the event of cash and mixed/other payments see for 
example: Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1990), Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel (1990), Travlos (1987), Fuller 
et al (2002) and Conn et al (2005). 
61
 Studies that have reported positive abnormal returns in private and subsidiary acquisitions see for example: 
Da Silva Rosa et al (2004), Ang and Kohers (2001), Fuller et al (2002), Draper and Paudyal (2006), Faccio and 
Masulis (2005) and Conn et al. (2005). 
62
 For studies that posit that acquiring firms experience positive abnormal returns when the acquisitions is 
financed with cash rather than stock see for example: Asquith, Bruner and Mullins (1990), Eckbo, Giammarino 
and Heinkel (1990), Travlos (1987), Fuller et al. (2002) and Conn et al. (2005) 
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revaluation depends upon the investors’ views on the real potential of the acquiring firm and 
the positive or negative signal of the acquisitions announcement. For example a cash 
acquisition or a private acquisition is in generally perceived by investors as a positive signal. 
New information regarding the value of the acquiring firm, help investors to revalue the 
acquisition quality and in the event that the acquirer is viewed as undervalued drive up its 
share price.    
Having examined the effects of firm valuation on the returns of the acquisition for the 
acquiring firm, results from testing market valuation on acquirer’s gains are reported in Table 
4.5.  The overall sample shows that acquirers enjoy positive abnormal returns of 1.07% 
statistically significant at 1%, while the sample partitioned by high/low valuation periods 
yields significant gains for high-valuation acquirers (1.82%) suggesting that acquirers 
bidding within high market valuation periods enjoy significant positive returns comparing 
with the ones in low market valuation periods (HML 1.50%). The same pattern holds when 
we divide the sample by multiple deals, method of payment and target status. Differentials in 
mean abnormal return of high versus low market valuation period, show that acquirers who 
engage in  acquisitions during high valuation periods outperform those who engage in deals 
in low valuation periods, irrespective of the deal type, the payment method and the target 
status.  More specific, single and multiple deals in overvalued periods result in 1.82% and 
1.83% respectively, while their counterparts in undervalued periods result in 0.31% and 
0.25%. Acquirers who offer cash, stock or mix during overvalued periods enjoy 1.71%, 
2.24% and 1.77% respectively, while gains span from 0.09% and 0.90% in cash and mix 
acquisitions to -1.17% in stock acquisitions. The sub-analysis by target status shows that 
bidders buying public targets generate significant losses (-1.05%) whereas acquirers buying 
private targets have significant gains of about 1.46%. The gains from private acquisitions 
range from 0.94% when the market is undervalued to 2.13% when the market is overvalued, 
while the gains from public acquisitions are significantly negative (-2.84%) in undervalued 
periods, and positive at overvalued periods, while not statistical significant. Our empirical 
results are consistent with previous UK studies,
63
and comparable with US studies who 
suggest that stock market reacts more favourably on announcement made during overvalued 
periods than those announced during undervalued periods.
64
 During flourishing periods, 
investors’ optimism or sentiment can intensify the positive expectations from i.e. a private 
                                                          
63
 See for example Petmezas (2009) 
64
 Tebouri (2005) and Bouwman et al., (2009).  
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acquisition and thus drive up the stock market price around the announcement. Even in the 
event of stock acquisitions that one would expect negative abnormal returns around the 
announcement, in a high market valuation synergies are overestimated, and acquirers’ 
announcement returns increase to positive and statistical significant.  
[Table 4.5] 
Finally, in the last table of our univariate analysis, (Table 4.6) bidder’s announcement 
abnormal returns are reported by industry valuation as captured by the detrended P/E ratio.  If 
industry P/E ratio captures the valuation errors of the market by at an industry-specific level, 
then we expect that the returns of the acquiring firms will be similar to those of Table 4.5 and 
market valuation. We do in fact confirm this expectation, and find in general that acquisitions 
announced during high valuation periods result in significantly positive abnormal returns, 
irrespective of the multiple type, method of payment and target type. Stock and public 
acquisitions during low valuation period result in negative abnormal returns as during low 
market valuation periods in the previous table.   
[Table 4.6] 
4.3.5.2 Acquiring Firms Post Acquisition Returns 
So far we have examined the acquiring firms’ performance during a short-run window around 
the announcement. We show that acquisitions announced during high market or industry 
valuation periods are perceived more positively by optimism investors than the acquisitions 
announced during low valuation periods, and this has an effect on bidders’ gains which are 
positive and highly significant. We also find that undervalued acquirers enjoy higher 
abnormal returns than overvalued acquirers, in line with information asymmetry hypothesis. 
We now turn our attention towards the returns of the acquisitions in the post-acquisition 
period.  
Accordingly, market timing appears to have a significant impact on long-term stock 
performance. Research has shown that overvalued acquirers have low subsequent returns. 
Rau and Vermaelen (1998) examine the relationship between firm-level valuation and long-
run firm performance of acquiring shareholders under extrapolation hypothesis. However, 
empirical research lacks evidence exploring both firm valuation errors and market/industry 
ones within the same period. More specific we expect to see acquirers buying during high 
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valuation markets to enjoy higher announcement returns but lower long-run abnormal returns 
than those buying during low-valuation markets. Empirical findings based on univariate and 
cross-sectional short-run analysis confirms that valuation errors during acquisitions 
announcement significantly affect acquirers’ announcement abnormal returns. Using the 
calendar-time approach (CTPR) market adjusted returns and calendar-time regression 
intercept and alphas are used to measure the excess returns and empirically investigate 
acquirer’s long-run performance. The Fama and French (1996) three factor model is used for 
this purpose.  
[Table 4.7] 
[Table 4.8] 
Table 4.7 and 4.8 report the results for the entire sample, for multiple deals, different methods 
of payment and target status across all three valuation sources (i.e industry, market and firm) 
for 12-months and 36-months after the announcement, respectively. We find that acquisitions 
announced during high market and industry valuation periods result in higher announcement 
returns, and in lower negative post-acquisition returns. In addition, undervalued acquirers 
suffer smaller losses compared with overvalued acquirers. Clearly, the long-run analysis in 
this study’s framework suggests that valuation status around the merger announcement shape 
acquirer’s gains both in the short but also in the long run period. 
4.3.5.3 Multivariate Analysis 
The results from univariate analysis focus on the impact of different valuation sources on 
bidder’s announcement and post-acquisition returns and acquisition’s characteristics. As in 
this framework the effects of multiple factors cannot be observed, announcement period 5-
day returns are regressed against a set of explanatory variables that are likely to affect 
acquirers’ gains as shown below: 
,
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Where the intercept, measures the excess return to bidders after accounting for the effects 
of all explanatory variables, while the vector of explanatory variables, iX includes variables 
that are most likely to explain bidders’ cumulative abnormal returns, ,i tCAR . PRIVATE is an 
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indicator variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the target is a private firm. CASH is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition is financed with cash only, and 
STOCK is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisition is financed with stock 
only. LRATIO is the log value of the ratio of the deal’s value to the market value of the 
acquirer. LMV is the log value of the acquirer’s market value. CBA is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the target is a foreign firm. HOSTILE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal 
is hostile and 0 otherwise. MULTIPLE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal was 
announced by an acquirer who also announced at least 5 deals within 3 years.  
LOW_FIRM_VALUATION and HIGH_FIRM_VALUATION is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the deals was announced during a low firm valuation period, or a high firm 
valuation period, respectively as captured by the P/B ratio. LOW_MARKET_VALUATION, 
HIGH_MARKET_VALUATION, LOW_IND_VALUATION, and 
HIGH_IND_VALUATION variables are defined analogously using the detrended market 
and industry P/E ratio.   
[Table 4.9] 
Table 4.9 presents the results from the multivariate analysis.  We first run a regression 
analysis including the factors we have used in the univariate analysis and several other 
important determinants. Then we include firm valuation, market valuation and industry 
valuation and then all three valuation sources. Target type is an important factor in the 
acquisitions process. Empirical studies have shown the acquiring firms’ returns around the 
announcement vary by the target type ( Servaes, 1991 and Mulherin and Boone, 2000). 
Private targets are considered riskier than public targets due to the information asymmetry 
that exists between the two parts. In general is more difficult to value a private firm than a 
public firm and thus the acquirer might mis-valued the target, offer a higher premium that 
will decrease his returns. We find the coefficient on PRIVATE negative and significant (see 
regression 1, Table 4.9). We also include dummy variables, CASH and STOCK, to account 
for the method of payment. Method of payment is related to the market reaction and the 
success of mergers. Travlos (1987) argue that firm’s stock valuation impacts the reaction of 
the market and the success and returns of the merger. Usually acquirers offer stock if they 
believe that their stock is overvalued (Shleifer and Vishny; 2003). The market recognizes this 
and reacts negatively to stock acquisitions. Cash acquisitions are found to perform better than 
stock acquisitions in terms of short run abnormal returns (Asquith et al., 1990). Consistent 
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with the literature predictions, we find a negative sign for stock acquisitions and positive for 
cash acquisitions, although statistical insignificant. The size of the target relative to the 
acquirer can affect the market reaction to a deal announcement (Asquith et al., 1983). The 
bigger this ratio is, thus the larger the target firm the bigger the impact of the particular 
acquisition on the acquirer and the greater the market reaction. We therefore expect and find 
a positive statistical significant relationship between relative size and announcement returns. 
We confirm the direction of this variable. Market value and cross border variables remain 
insignificant through all of our regression. Finally, MULTIPLE is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the deal was announced by an acquirer who also announced at least 5 deals within 
3 years. This measure shows acquirers who make more frequent announcements and they are 
more likely to be overconfident (Doukas and Petmezas, 2007). Univariate analysis shows that 
multiple deals outperform single deals and we confirm this result in the multivariate 
framework. If we change the definition of multiple acquirers as those that make 3 (or 5) 
acquisitions within a 3-year period and single as those that make only 1 acquisition within a 
3-year period then our results for acquirers’ profitability are consisted with previous UK 
studies ( see for example Doukas and Petmezas; 2007).   
In regression 2, we introduce the firm valuation variable and find that overvalued acquirers 
enjoy significantly less abnormal returns than undervalued firms. In general, undervalued 
acquirers have been found to outperform overvalued acquirers (Rau and Vermaelen; 1998 
and Sudarsanam and Mahate; 2003). Sudarsanam and Mahate, (2003) explain that an 
overvalued acquirer is more likely to offer his stock than cash and as explained above, stock 
acquisitions have a negative market reaction whereas investors anticipate high growth of 
undervalued acquirers and react positively. In regression 3 and 4, we include market and 
industry valuation variables, and as expected we find that acquisitions announced during 
overvalued markets or overvalued industries increase abnormal returns. Our results are 
statistical significant.  
Our findingss find support on both information asymmetry hypothesis and investor sentiment. 
We argue that since investors value firms based on the availability of relevant information 
(information asymmetry), during booming markets optimism can intensify investors’ positive 
expectations (investor sentiment hypothesis) and drive up the stock market price around the 
announcement. Similarly, if an industry is perceived as overvalued, investors’ synergy-
estimation will be also more prominent and this will be reflected on acquirer’s stock return 
136 
 
around the announcement. Finally, in the last regression we include all three valuation 
sources and we find that the increase in acquiring firms’ abnormal returns around the 
announcement is driven by target status, relative size, and multiple deals. More importantly, 
we show that firm, market and industry valuations significantly affect the acquirers’ short-run 
gains.  
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4.4 Conclusion 
There is an extensive literature exploring the motives of takeovers and the returns of 
acquiring firms. Several theories have been motivated by findings suggesting that mergers 
destroy value for the acquiring firms’ shareholders. We explore acquiring firms’ returns by 
assessing firm, market and industry valuations around the announcement and after we control 
for several firm and deal characteristics that affect takeover process and performance. Our 
key finding is that factors like the target type, the method of payment or multiple deals work 
as signalling tools in the merger process and that firm, market and industry valuations around 
the announcement are associated with the acquiring firms’ performance, enhance investors 
beliefs about the potential value of the mergers and consequently drive the stock market.   
We provide direct empirical evidence from the UK takeover market that valuation status 
during the acquisition announcement is an important motive for firms to make acquisitions. 
Acquirer’s gains are positively related with high market/industry valuation periods and 
negatively with acquiring firm’s valuation.65 Our results remain robust after controlling for 
the multiple deals, method of payment, target status, relative size, acquirer’s size and cross 
border acquisitions. Our findings can be interpreted as consistent with the information 
asymmetry hypothesis and investor’s sentiment. Accordingly, investors evaluate acquiring 
firms and the potential synergies of the merger based on the available information. Market 
and industry information are more transparent and accessible and during high market/industry 
valuation periods, investors allocate more weight to industry or market misvaluation than the 
firm’s true value. In turn, investors’ beliefs about merger profitability become more (or less) 
biased in a booming market (or in a depressed market). This over- or under- estimation of the 
merger potential value is the driving factor of the acquiring firms’ announcement abnormal 
returns. Transaction and firm characteristics work as signalling tools for the investors. In the 
presence of information asymmetry the release of new information about the merger, such as 
the method of payment, entice investors to reappraise the target and bidder’s value and the 
potential of the merger. For example, cash payments are in general perceived positively by 
the investors and thus an announcement of a cash acquisition in a high market valuation 
period can drive acquirer’s stock price up. The correlation of high market/industry valuation 
and high takeover gains can be rationalizes with investor sentiment (Brown and Cliff, 2005), 
while our results for higher gains of undervalued acquirers are consistent with previous 
                                                          
65
 Our results are in line with previous UK studies such as Petmezas (2009) and Antoniou, Guo and Petmezas 
(2008)  
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studies like Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) and Rau and Vermaelen (1998). Investor 
sentiment, the information contents of the transaction, and the sources of mis-valuation, form 
the framework of our analysis and explain the acquiring firms’ merger performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
139 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
  
DEAL VALUE  (£MIL) SIZE (£MIL) RELATIVE SIZE 
YEAR N mean median mean median mean median 
1986 16 78.34 70.22 506.38 313.25 0.32 0.11 
1987 55 95.35 21.00 839.53 345.31 0.30 0.11 
1988 126 63.13 5.92 443.29 106.71 0.21 0.07 
1989 152 54.91 7.13 411.73 107.69 0.18 0.07 
1990 98 31.76 4.50 242.16 87.67 0.18 0.06 
1991 79 51.33 5.77 448.77 94.26 0.23 0.10 
1992 72 22.69 3.38 306.04 93.61 0.21 0.05 
1993 103 25.69 6.00 521.75 97.21 0.29 0.07 
1994 166 31.19 6.01 454.24 84.07 0.35 0.06 
1995 184 35.00 5.37 469.92 103.45 0.21 0.05 
1996 231 52.73 5.07 315.65 107.78 0.26 0.06 
1997 260 34.31 4.51 416.00 89.36 0.21 0.07 
1998 280 148.14 6.18 769.27 124.99 0.21 0.06 
1999 302 181.33 8.87 795.34 147.78 0.34 0.10 
2000 308 92.25 9.96 1431.21 181.80 0.22 0.07 
2001 215 25.65 8.15 1029.38 98.49 0.28 0.09 
2002 184 85.83 6.45 1326.36 91.10 0.43 0.08 
2003 130 54.74 5.75 1485.03 88.96 0.45 0.07 
2004 162 24.36 4.99 995.01 71.82 0.29 0.08 
2005 259 49.36 7.70 1210.27 81.60 0.95 0.10 
2006 240 53.81 7.36 1728.65 90.77 0.90 0.10 
TOTAL 3622 68.94 6.69 854.49 107.77 0.36 0.07 
 
This table presents the yearly mean and median values of deals for the sample of 3622 M&As 
announced by UK listed firms in the LSE, for the period of 1986 to 2006. Targets are private, public 
or subsidiary firms with a deal value above 1 million UK pounds, operating in either domestic or 
foreign markets. The deal value (£million) is the total value that the acquirer pays, excluding fees and 
expenses. Size is the acquirer’s market capitalization at the time of the merger announcement. 
Relative size is the ratio of the deal value over the market value of the acquiring firm one month prior 
to the announcement.  
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Table 4.2 Yearly Acquisitions Activity 
  
DEALS TARGET STATUS MODE OF PAYMENT MARKET INDUSTRY 
YEAR N MULTIPLE SINGLE PRIVATE PUBLIC CASH STOCK MIX DOM CBA INTRA INTER 
1986 16(0.44) 1(7) 15(93) 10(63) 6(38) 10(63) 5(31) 1(6) 11(69) 5(31) 8(50) 8(50) 
1987 55(1.52) 1(2) 54(98) 29(53) 26(47) 24(44) 19(35) 12(22) 39(71) 16(29) 20(36) 35(64) 
1988 126(3.48) 4(3) 122(97) 88(70) 38(30) 63(50) 16(13) 47(37) 80(63) 46(37) 51(40) 75(60) 
1989 152(4.20) 1(1) 151(99) 117(77) 35(23) 60(40) 27(18) 65(43) 102(67) 50(33) 56(37) 96(63) 
1990 98(2.71) 1(1) 97(99) 81(83) 17(17) 50(51) 12(12) 36(37) 59(60) 39(40) 36(37) 62(63) 
1991 79(2.18) 2(3) 77(97) 58(73) 21(27) 21(27) 24(30) 34(43) 61(77) 18(23) 31(39) 48(61) 
1992 72(1.99) 5(7) 67(93) 64(89) 8(11) 23(32) 18(25) 31(43) 48(67) 24(33) 25(35) 47(65) 
1993 103(2.84) 10(10) 93(90) 91(88) 12(12) 34(33) 22(21) 47(46) 68(66) 35(34) 41(40) 62(60) 
1994 166(4.58) 9(6) 157(94) 144(87) 22(13) 65(39) 25(15) 76(46) 120(72) 46(28) 72(43) 94(57) 
1995 184(5.08) 13(7) 171(93) 159(86) 25(14) 57(31) 26(14) 101(55) 128(70) 56(30) 69(38) 115(63) 
1996 231(6.38) 19(8) 212(92) 200(87) 31(13) 79(34) 30(13) 122(53) 153(66) 78(34) 101(44) 130(56) 
1997 260(7.18) 19(7) 241(93) 223(86) 37(14) 95(37) 30(12) 135(52) 173(67) 87(33) 117(45) 143(55) 
1998 280(7.73) 22(8) 258(92) 241(86) 39(14) 104(37) 37(13) 139(50) 185(66) 95(34) 137(49) 143(51) 
1999 302(8.34) 19(6) 283(94) 228(75) 74(25) 111(37) 43(14) 148(49) 200(66) 102(34) 158(52) 144(48) 
2000 308(8.50) 27(9) 281(91) 259(84) 49(16) 74(24) 53(17) 181(59) 204(66) 104(34) 168(55) 140(45) 
2001 215(5.94) 12(6) 203(94) 186(87) 29(13) 50(23) 37(17) 128(60) 137(64) 78(36) 120(56) 95(44) 
2002 184(5.08) 12(7) 172(93) 168(91) 16(9) 67(36) 23(13) 94(51) 137(74) 47(26) 94(51) 90(49) 
2003 130(3.59) 6(5) 124(95) 111(85) 19(15) 54(42) 23(18) 53(41) 90(69) 40(31) 80(62) 50(38) 
2004 162(4.47) 9(6) 153(94) 152(94) 10(6) 54(33) 12(7) 96(59) 120(74) 42(26) 85(52) 77(48) 
2005 259(7.15) 7(3) 252(97) 236(91) 23(9) 88(34) 27(10) 144(56) 179(69) 80(31) 141(54) 118(46) 
2006 240(6.63) 0 240(100) 219(90) 24(10) 73(30) 19(8) 148(62) 155(65) 85(35) 134(56) 106(44) 
TOTAL 3622 199(6) 3423(94) 3061(85) 561(15) 1256(35) 528(15) 1838(51) 2449(68) 1173(32) 1744(48) 1878(52) 
 
This table presents the yearly numbers of deals for the sample of 3622 M&As announced by UK listed firms in the LSE, for the period of 1986 to 2006. Next 
to each number, the yearly percentage is reported in the parenthesis. Multiple deals, are the deals announced by an acquirer who acquired five or more targets 
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within a 3-year period. Targets firms are either publicly traded or private. The method of payment is cash, stock or a combination of cash and equity. The 
target is either a UK firm (domestic) or foreign (CBA=cross border acquisition). Finally, each deal is classified as diversifying (inter-industry) when the 
acquirer takes over a target with a different two-digit SIC industry code or non-diversifying (intra-industry) is the target and the acquirer are operating in the 
same industry sector.  
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Table 4.3 Valuation Statistics by Multiple Deals, Method of Payment and Target Status 
Valuation Source 
 
FIRM  MARKET  INDUSTRY  
 
N mean median mean median mean median 
Panel A. Mean valuations of the overall sample 
ALL 3622 0.49*** -0.14*** -0.18*** -0.45*** 0.21 0.20 
Panel B. Mean valuations by multiple deals 
SINGLE 3423 0.48** -0.16** -0.18*** 0.45*** 0.18 0.20 
MULTIPLE 199 0.67** 0.12** -0.24 0.34 0.76 0.00 
Panel C. Mean valuations by method of payment 
CASH 1256 0.29 -0.13 -0.11* 0.46* 0.12 0.06 
STOCK 528 0.64*** -0.09*** -0.13 0.36 0.69 0.43 
MIX 1838 0.59** -0.16** -0.25*** 0.46*** 0.14 0.23 
Panel D. Mean valuations by target status 
PRIVATE 3061 0.55*** -0.15*** -0.20*** 0.46*** 0.15 0.20 
PUBLIC 561 0.19 -0.08 -0.11 0.39 0.57 0.14 
Panel E. Differences  in mean valuations  
       
SINGLE - MULTIPLE  -0.18 0.06 -0.58 
CASH - STOCK 
 
-0.35 0.01 -0.58 
PRIVATE - PUBLIC 
 
0.36 -0.09 -0.43*** 
 
This table reports the mean and median valuation values of the 3622 deals in our sample, at a firm, 
market and industry level. The price-to-book (P/B) method is used to estimate firm’s valuation, the 
market P/E ratio (i.e. FTSE ALL SHARE P/E ratio) to estimate the market valuation and the industry 
P/E ratio to estimate the industry valuation one month prior to the merger announcement. Panel A. 
reports the mean valuations for the entire sample, Panel B, C and D reports the mean valuations by 
multiple deals, the method of payment, and the target status respectively. Multiple deals are the deals 
announced by an acquirer who acquired five or more targets within a 3-year period. Targets firms are 
either publicly traded or private. The method of payment is cash, stock or a combination of cash and 
equity.  In panel E we report the mean difference in valuations by the deal multiple status, the method 
of payment and the target status. A t-test is used to examine whether the mean valuation is 
significantly different from zero.  
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Table 4.4 Acquirer’s Mean AR by Firm Valuation, Multiple Deals, Method of Payment and 
Target Status 
Valuation Source  
 
FIRM  
 
 
 ALL LOW NEUTRAL HIGH HML 
Panel A. Acquirer’s mean abnormal returns by firm valuation periods 
ALL 
mean 1.07%*** 1.70%*** 1.23%*** 0.28%* -1.42%*** 
N 3622 1207 1208 1207 - 
Panel B. Acquirer’s mean abnormal returns by multiple deals 
SINGLE mean 1.04%*** 1.64%*** 1.21*** 0.25% 1.39%*** 
 N 3423 1168 1141 1114 - 
MULTIPLE mean 1.51%*** 3.54%** 1.52%** 0.66% 2.89%*** 
 
N 199 39 67 93 - 
Panel C. Mean valuations by method of payment 
CASH 
mean 0.83%*** 1.58%*** 0.92%*** -0.04% -1.62%*** 
N 1256 406 453 397 - 
STOCK 
mean 0.59% 2.80%*** -0.29% -0.65% -3.46%*** 
N 528 174 148 206 - 
MIX 
mean 1.37%*** 1.47%*** 1.83%*** 0.81%*** -0.66%* 
N 1838 627 607 604 - 
Panel D. Mean valuations by target status 
PRIVATE 
mean 1.46%*** 2.08%*** 1.54%*** 0.73%*** -1.35%*** 
N 3061 1026 1043 992 - 
PUBLIC 
mean -1.05%*** -0.45% -0.75% -1.78%*** -1.34%* 
N 561 181 165 215 - 
Panel E. Differences  in acquirer’s mean abnormal returns 
ALL MULTIPLE – ALL SINGLE 0.40%** 
   
LOW MULTIPLE – HIGH SINGLE 3.33%***    
HIGH MULTIPLE – LOW SINGLE -0.98%    
ALL CASH – ALL STOCK 0.24%    
LOW CASH - LOW STOCK -1.20% 
   
HIGH CASH - HIGH STOCK -0.61% 
   
LOW CASH – HIGH STOCK 2.23%*** 
   
HIGH CASH – LOW STOCK -2.82%*** 
   
ALL PRIVATE - ALL PUBLIC 2.50%*** 
   
LOW PRIVATE - LOW PUBLIC 2.52%*** 
   
HIGH PRIVATE - HIGH PUBLIC 2.51%*** 
   
LOW PRIVATE – HIGH PUBLIC 3.86%*** 
   
HIGH PRIVATE – LOW PUBLIC 1.17%** 
   
 
This table reports the acquirer’s mean abnormal returns 5 days around the announcement [-2,+2] for 
the 3622 deals in our sample by the firm valuation periods (i.e. low, medium and high) and also by 
multiple deals, the method of payment, and the target status.  The price-to-book (P/B) ratio one month 
before the announcement is used to estimate firm’s valuation.  To classify a month as high- (low-) 
valuation period, the P/B ratio of that month should belong to the top third of all P/B above (below) 
the past five-year average. All remaining months are classified as neutral-valuation periods. Panel B, 
C and D reports the mean abnormal returns by multiple deals, the method of payment, and the target 
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status respectively. Multiple deals are the deals announced by an acquirer who acquired five or more 
targets within a 3-year period. Targets firms are either publicly traded or private. The method of 
payment is cash, stock or a combination of cash and equity. In panel E we report the mean difference 
in abnormal returns by the deal multiple status, the method of payment and the target status. A t-test is 
used to examine whether the mean abnormal return is significantly different from zero.  
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Table 4.5 Acquirer’s Mean AR by Market Valuation, Multiple Deals, Method of Payment 
and Target Status 
Valuation Source  
 
MARKET  
 
 
 ALL LOW NEUTRAL HIGH HML 
Panel A. Acquirer’s mean abnormal returns by firm valuation periods 
ALL 
mean 1.07%*** 0.31% 1.14%*** 1.82%*** 1.50%*** 
N 3622 1227 1276 1119 - 
Panel B. Acquirer’s mean abnormal returns by multiple deals 
SINGLE mean 1.04%*** 0.31% 1.07%*** 1.82%*** 1.50%*** 
 N 3423 1158 1210 1055 - 
MULTIPLE mean 1.51%*** 0.25% 2.53%*** 1.83%*** 1.60%* 
 
N 199 69 66 64 - 
Panel C. Mean valuations by method of payment 
CASH 
mean 0.83%*** 0.09% 0.72%** 1.71%*** 1.60%*** 
N 1256 413 437 406 - 
STOCK 
mean 0.59% -1.17% 0.85% 2.24%*** 3.40%*** 
N 528 188 167 173 - 
MIX 
mean 1.37%*** 0.90%*** 1.49%*** 1.77%*** 0.90%* 
N 1838 626 672 540 - 
Panel D. Mean valuations by target status 
PRIVATE 
mean 1.46%*** 0.94%*** 1.38%*** 2.13%*** 1.20%*** 
N 3061 1023 1117 921 - 
PUBLIC 
mean -1.05%*** -2.84%*** -0.51% 0.37% 3.20%*** 
N 561 204 159 198 - 
Panel E. Differences  in acquirer’s mean abnormal returns 
LOW MULTIPLE – HIGH SINGLE -1.60%    
HIGH MULTIPLE – LOW SINGLE 1.50%    
ALL CASH – ALL STOCK 0.24%    
LOW CASH - LOW STOCK 1.26%** 
   
HIGH CASH - HIGH STOCK -0.50% 
   
LOW CASH – HIGH STOCK -2.20%*** 
   
HIGH CASH – LOW STOCK 2.88%*** 
   
ALL PRIVATE - ALL PUBLIC 2.50%*** 
   
LOW PRIVATE - LOW PUBLIC 3.78%*** 
   
HIGH PRIVATE - HIGH PUBLIC 1.76%*** 
   
LOW PRIVATE – HIGH PUBLIC 0.56% 
   
HIGH PRIVATE – LOW PUBLIC 4.98%*** 
   
 
This table reports the acquirer’s mean abnormal returns 5 days around the announcement [-2,+2] for 
the 3622 deals in our sample by the market valuation periods (i.e. low, medium and high) and also by 
multiple deals, the method of payment, and the target status. The market P/E ratio (i.e. FTSE ALL 
SHARE P/E ratio) is used to estimate the market valuation one month prior to the merger 
announcement. Panel B, C and D reports the mean abnormal returns by multiple deals, the method of 
payment, and the target status respectively. Multiple deals are the deals announced by an acquirer who 
acquired five or more targets within a 3-year period. Targets firms are either publicly traded or 
private. The method of payment is cash, stock or a combination of cash and equity. In panel E we 
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report the mean difference in abnormal returns by the deal multiple status, the method of payment and 
the target status. A t-test is used to examine whether the mean abnormal return is significantly 
different from zero.  
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Table 4.6 Acquirer’s Mean AR by Industry Valuation, Multiple Deals, Method of Payment 
and Target Status 
Valuation Source  
 
MARKET  
 
 
 ALL LOW NEUTRAL HIGH HML 
Panel A. Acquirer’s mean abnormal returns by firm valuation periods 
ALL 
mean 1.07%*** 0.55%*** 0.95%*** 1.75%*** 1.20%*** 
N 3622 1256 1186 1180 - 
Panel B. Acquirer’s mean abnormal returns by multiple deals 
SINGLE mean 1.04%*** 0.51%** 0.95%*** 1.70*** 1.20%*** 
 N 3423 1185 1118 1120 - 
MULTIPLE mean 1.51%*** 1.17%** 0.90% 2.62%** 1.40% 
 
N 199 71 68 60 - 
Panel C. Mean valuations by method of payment 
CASH 
mean 0.83%*** 0.20% 0.91%*** 1.45%*** 1.20%*** 
N 1256 449 409 398 - 
STOCK 
mean 0.59% -0.32% 0.48% 1.53% 1.90% 
N 528 170 175 183 - 
MIX 
mean 1.37%*** 1.02%*** 1.11%*** 2.01%*** 1.00%** 
N 1838 637 602 599 - 
Panel D. Mean valuations by target status 
PRIVATE 
mean 1.45%*** 1.04%*** 1.39%*** 1.90%*** 0.90%** 
N 3061 1069 992 1000 - 
PUBLIC 
mean -1.05%*** -2.24%*** -1.36%*** 0.54% 2.80%*** 
N 561 187 194 180 - 
Panel E. Differences  in acquirer’s mean abnormal returns 
LOW MULTIPLE – HIGH SINGLE -0.50%    
HIGH MULTIPLE – LOW SINGLE 2.10%**    
ALL CASH – ALL STOCK 0.24%    
LOW CASH - LOW STOCK 0.53% 
   
HIGH CASH - HIGH STOCK -0.08% 
   
LOW CASH – HIGH STOCK 1.30%* 
   
HIGH CASH – LOW STOCK 1.77%** 
   
ALL PRIVATE - ALL PUBLIC 2.50%*** 
   
LOW PRIVATE - LOW PUBLIC 3.28%*** 
   
HIGH PRIVATE - HIGH PUBLIC 1.43%** 
   
LOW PRIVATE – HIGH PUBLIC 0.50% 
   
HIGH PRIVATE – LOW PUBLIC 4.21%*** 
   
 
This table reports the acquirer’s mean abnormal returns 5 days around the announcement [-2,+2] for 
the 3622 deals in our sample by the market valuation periods (i.e. low, medium and high) and also by 
multiple deals, the method of payment, and the target status. The the industry P/E ratio is used to 
estimate the market valuation one month prior to the merger announcement. Panel B, C and D reports 
the mean abnormal returns by multiple deals, the method of payment, and the target status 
respectively. Multiple deals are the deals announced by an acquirer who acquired five or more targets 
within a 3-year period. Targets firms are either publicly traded or private. The method of payment is 
cash, stock or a combination of cash and equity. In panel E we report the mean difference in abnormal 
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returns by the deal multiple status, the method of payment and the target status. A t-test is used to 
examine whether the mean abnormal return is significantly different from zero.  
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Table 4.7 Acquirers 12 Months Long-Term Performance  
VALUATION 
  
FIRM 
 
MARKET 
 
INDUSTRY 
 
  
ALL LOW NEUTRAL HIGH HML LOW NEUTRAL HIGH HML LOW NEUTRAL HIGH HML 
Panel A. ALL 
mean -0.12*** -0.08*** -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.08*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.06*** 0.08*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.12*** 0.00 
N 3622 1207 1208 1207 
 
1227 1276 119 - 1256 1186 1180 - 
Panel B. Multiple deals 
SINGLE mean -0.13*** -0.09*** -0.12*** -0.18*** -0.08*** -0.15*** -15*** -0.08*** 0.07*** -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.14*** 0.00 
 N 3423 1168 1141 1114 - 1158 1210 1055 - 1185 1118 1120 - 
MULTIPLE mean 0.09** 0.33** 0.02 0.03 -0.30*** -0.03 0.09* 0.22** 0.25** 0.20*** -0.04 0.10 -0.10 
 N 199 39 67 93 - 69 66 64 - 71 68 60 - 
Panel C. Method of Payment 
CASH 
mean -0.09*** -0.04* -0.10*** -0.14*** -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.06** 0.05* -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.04 
N 1256 406 453 397 - 413 437 406  449 409 409  
STOCK 
mean -0.019*** -0.12** -0.20*** -0.23*** -0.12** -0.20*** -0.27*** -0.09* 0.11* -0.23*** -0.08* -0.08* 0.15 
N 528 174 148 206 - 188 167 173  170 175 175  
MIX 
mean -0.11*** -0.09*** -0.10*** -0.15*** -0.05* -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.05** 0.09*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.01 
N 1838 627 607 604 - 626 672 540  637 602 602  
Panel D. Target Status 
PRIVATE 
mean -0.11*** -0.08*** -0.11*** -0.16*** -0.08*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.05** 0.10*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 0/00 
N 3061 1026 1043 992  1023 1117 921  1069 992 1000  
PUBLIC 
mean -0.14*** -0.10*** -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.06 -0.15*** -0.13*** -0.13*** 0.02 -0.15*** -0.10*** -0.16*** -0.01 
N 561 181 165 215  204 159 198  187 194 180  
Excess returns are estimated using calendar time regressions for each portfolio for 1 year post-event holding periods. This table presents all acquisitions for 
12-months after the deal announcement according to the source of valuation (i.e firm, market and industry). We then present long-run returns based on 
multiple deals (Panel B), the method of payment (i.e. cash, stock, mix) in Panel C, and target status (i.e. private and public) in Panel D. Each portfolio is 
rebalanced each month to include firms that just announced a deal. The monthly abnormal returns are measured by intercepts as shown below: 
   , , , ,p t f t p p m t f t p t p t tR R a R R s SMB h HML         
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where ,p t
R
is the calendar time portfolio return, ,f t
R
is the return on one month T-bill during month t; SMB stands for small minus big and is the excess return 
of a portfolio of small firms over a portfolio of large firms and finally HML stands for high minus low and is the excess return of a portfolio of value firms 
over glamour firms. SMB and HML are estimated following Fama and French (1996) methodology.  
pa measures the monthly average risk adjusted excess returns after controlling for the three risk factors. The dependent variable 
 , ,p t f tR R is the monthly 
excess return of the calendar-time portfolio of bidders over the risk free rate; 
 , ,m t f tR R is the excess return of the market portfoli; A t-test is used to 
examine whether the monthly abnormal returns are significantly different from zero. 
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Table 4.8 Acquirers 36 Months Long-Term Performance  
VALUATION 
  
FIRM 
 
MARKET 
 
INDUSTRY 
 
  
ALL LOW NEUTRAL HIGH HML LOW NEUTRAL HIGH HML LOW NEUTRAL HIGH HML 
Panel A. ALL 
mean -0.41*** -0.31*** -0.43*** -0.47*** -0.16*** -0.45*** -0.47*** -0.29*** 0.16*** -0.49*** -0.39*** -0.33*** 0.17*** 
N 3622 1207 1208 1207 - 1227 1276 1119 - 1256 1186 1180 - 
Panel B. Multiple deals 
SINGLE mean -0.42*** -0.34*** -0.43*** -0.50*** 0.18*** -0.46*** -0.48*** -0.30*** 0.16*** -0.52*** -0.39*** -0.34*** 0.18*** 
 N 3423 1168 1141 1114 - 1158 1210 1055 - 1185 1118 1120 - 
MULTIPLE mean -0.17** 0.07 -0.40*** -0.10 -0.17 -0.20* -0.24** -0.06 0.14 -0.12 -0.31*** -0.07 0.05 
 N 199 39 67 93 - 69 66 64 - 71 68 60 - 
Panel C. Method of Payment 
CASH 
mean -0.31*** -022*** -0.32*** -0.41*** -0.19*** -0.39*** -0.37*** -0.18*** 0.21*** -041*** -0.35*** -0.17*** 0.25*** 
N 1256 406 452 397 - 413 437 406  449 409 398  
STOCK 
mean -0.53*** -0.41*** -0.55*** -0.62*** 0.20** -0.54*** -0.67*** -0.39*** 0.14* -0.59*** -0.49*** -0.53*** 0.06 
N 528 174 148 206 - 188 167 173  170 175 183  
MIX 
mean -0.43*** -0.35*** -0.48*** -0.47*** -0.11*** -0.46*** -0.48*** -0.33*** 0.13*** -0.53*** -0.39*** -0.37*** 0.16*** 
N 1838 627 607 604 - 626 672 540  637 602 599  
Panel D. Target Status 
PRIVATE 
mean -0.41*** -0.33*** -0.43*** -0.48*** -0.15*** -0.45*** -0.48*** -0.30*** 0.15*** -0.51*** -0.39*** -0.33*** 0.18*** 
N 3062 1026 1043 992  1023 1117 921  1069 992 1000  
PUBLIC 
mean -0.37*** -0.23*** -0.43*** -0.44*** -0.21*** -0.46*** -0.42*** -0.24*** 0.22*** -0.42*** -0.37*** -0.31*** 0.11* 
N 561 181 165 215  204 159 198  187 194 180  
Excess returns are estimated using calendar time regressions for each portfolio for 3 years post-event holding periods. This table presents all acquisitions for 
36-months after the deal announcement according to the source of valuation (i.e firm, market and industry). We then present long-run returns based on 
multiple deals (Panel B), the method of payment (i.e. cash, stock, mix) in Panel C, and target status (i.e. private and public) in Panel D. Each portfolio is 
rebalanced each month to include firms that just announced a deal. The monthly abnormal returns are measured by intercepts as shown below: 
   , , , ,p t f t p p m t f t p t p t tR R a R R s SMB h HML         
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where ,p t
R
is the calendar time portfolio return, ,f t
R
is the return on one month T-bill during month t; SMB stands for small minus big and is the excess return 
of a portfolio of small firms over a portfolio of large firms and finally HML stands for high minus low and is the excess return of a portfolio of value firms 
over glamour firms. SMB and HML are estimated following Fama and French (1996) methodology.  
pa measures the monthly average risk adjusted excess returns after controlling for the three risk factors. The dependent variable 
 , ,p t f tR R is the monthly 
excess return of the calendar-time portfolio of bidders over the risk free rate; 
 , ,m t f tR R is the excess return of the market portfoli; A t-test is used to 
examine whether the monthly abnormal returns are significantly different from zero. 
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Table 4.9 Cross-Sectional Analysis - Determinants of Acquirers Announcement AR 
 
 Dependent variable = five-day CAR 
Explanatory Variables Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Intercept  0.033*** 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.032*** 
PRIVATE  -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
CASH  0.003 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 
STOCK  -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
LRATIO  0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 
LMV  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
CBA  -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 
HOSTILE  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 
MULTIPLE  0.009 0.010* 0.009 0.009 0.010* 
LOW_FIRM_VALUATION   0.002   0.001 
HIGH_FIRM_VALUATION   -0.007*   -0.006** 
LOW_MARKET_VALUATION    -0.006**  -0.004 
HIGH_MARKET_VALUATION    0.009***  0.008** 
LOW_IND_VALUATION     -0.004 0.000 
HIGH_IND_VALUATION     0.008** 0.005 
Obs = 3622
       
Adjusted-R
2  2.43% 2.61% 2.99% 2.78% 2.85% 
Estimates of cross-sectional determinants of announcement period gains of acquirers are reported in 
this table. Announcement period 5-day excess returns of bidders are regressed against a set of 
explanatory variables. PRIVATE is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if and only if the target 
is a private firm. CASH is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if  the acquisition is financed 
with cash only, and STOCK is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the acquisitions is 
financed with stock only. LRATIO is the log value of the ratio of the deal’s value to the market value 
of the acquirer. LMV is the log value of the acquirer’s market value. CBA is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if the target is a foreign firm. HOSTILE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal is 
hostile and zero otherwise. MULTIPLE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal was announced 
by an acquirer who also announced at least 5 deals within 3 years.  LOW_FIRM_VALUATION and 
HIGH_FIRM_VALUATION is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the deals was announced during a 
low firm valuation period, or a high firm valuation period, respectively as captured by the P/B ratio. 
LOW_MARKET_VALUATIO, HIGH_MARKET_VALUATION, LOW_IND_VALUATION, and 
HIGH_IND_VALUATION variables are defined analogously using the market P/E ratio and the 
industry P/E ratio. The intercept measures the excess return to bidders after accounting of the effects 
of all explanatory variables. The following equation is estimated using OLS regression: 
,
1
N
i t i i
i
CAR X 

  
 
Adjusted -R
2
 is reported for each model. Significant level of 1%, 5% and 10% are indicated with *, 
**, and *** respectively. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
5.1 Concluding remarks 
This thesis examines three very important aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions to shed more 
light on acquiring firms’ returns; the motives, the bankruptcy risk and the valuation errors. 
The motive behind a corporate project defines the process and the outcome of the project. 
Thus acquisitions which do not improve the financial performance of the firm might take 
place for other reasons than to improve shareholders’ wealth. We use the relationships 
between bidder, target and total gains to distinguish among three of the most prominent 
merger motives and also investigate whether market conditions (such as waves and 
misvaluation) will alter these motives. In addition, diversification has been known as a risk 
management tool due to the operational hedging that can be accomplished via a diversified 
merger. Recent empirical evidence show that mergers increase risk. This study explores 
acquiring firm’s risk variation in different diversification strategies. Finally, valuation errors 
stemming from the firm, the market or the industry have been found to affect the acquirers’ 
returns. We investigate the effect of these three sources of misvaluation on acquiring firms’ 
abnormal returns after we control for various factors which affect takeover process and 
outcome, such as multiple deals, the method of payment, the target status, the relative size 
and cross border acquisitions.   
The first empirical part of this thesis, Chapter 2, considers the relation between wealth gains 
of the target, the acquirer and the total gains to distinguish between synergistic mergers, 
mergers which are driven by managerialism and those driven by hubris in the US market. Our 
sample period spans from 1980 to 2010. We also recognize the importance role of merger 
waves and market valuations during the announcement of a merger and explore whether 
merger motives differ during these periods. We extent Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) to 
control for other variables that might affect takeover process. We identify common dominant 
variables that affect the correlation analysis across our three main sub-samples, entire sample, 
tender and non-tender acquisitions and also show that univariate findings become stronger or 
improve their significant power in the multivariate analysis.  More specific, we find that both 
tender and non-tender offers are driven by synergy, value-increasing acquisitions are driven 
by both synergy and hubris, whereas value-decreasing by managerialism. Therefore the 
nature of the deal (hostile or non-hostile) does not affect the primary motives of the 
acquisition. The motive patterns remain robust across high and low valuation periods and 
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most wave periods and after filtering the impact of several characteristics affecting takeover 
process. Finally, for robustness purposes we capture managerial motives using other proxies 
(i.e. total gains for synergy, Ney buyer measure for hubris and G-index for managerialism) 
and our results remain.  
In the next empirical chapter, Chapter 3, we investigate which diversification types affect 
acquiring firms’ default risk after the merger announcement. We compare default risk prior to 
the announcement and six months after the merger completion in vertical, horizontal, mixed 
vertical/horizontal and conglomerate acquisitions. The question to diversify will always be a 
calculated risk; however the profitability of the merger and realizing the diversification 
benefits in terms of risk are greatly depended upon the manager of the acquiring firm and 
how capable is to complete the deal. Persuading an unrelated merger might be riskier than a 
related one, due to the uncertainty of entering a new market/industry and the information 
asymmetry in terms of integrating with a firm in an unfamiliar market/industry. The acquirer 
is more likely to overlook critical factors and overpay the target firm and experience 
monitoring problems once the merger is completed.  
Information asymmetry concept dates back to Akerlof, (1970); the model assumes that due to 
information asymmetry the buyer cannot tell the bad-quality products. We therefore argue 
that the acquirer has more difficulties to communicate and to verify the benefits of an 
unrelated acquisition and it creates a risk of adverse selection. On the other hand when the 
acquirer makes a related acquisition, he is familiar with the nature of the business, the 
industry and the production process of the target and therefore the choice of a firm that will 
be both profitable and decrease default risk, is easier. Since horizontal diversification is the 
merger of two firms that belong in the same industry and in the same stage of production, 
then information asymmetry between the acquirer and the target minimizes which in turn 
should reduce default risk for the acquiring firm to the minimum.      
The last empirical part, Chapter 4, concentrates on the UK market and provides new 
supporting evidence on the misvaluation theory of mergers. We study how firm, market, or 
industry valuation errors affect the acquiring firms’ returns after controlling for multiple 
deals, the method of payment, the target’s firm status, the relative size, the acquirer’s size and 
for cross-border acquisitions. We find that, during high market/industry valuation periods 
mergers increase returns for the acquiring firms and although returns are reversed in the long-
run, these mergers are less value destroying compared with mergers during low 
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market/industry valuation periods. We also show that undervalued firms, high relative size 
deals, multiple and cash acquisitions are more profitable in both short and long run period. 
Consistent with previous studies, our results suggest that information asymmetry and 
investors’ sentiment may play an important role in explaining the acquiring firms’ returns 
patterns. Antoniou, Guo and Petmezas (2008) show that the performance of UK acquirers 
during high market valuation periods is driven by investors’ sentiment. We argue that since 
investors value firms based on the availability of relevant information (information 
asymmetry), during booming markets optimism can intensify investors’ positive expectations 
(investor sentiment hypothesis). A merger announcement releases information to the market 
and helps investors to adjust their views on the firms’ value. Deal and firm characteristics of 
the merger also work as a signaling tool in the market (Myers and Majluf, 1984). For 
example an acquirer offering his stock as the method of payment, is usually perceived as a 
signal that the acquirer is overvalued or a cash acquisitions is viewed positively by investors 
(Schlingemann, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2007). At the same time, investors’ 
expectations can be elevated during periods of extreme market/industry valuations and drive 
up or down the stock market price around the announcement.  
5.2 Implications of the study 
The empirical results on the motives, default risk and valuation error in Corporate Takeovers 
and the suggested mechanisms under which these factors work, significantly improve the 
knowledge on Mergers and Acquisitions not only for researchers but also for corporations 
and investors. This thesis underlies the significance role of market conditions on the takeover 
motives. Specifically, in Chapter 2 we show that merger motives are driven by the state of the 
market (i.e. booming or depressing) and the merger waves, whilst the nature of the deal (i.e. 
tender, non-tender) does not affect the primary motives. In addition, new empirical evidence 
on mergers and default risk from Chapter 3 offer valuable insight on the risk reduction 
benefit of diversified mergers. Finally, in the last empirical study, Chapter 4, we provide 
direct empirical evidence from the UK takeover market that valuation status during the 
acquisition announcement is an important motive for firms to make acquisitions. Acquirer’s 
gains are positively related with high market/industry valuation periods and negatively with 
acquiring firm’s valuation. Our results remain robust after controlling for the multiple deals, 
method of payment, target status, relative size, acquirer’s size and cross border acquisitions.   
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5.3 Limitations of the study and Recommendations for future research 
In a financial market every single factor is significant and all elements are inter-connected 
and work together to form the market. However, in every empirical study there is always a 
dependent variable and a set of explanatory set of variables. For example, takeover motives is 
the dependent variable in the first chapter, default risk in the second chapter and acquiring 
firms’ returns around the announcement in the last chapter. In each chapter several 
independent variables have been considered based on how significant is their impact on 
depend variable. It is possible in every study that you have omitted factors that are relevant to 
the explanation of the variation of the depend variable. Therefore, there is always room for 
improvement in future research that will allow the use of other control variables and the 
interaction between these variables.   
A natural extension of this thesis will be to study default risk changes in takeovers in specific 
industries or other markets and make a comparison to US market. In addition, it would be 
interesting to see how the target firm’s default risk or the origin of the target (domestic or 
foreign), firm and deal characteristics (such as the method of payment) and also the unique 
features of each region would affect the outcome of the takeovers.  
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